23:0376(54)CA - Air Force HQ, Air Force Logistics Command, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH and AFGE Council 214 -- 1986 FLRAdec CA
[ v23 p376 ]
23:0376(54)CA
The decision of the Authority follows:
23 FLRA No. 54
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS, AIR FORCE LOGISTICS
COMMAND, WRIGHT-PATTERSON AIR FORCE
BASE, OHIO
Respondent
and
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES, COUNCIL 214, AFL-CIO
Charging Party
Case No. 5-CA-50046
DECISION AND ORDER
I. Statement of the Case
In this unfair labor practice case, the Administrative Law Judge
dismissed the General Counsel's complaint alleging that the Respondent
committed an unfair labor practice under section 7116(a)(1) and (8) of
the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (the Statute).
The General Counsel asserted that the Respondent violated section
7115(a) of the Statute in recouping overpayments of union dues
previously remitted by the Respondent to the Charging Party (the Union)
by deducting such overpayments from subsequent remittances. The Judge
found that the Respondent properly recouped the overpayment of dues, on
behalf of former unit employees who had been promoted to supervisory
positions, by using the set-off method.
The case is now before the Authority on the General Counsel's
exceptions to the Judge's Decision. Both the General Counsel and the
Respondent have filed briefs in support of their opposing positions.
II. Background
In 1978 and again in 1982, the Respondent in this case entered into
master labor agreements with the Union. Both agreements provided that
"(a)dministrative errors in remittance checks (to the Union) and/or
improper deductions will be corrected by the (Respondent) and adjusted
in the next remittance check to be issued to the Union local." An
official of the Respondent charged with effecting these adjustments at
the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio testified that, in practice,
payroll transactions and adjustments are processed by computer upon
receipt of a Standard Form 50 for each change in employment status, and
that such adjustments were made during a subsequent pay period. He
testified further that underpayments and overpayments of dues were
corrected as a matter of course by adding to or subtracting from the
amount remitted to the Union during any given pay period, and that he
undertook this method of adjustment, in reliance on the master labor
agreements' provision quoted above, since at least as early as August of
1981.
For pay periods ending on June 23, 1984, September 15, 1984,
September 22, 1984 and September 29, 1984, the Respondent deducted from
the amount allotted and remitted to the Union a total of $220.50,
representing dues allotments withheld erroneously in the past from the
salaries of unit employees who had once authorized such allotments but
later became ineligible to do so when they were promoted to supervisory
positions. The Respondent then reimbursed the supervisors for the
amount of dues erroneously withheld from their salaries. This
proceeding before the Authority ensued.
III. Decision of the Administrative Law Judge
In finding the Respondent's dues recoupment procedure to be lawful,
the Judge discounted the General Counsel's contention that it violated
section 7115(a) of the Statute under the Authority's supplemental
decisions in Department of the Air Force, Griffiss Air Force Base, Rome,
New York (Griffiss), 15 FLRA 1032 (1984), and Department of the Air
Force, 3480th Air Base Group, Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas
(Goodfellow), 14 FLRA 795 (1984). The Judge noted that those decisions
were rendered on reversal and remand from the U.S. Courts of Appeals for
the Second and Fifth Circuits, /1/ and that the Authority's language in
the supplemental decisions indicated that it simply "accepted" the
Court's decision in each case as "the law of the case." 14 FLRA at 796;
15 FLRA at 1033. The Judge found that the Authority had not altered its
own original interpretation of the Statute in issuing the two decisions
on remand because they contained no implication that the Authority was
doing so. He therefore concluded that the Respondent's method of
recouping erroneously allotted union dues did not violate the Statute
under existing Authority precedent.
IV. Positions of the Parties
The General Counsel contends in its brief that the Judge should have
found that the Authority's supplemental decisions on remand in Griffiss
and Goodfellow did indeed alter the Authority's position on the
lawfulness of the agencies' method of dues recoupment under section
7115(a) of the Statute. The General Counsel argues that the Authority
made it clear in the Griffiss and Goodfellow supplemental decisions that
an agency may not recoup erroneously withheld union dues of former unit
members by deducting overpayments from union dues allotments for current
unit members, and then reimbursing the former unit members whose dues
had been incorrectly withheld.
The General Counsel maintains further that, as the Courts held in
Griffiss and Goodfellow, section 7115(a) of the Statute imposes an
affirmative duty on an agency to honor the assignments of current unit
members by remitting regular and periodic dues deducted from their
accrued salaries to their exclusive representative, so that an agency's
application of a portion of the pay of current unit members to
extinguish a debt to former unit members abrogates the agency's
statutory duty to its current member employees. This statutory duty,
the General Counsel urges further, cannot be waived by an exclusive
representative in a collective bargaining agreement and, even if it
could, parole evidence in this case shows that the provision of the
master labor agreement regarding the correction of "administrative
errors" was intended to apply to "arthmetical errors" only.
The Respondent contests these arguments in its reply brief. The
Respondent contends that it cannot be found to have committed an unfair
labor practice by acting, as it did, in accord with a reasonable
interpretation of the master labor agreement: "Improper deductions"
fall within the agreement's provision with respect to "administrative
errors." It also argues that an exclusive representative is indeed
empowered to negotiate restrictions on a statutory right of its members.
The Respondent argues in addition that the Authority has correctly not
modified its position on the propriety of the Respondent's method of
recoupment despite its compliance with the remand orders in Griffiss and
Goodfellow.
V. Analysis
In challenging the Judge's Decision in this case, the General Counsel
acknowledges that the Authority's supplemental decisions in Griffiss and
Goodfellow "may be interpreted as being limited to those cases" in the
Second and Fifth Circuits. It argues that the Authority did not
"intend" such a result, however, because it would lead to the anomalous
situation of different decisions on the same issue in different federal
circuits. We find no merit to this argument.
Under section 7123(a) of the Statute, the Authority's decisions and
orders are reviewable by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, or another of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals
depending on the parties' geographic location. Since one circuit court
of appeals is not bound by another's decision, judicial review of the
Authority's decisions may result in inconsistent rules of law on the
same or similar issues among the various circuits. Such inconsistency
among the circuit courts may be resolved only by the U.S. Supreme Court.
The Judge correctly found that our supplemental decisions in Griffiss
and Goodfellow, in which we accepted the decisions of the circuit courts
in those cases as the "law of the case," were not intended to convey
that the Authority had changed its opinion on the matter. Under the
"law of the case" doctrine, an issue of law as decided in a reviewing
court becomes binding precedent to be followed in successive stages of
litigation involving the same case. The Authority was therefore bound
to accept the circuit courts' decisions in Griffiss and Goodfellow. We
have consistently held that an agency's recoupment of dues erroneously
remitted to the exclusive representative of a bargaining unit on behalf
of a former unit member, by deducting the previous overpayment from the
subsequent remittance of dues for current members, is not inconsistent
with the requirements of section 7115(a) and does not violate section
7116(a)(1) or (8) of the Statute. /2/ For the following reasons we
continue to follow this precedent and respectfully disagree with the
Second and Fifth Circuits.
Section 7115(a) of the Statute enables a bargaining unit member to
have his employing agency deduct periodic union membership dues from his
regular pay and forward it to the exclusive representative of the
bargaining unit directly. Section 7115(b) also provides that such an
allotment "shall terminate when . . . the agreement between the agency
and the exclusive representative involved ceases to be applicable to the
employee . . ." Section 7112(b) provides that a bargaining unit may not
be deemed "appropriate" if it includes a supervisor, and, by way of
defining "collective bargaining" and "employee," section 7103 of the
Statute provides that a supervisor may not be a member of a bargaining
unit.
Consistent with these provisions, at the time a bargaining unit
member is promoted to a supervisory position, he may no longer be
included in the unit and, therefore, his statutory right to dues
allotment ceases immediately by operation of law. Consequently, an
agency's recoupment of dues erroneously paid to an exclusive
representative on behalf of an employee after his appointment to a
supervisory position constitutes the correction of an administrative
error in compliance with the terms of the Statute. The setoff of such
overpayments against current allotments and remittances to the union
constitutes a lawful and efficient means of recoupment. The Authority
adheres to the position that such a method of recoupment does not
violate either section 7115(a) or section 7116(a)(1) and (8) of the
Statute.
In the Goodfellow case, the Fifth Circuit held as follows:
Section 7115(a) . . . imposes an affirmative duty on a federal
agency to honor the current assignments of unit employees by
remitting regular and periodic dues deducted from their accrued
salaries to their exclusive representative. Until the funds thus
deducted are delivered to the union, they remain the property of
the particular members from whose earned wages they are taken. By
applying a portion of the pay of unit employees to extinguish the
debt owed another, (the agency) abrogated its statutory duty to
the former.
Goodfellow, supra, 715 F.2d at 228. The Authority respectfully
disagrees.
Once an agency deducts membership dues from the salary of a unit
employee for remittance to the exclusive representative, that money
becomes part of a fund designated for forwarding to the union in due
course. The employee does not have immediate access to his portion of
the fund before it is forwarded to the union. He is also precluded by
the terms of section 7115(a) from revoking a dues allotment other than
at intervals of one year, unless (1) the bargaining agreement between
the agency and the exclusive representative ceases to apply to the
employee, as discussed above; or (2) when the employee is suspended or
expelled from membership in the exclusive representative, which is
inapplicable here. See U.S. Army, U.S. Army Materiel Development and
Readiness Command, Warren, Michigan, 7 FLRA 194, 199 (1981). There is
no adverse impact on an employee's statutory right to a dues allotment
which might result from an agency's use of the setoff method of
recouping dues overpayments in this case, and the Fifth Circuit
mentioned none in Goodfellow, other than the unspecific "impinge(ment)
upon employee protections secured by Section 7115(a) . . ." /3/
In the Griffiss case, the Second Circuit considered the legislative
history of section 7115(a) of the Statute, and noted Congress' rejection
of proposals for mandatory payment of union dues on behalf of all unit
employees as well as proposals leaving the issue of dues check-off to
negotiation. American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO,
Local 2612 v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 739 F.2d 87 (2d Cir.
1984). The Court found that Congress' final enacted provision,
specifying that no dues could be deducted from an employee's paycheck
unless he authorized the deduction in writing, was intended "to allow
the employee alone to control the manner of dues payment." Id. at 89.
The Court found taht, in view of this legislative intent, "an agency's
obligation to honor dues check-off authorizations is mandatory and
nondiscretionary." Id. The Court therefore concluded that current unit
members who assigned portions of their wages for the payment of union
dues had the right to expect their assigned wages to be used for that
purpose. The Court concluded further that the agency's method of
recouping its overpayment of dues on behalf of former unit members by
setoff against dues allotments for present unit members violates the
current unit members' right to allotment under section 7115(a), and thus
constitutes an unfair labor practice under section 7116(a)(1) and (8).
In the Authority's view Congress did not intend this interpretation of
section 7115(a).
When an agency allots and remits more membership dues to the
exclusive representative of a bargaining unit than it should have -- in
this case by remitting dues withheld from former unit employees who had
become supervisors and were therefore no longer eligible for inclusing
in the unit or entitled to authorize dues withholding -- the union
receives more dues under section 7115(a)'s dues deduction provisions
than it would have if the overpayment had not occurred. When the agency
corrects the overpayment by setoff against presently allotted dues
before remittance to the exclusive representative, the right of current
unit members to have their dues remitted to the Union is not violated.
Rather, the portion of the dues of current unit members which was not
remitted to the union was, in effect, "pre-paid" by the agency through
previous overpayments. An agency need not maintain the dues allotments
of current member employees intact until they are remitted to the union
under section 7115(a) of the Statute, as long as the agency remits
sufficient payments to the union to avoid dues arrearage on the part of
employees properly covered by section 7115(a). /4/
The Judge did not pass on the General Counsel's two additional
contentions: (1) that the provisions of the master labor agreement
quoted above did not permit the Respondent to recoup overpayments of
union dues; and (2) that the Respondent and the Union could not waive
the statutory right of employees to have dues withheld if they so
authorize their employer in writing. In view of our interpretation of
section 7115(a) of the Statute, it is unnecessary to consider these two
additional contentions.
VI. Conclusions
Having considered all of the facts and circumstances of this case, as
well as the positions of the parties, the Authority concludes that the
Respondent did not violate section 7115(a) of the Statute and therefore
did not commit an unfair labor practice under section 7116(a)(1) or (8),
as charged by the General Counsel. Accordingly, we shall dismiss the
General Counsel's complaint against the Respondent.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that the complaint in Case No. 5-CA-50046 be, and it
hereby is, dismissed in its entirety.
Issued, Washington, D.C., September 23, 1986.
/s/ Jerry L. Calhoun, Chairman
/s/ Henry B. Frazier III, Member
/s/ Jean McKee, Member
FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY
-------------------- ALJ$ DECISION FOLLOWS --------------------
Case No.: 5-CA-50046
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS, AIR FORCE LOGISTICS
COMMAND, WRIGHT-PATTERSON AIR FORCE
BASE, OHIO
Respondent
and
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES, COUNCIL 214, AFL-CIO
Charging Party
Lieutenant Colonel Glenn H. Schlabs and
Major W. Kirk Underwood
For Respondent
Paul Palacio
For the Charging Party
Judity A. Ramey, Esq.
For the General Counsel
Before: SALVATORE J. ARRIGO
Administrative Law Judge
DECISION
This case arose under the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations
Statute, Chapter 71 of Title 5 of the U.S. Code, 5 U.S.C. Section 7101,
et seq.
Upon an unfair labor practice charge filed by the American Federation
of Government Employees, Council 214, AFL-CIO, against the Department of
the Air Force, Headquarters, Air Force Logistics Command,
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio (herein referred to as
Respondent), the General Counsel of the Authority, by the Regional
Director for Region V, issued a Complaint and Notice of Hearing alleging
Respondent violated the Statute when it recouped erroneous union dues
checkoff allotments previously transmitted to the Union by reducing
subsequent dues remittances.
A hearing on the Complaint was conducted in Dayton, Ohio at which all
parties were represented and afforded full opportunity to adduce
evidence, call, examine and cross-examine witnesses and argue orally.
Briefs were filed by Respondent and the General Counsel, and have been
carefully considered.
Upon the entire record in this matter, my observation of the
witnesses and their demeanor and from my evaluation of the evidence, I
make the following:
Findings of Fact
On January 13, 1978 the American Federation of Government Employees,
AFL-CIO, was certified as the exclusive representative of a consolidated
unit of all non-supervisory non-professional employees, with certain
exclusions, paid from appropriated funds and serviced by the Air Force
Logistics Command (AFLC) Civilian Personnel Offices at various AFLC
facilities including Kelly Air Force Base, San Antonio, Texas. At all
times material herein the American Federation of Government Employees,
Council 214, AFL-CIO (the Union) has been an agent of the American
Federation of Government Employees with respect to the employees of
Respondent, including the employees at Kelly Air Force Base, and
Respondent and the Union have been parties to a Master Labor Agreement
(MLA) covering the employees described above. The MLA contains a dues
withholding provision (Article 8) that includes the following language
under the caption "Administrative Errors" in Section 8.08:
"Deductions will not be made for an employee who has been in a
nonpay status for a pay period. Administrative errors in
remittance checks and/or improper deductions will be corrected by
the Employer and adjusted in the next remittance check to be
issued to the Union local. If the Union local is not scheduled to
receive a remittance check after discovery of the error, the Union
agrees to promptly refund the amount of the erroneous remittance."
Pursuant to section 7115(a) and (b) of the Statute /5/ and and
Article 8 of the MLA, supra, management officials at Kelly Air Force
Base regularly deduct union dues from the salaries of employees who are
members of the bargaining unit who executed written assignments for such
allotments and transfer said dues allotments to AFGE local 1617 in a
single remittance check. For pay periods ending June 23, 1984,
September 15, 1984, September 22, 1984 and September 29, 1984,
management officials at Kelly Air Force Base, relying upon MLA Section
8.08 supra, deducted from the total amount due to the local for dues
certain amounts representing dues allotments withheld erroneously in the
past from the salaries of individuals who had for a period of time been
ineligible for dues withholding by virtue of their promotion to
supervisory positions. The total amount deducted from the amount due
the local for the four above-described pay periods was $220.50.
Management officials used these funds to reimburse the supervisors from
whose salaries dues had been erroneously withheld and continue to use
the above described method of recouping erroneously withheld dues
remitted to the union.
The Master Labor Agreement was first negotiated in 1978 and
renegotiated in 1982. The "Administrative Errors" section of the dues
withholding provision, supra, was the same in both agreements. Val
Buxton, Chief of Labor and Employees Relations Division and Respondent's
Chief negotiator during the negotiations which gave rise to the 1978 and
1982 agreements, testified that during the 1978 negotiations the
language of Section 8.08 was adopted to reflect many existing local
arrangements. He further testified that during the 1978 negotiations
the parties discussed employees leaving the unit and Respondent
erroneously continuing dues checkoff. However, Buxton did not provide
any significant details regarding the specific nature of those
discussions. /6/
John Mullholland, AFGE's Director of Labor-Management Service
Department, testified that in 1978 he was the chief negotiator for
Council 214 during negotiations with the Respondent for the MLA.
According to Mullholland, during the 1978 negotiations there were no
discussions about employees being promoted to supervisory positions and
the application of Section 8.08 of the agreement to that situation.
Rather, according to Mullholland the limited discussion of Section 8.08
concerned the recoupment of money which was occasioned by computer and
arithmetical errors and not recouping money erroneously collected and
paid to the Union.
Major Thayne H. Cuevas, Chief of the Accounting and Finance Branch at
Kelly AFB testified to the dues deduction and remittance procedures at
the facility. According to Cuevas, the total amount of dues deducted
during a pay period is adjusted by those dues which might not have been
previously deducted but should have been and dues erroneously deducted.
That adjusted sum is then remitted to local 1617. Cuevas testified that
such underpayments and overpayments would be corrected when
documentation (a Standard Form 50) regarding a payroll change reached
his office. Thus, an action requiring a payroll change might occur in
one payroll period but would not be reflected in actual payments until a
subsequent payroll period when the Standard Form 50 was received and
acted upon in the Finance and Accounting Branch. A promotion of someone
out of a position eligible for dues checkoff or a voluntary request to
terminate dues checkoff could cause such an adjustment. The payroll
transactions are computer processed and a recapitulation of adjustments
to the remittance check is sent to local 1617. Cuevas testified he
relied on Section 8.08 of the agreement to make these adjustments and
this procedure has been followed since August 1981 to her personal
knowledge and "as long as there's been a dues checkoff" according to
some of his payroll employees.
Discussion and Conclusions
Respondent contends its recoupment actions herein were permissable
based upon: (1) Existing Authority decisions, particularly Department
of the Air Force, 3480th Air Base Group, Goodfellow Air Force Base,
Texas, 9 FLRA 294 (1982) and Department of the Air Force, Griffiss Air
Force Base, Rome, New York, 12 FLRA 198 (1983); (2) A contractual right
provided in Section 8.08 the Master Labor Agreement; and (3) Rulings of
the Comptroler General
In support of its allegations the General Counsel contends: (1)
Since the Authority's decisions in Goodfellow and Griffiss were set
aside by Circuit Courts of Appeals /7/ and in each case the Authority in
Supplemental Decisions accepted the Court's opinion as "the law of the
case," /8/ such conduct warrants the conclusion that the Authority has
reversed its positions on the issue; and (2) Section 8.08 of the Master
Labor Agreement does not privilege Respondent to recoup union dues and,
in any event, the parties could not waive the employees' Statutory right
to have dues deductions used by Respondent only as authorized by the
employees.
Respondent's recoupment herein is virtually identical to that
previously considered by the Authority in Goodfellow and Griffiss and
found to be permissible conduct under the Statute. The General Counsel
recognizes that Administrative Law Judges are obligated to follow
Authority precidents and denial of enforcement of an Order of the
Authority by a Court of Appeals does not "in and of itself, constitute a
change of Authority law." The General Counsel argues however that
accepting the decisions of the Circuit Courts in Goodfellow and Griffiss
as "the law of the case" in those cases warrants the conclusion that the
Authority has reversed its position on the matter.
I do not agree. In my opinion the Authority's action of accepting a
Court's decision as "the law of the case," whether it be one Court of
Appeals or more, /9/ gives no indication that the Authority is reversing
its approach to the matter. If the Authority desired to change its
position on recoupment it had ample opportunity to expressly do so in
Goodfellow and Griffiss when it considered the reversals from the Courts
of Appeals. However, the Authority merely accepted the Courts' decision
as "the law of the case", expressing no view contrary to that
articulated in its underlying decisions. Accordingly, since I am
constrained to follow the Authority's holding until such time as the
Authority specifically revises its position on the matter or it becomes
apparent that the Authority will no longer adhere to this position, I
conclude that based upon existing Authority precident Respondent's
conduct herein did not violate the Statute and I recommend the Authority
issue the following:
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Complaint in Case No. 5-CA-50046 be,
and hereby is, dismissed. /10/
/s/ SALAVTORE J. ARRIGO
Administrative Law Judge
Dated: June 13, 1985
Washington, DC
--------------- FOOTNOTES$ ---------------
(1) American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 2612
v. Federal Labor Relations Authority (Griffiss), 739 F.2d 87 (2d Cir.
1984); American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 1816
v. Federal Labor Relations Authority (Goodfellow), 715 F.2d 224 (5th
Cir. 1983).
(2) In addition to the Griffiss and Goodfellow cases noted above, see
Dugway Proving Grounds, Dugway, Utah, 9 FLRA 409 (1982); National
Archives and Records Service and National Archives Trust Board, General
Services Administration, Washington, D.C., 9 FLRA 413 (1982); and
Internal Revenue Service, Fresno Service Center, Fresno, California, 7
FLRA 371 (1981), reversed as to other matters sub nom. Internal Revenue
Service Center, Fresno, California v. FLRA, 706 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir.
1983).
(3) The Fifth Circuit even acknowledged in Goodfellow, 715 F.2d 229,
that the Government has the right "to recover by offset or otherwise
sums illegally or erroneously paid," quoting from Lodge 2424,
International Association of Machinist and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v.
United States, 564 F.2d 66, 71 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
(4) The Second and Fifth Circuits would appear to place on management
the statutory duty of setting apart or retaining intact the individual
and collective dues allotted by employees until the dues are remitted to
the Union. Aside from the fact that dues are not allotted of
transferred in any individually identifiable for, we respectfully
disagree that the Statute imposes such a duty. To require such an
interpretation of the Statute would be comparable to the common law
recovery action of replevin, in which a plaintiff seeks to have his
wrongfully withheld property returned to him without alteration or
substitution. See Kelley v. Dunne, 369 F.2d 627 (1st Cir. 1966);
Honeywell Information Systems, Inc.v. Demographic Systems, Inc., 396 F.
Supp. 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Such an action does not apply to the
recovery of money, however, unless the plaintiff can show that the money
he seeks to recover constitutes unique currency and may be identified
specifically so that recovery of the same money wrongfully withheld by
another is both justifiable and possible. Kelley, 369 F.2d at 628.
(5) Section 7115(a) and (b) of the Statute provides:
"(a) If an agency has received from an employee in an
appropriate unit a written assignment which authorizes the agency
to deduct from the pay of the employee amounts for the payment of
regular and periodic dues of the exclusive representative of the
unit, the agency shall honor the assignment and make an
appropriate allotment pursuant to the assignment. Any such
allotment shall be made at no cost to the exclusive representative
or the employee. Except as provided under subsection (b) of this
section, any such assignment may not be revoked for a period of 1
year.
"(b) An allotment under subsection (a) of this section for the
deduction of dues with respect to any employee shall terminate
when -
"(1) the agreement between the agency and the exclusive
representative involved ceases to be applicable to the employee;
or;
"(2) the employee is suspended or expelled from membership in
the exclusive representative."
(6) I found Buxton's testimony to be confusing and inconclusive both
as to the intent and meaning of Section 8.08 of the agreement as it
applies to the issues herein.
(7) AFGE, AFL-CIO, Local 1816 v FLRA (Goodfellow), 715 F.2d 224 (5th
Cir. 1983) and AFGE, AFL-CIO v. FLRA (Griffiss), 739 F.2d 87 (2nd Cir.
1984).
(8) Goodfellow, 14 FLRA 795 (1984) and Griffiss, 15 FLRA No. 188
(1984).
(9) I note in Griffiss, 12 FLRA 198, fn 1, the General Counsel sought
to withdraw the complaint on the sole ground that Goodfellow, decided
subsequent to issuance of the complaint, was dispositive of Griffiss.
(10) In view of this disposition I need not reach the other issues
presented in this matter.