18:0195(27)CA - Customs Service, Region VIII, San Francisco, CA and NTEU -- 1985 FLRAdec CA
[ v18 p195 ]
18:0195(27)CA
The decision of the Authority follows:
18 FLRA No. 27 UNITED STATES CUSTOMS SERVICE REGION VIII SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA Respondent and NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION Charging Party Case No. 9-CA-499 DECISION AND ORDER The Administrative Law Judge issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding finding that the Respondent had engaged in certain unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recommending that it be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action. The Judge further found that the Respondent had not engaged in other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint, and recommended that the complaint be dismissed as to those allegations. Exceptions to the Judge's Decision were filed by the General Counsel and the Respondent, and the General Counsel and the Charging Party filed oppositions to the Respondent's exceptions. /1/ Pursuant to section 2423.29 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations and section 7118 of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (the Statute), the Authority has reviewed the rulings of the Judge made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. Upon consideration of the Judge's Decision and the entire record in the case, the Authority hereby adopts the Judge's findings, /2/ conclusions /3/ and recommendations, as modified herein. The amended complaint alleged, inter alia, that Respondent violated section 7116(a)(1), (5) and (8) of the Statute /4/ by failing to afford the Charging Party, the National Treasury Employees Union (the Union), notice of and an opportunity to be represented at two formal discussions within the meaning of section 7114(a)(2)(A) of the Statute. /5/ In agreement with the Judge, the Authority finds the March 17, 1980 meeting of the Logistics Management Division concerning enforcement of the dress code policy to be a formal discussion concerning a personnel policy or practice or other general condition of employment within the meaning of section 7114(a)(2)(A). /6/ Thus, it is clear that the meeting of March 17 constituted a discussion /7/ between unit employees and representatives of management, and, as noted by the Judge, it is undisputed that enforcement of the Respondent's dress code concerns a personnel policy or practice or other general condition of employment. The only issue is whether the meeting was "formal" in nature. The Authority has previously identified a number of factors relevant to such a determination in considering the totality of facts and circumstances presented. See, e.g., Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security Administration, Bureau of Field Operations, San Francisco, California, 10 FLRA 115 (1982); Defense Logistics Agency, Defense Depot Tracy, Tracy, California, 14 FLRA 475 (1984). Applying such factors herein, the Authority concludes that the March 17 meeting was "formal" in nature. Thus, the meeting was called by Lackey, the Respondent's Director of the Logistics Management Division, in accordance with a letter from the Acting Regional Commissioner. In addition, the record indicates that several other supervisors or management officials also were present. The record further indicates that the Division's employees were informed in advance that the meeting would take place, and, as found by the Judge, that the meeting was "neither happenstance nor merely a chance encounter of some employees with a supervisor." Although from the record it is not apparent whether employees were informed in advance as to the particular subject matter of the meeting, and there was not a formal agenda, the purpose of the meeting was clear: enforcement of the Respondent's dress code. While the record does not indicate whether attendance was mandatory, it appears that most, if not all of the Division employees attended. Finally, the record discloses that the meeting lasted 20-25 minutes and took place in the work area. Based on the totality of the foregoing facts and circumstances, the Authority concludes that the meeting was formal in nature. Accordingly, as all of the elements of section 7114(a)(2)(A) of the Statute have been met, the Authority adopts the Judge's conclusion that the Union had a right to be given the opportunity to be represented at this meeting, and that the Respondent violated section 7116(a)(1) and (8) of the Statute by its failure to afford the Union such an opportunity. However, contrary to the Judge, the Authority finds that the General Counsel has failed to establish that the Respondent violated section 7116(a)(5) of the Statute by such conduct. The only unlawful conduct alleged in the amended complaint as to this meeting was that the Respondent had failed to permit the Union to be present at a formal discussion as required by section 7114(a)(2)(A) of the Statute. This section does not itself give rise to an obligation to negotiate within the meaning of the Statute. Therefore, a failure to comply with section 7114(a)(2)(A) cannot, standing alone, form the basis of a section 7116(a)(5) violation. Accordingly, the Authority shall dismiss that portion of the complaint. Department of Defense, National Guard Bureau, Texas Adjutant General's Department, 149th TAC Fighter Group (ANG) (TAC), Kelly Air Force Base, 15 FLRA No. 111 (1984). The Authority also disagrees with the Judge's conclusion that a meeting held on March 19, 1980 between an employee and the Assistant Regional Commissioner/Administration concerning the application of the dress code to that employee constituted a formal discussion. In this regard, the employee expressed a desire to meet with the Assistant Regional Commissioner, a second-level supervisor of the employee, because the employee wanted to discuss the application and interpretation of the dress code with respect to himself. The meeting ultimately took place in the Assistant Regional Commissioner's office. No other management representatives or employees attended the meeting, which lasted about 20 minutes and solely concerned the employee's displeasure and unhappiness with the dress code. The totality of circumstances reflects the absence of formality. See Office of Program Operations, Field Operations, Social Security Administration, San Francisco Region, 9 FLRA 48, 50 (1982) (wherein the Authority found that a meeting was not a formal discussion because, inter alia, it was initiated by the two employees to discuss their own concerns). /8/ Accordingly, inasmuch as the meeting was not a formal discussion, the Respondent's failure to provide the Union with an opportunity to be present was not violative of section 7116(a)(1), (5) and (8) of the Statute and the Judge's finding to the contrary must be set aside. /9/ The complaint also alleged that the meeting of March 19, 1980 constituted a bypass of the exclusive representative, in violation of section 7116(a)(1) and (5) of the Statute. The Judge failed to make a finding as to that allegation. Although there were no exceptions to the Judge's failure to make such a finding, the Authority concludes that the meeting did not constitute a bypass of the Union, as the record does not establish that the Respondent attempted to deal directly with the employee concerning conditions of employment or that the meeting undermined the status of the Union as the exclusive representative. /10/ Accordingly, the Authority shall dismiss that allegation of the complaint. ORDER Pursuant to section 2423.29 of the Rules and Regulations of the Federal Labor Relations Authority and section 7118 of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, the Authority hereby orders that the United States Customs Service, Region VII, San Francisco, California, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Failing to give the employees' exclusive representative, the National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), prior notice of and the opportunity to be represented at formal discussions with members of the bargaining unit represented by NTEU concerning grievances, personnel policies and practices or other general conditions of employment. (b) Interfering with, restraining or coercing its employees in the exercise of their statutory rights by making threats of reprisal because they sought representation by NTEU or because they sought to file grievances. (c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights assured by the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute. 2. Take the following affirmative action in order to effectuate the purposes and policies of the Statute: (a) Give the National Treasury Employees Union prior notice of, and an opportunity to be represented at, formal discussions with bargaining unit employees exclusively represented by NTEU concerning grievances, personnel policies and practices or other general conditions of employment. (b) Post at United States Customs Service, Region VII, San Francisco, California, copies of the attached Notice on forms to be furnished by the Federal Labor Relations Authority. Such forms shall be signed by the Principal Regional Official, or his designee and shall be posted and maintained for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all bulletin boards and other places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to ensure that such Notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Pursuant to section 2423.30 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations, notify the Regional Director, Region IX, Federal Labor Relations Authority, in writing, within 30 days from the date of this Order, as to what steps have been taken to comply herewith. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the remaining allegations of the amended complaint be, and they hereby are, dismissed. Issued, Washington, D.C., May 24, 1985 Henry B.Frazier III, Acting Chairman William J. McGinnis, Jr., Member FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES PURSUANT TO A DECISION AND ORDER OF THE FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY AND IN ORDER TO EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF CHAPTER 71 OF TITLE 5 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS WE HEREBY NOTIFY OUR EMPLOYEES THAT: WE WILL NOT fail to give the National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) prior notice of, and the opportunity to be represented at, formal discussions with members of the bargaining unit exclusively represented by NTEU concerning grievances, personnel policies and practices or other general conditions of employment. WE WILL NOT interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their statutory rights by making threats of reprisal because they seek representation by NTEU or because they seek to file grievances. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their rights assured by the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute. WE WILL give NTEU prior notice of, and an opportunity to be represented at, formal discussions with bargaining unit employees exclusively represented by NTEU concerning grievances, personnel policies and practices or other general conditions of employment. (Activity) Dated: By: (Signature) (Title) This Notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any questions concerning this Notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Regional Director, Region IX, Federal Labor Relations Authority, whose address is: 530 Bush Street, Room 542, San Francisco, California 94108, and whose telephone number is: (415) 556-810;. -------------------- ALJ$ DECISION FOLLOWS -------------------- Martha Toy Wong, Esq. For the Respondent Andrew Krakoff, Esq. Lucinda A. Bendat, Esq. For the Charging Party Nancy E. Pritikin, Esq. For the General Counsel Before: SAMUEL A. CHAITOVITZ, Administrative Law Judge DECISION Statement of the Case This proceeding arose pursuant to the Federal Labor-Management Relations Statute, 5 U.S.C. 7101 et seq. (hereinafter called the Statute). Pursuant to an unfair labor practice charge filed on May 19, 1980, by National Treasury Employees Union (hereinafter called Union and/or NTEU) against United States Customs Service, Region VII, San Francisco, California, (hereinafter called Respondent and/or Customs), said charge having been amended on July 1 and 31, 1980, the General Counsel of the Federal Labor Relations Authority, by the Director for Region 9, issued a Complaint and Notice of Hearing on August 26, 1980. The Complaint was Amended on December 3, 1980. The Amended Complaint alleges that Respondent violated Sections 7116(a)(1), (5) and (8) of the Statute with respect to meetings conducted and statements made on March 17 and 19, 1980. Respondent in its Answer denies it violated the Statute. A hearing was held before the undersigned in San Francisco, California at which all parties were represented and were afforded full opportunity to examine and cross-examine witnesses and to introduce evidence. Post hearing briefs were filed and have been considered. Upon the entire record, including my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make the following findings, conclusions and recommendations: Findings of Fact At all times material herein NTEU was the collective bargaining representative of a unit that included the employees of Respondent's San Francisco Regional Office, Logistics Management Division. On March 17, 1980 Mr. Rae Lackey, Respondent's Director of the Logistics Management Division, called and conducted a meeting of the Customs' employees in the Logistics Management Division. In accordance with a letter from Respondent's Acting Regional Commissioner, Lackey informed the employees of the existing regional dress code. Lackey stated that the dress code prohibited the wearing of blue jeans and tennis shoes and that male employees were to wear shirts and ties. Lackey further advised the employees that failure to comply with the dress code would result in disciplinary action. Employee Peter McCool questioned the policy and protested its unfair application stating it did not apply to women. Employee Gene McAllister also expressed his displeasure with the policy and its application. Lackey indicated that he didn't know if he would have the authority to issue the disciplinary letters, but that they would be issued. Mr. Lackey did not argue with the employees, he merely stated that he would enforce management's decision. NTEU was not notified in advance concerning this March 17, 1980 meeting and no Union representative was present. On March 17, after the Lackey meeting described above, McAllister went to see Labor Relations Specialist Ann Segars. /11/ McAllister expressed his concern about the dress code and indicated an interest in talking to Paul Andrews, Assistant Regional Commissioner/Administration. Segars called Andrews and then advised McAllister that the matter was taken care of. On March 19, 1980 during a meeting with Lackey, concerning procurement McAllister was informed that Andrews would be calling in McAllister for a meeting concerning the dress code. McAllister then spoke to Union Steward Donna Richardson who informed McAllister that he had the right to have a Union representative present at the meeting with Andrews. McAllister then went to Segars' office and informed her that Andrews was having a meeting with him. Segars stated that the meeting was probably so that management could come up with some compromise and would probably be just "counseling." McAllister mentioned that he was considering having a Union representative accompany him. Segars advised McAllister that she "didn't know whether it would be a good idea to have a Union representative present at this meeting between Paul Andrews and (McAllister). That it could possibly charge or make the situation more rigid." /12/ Later on March 19, 1980, Andrews stopped at McAllister's desk and stated that Andrews heard that McAllister wanted a Union representative at their meeting and that Andrews did not think it was necessary that McAllister have a Union representative there. McAllister acquiesed Andrews, upon encountering Union Steward Richardson in the hall, advised Richardson that McAllister did not want a Union representative present. At 3:00 p.m. on March 19, 1980 Andrews and McAllister met in the Regional Commissioner's office. Just Andrews and McAllister were present at the meeting, which lasted approximately 20 minutes. Andrews and McAllister discussed the dress code in detail, including how and why it would apply to McAllister and his particular wardrobe. /13/ McAllister indicated that he did not think the dress code should apply to him since he did not meet the public. According to McAllister, Andrews stated, "You can challenge me on this, but I can issue letters of reprimand . . . I can fucking fire your ass. You can file a grievance and all, but you can't fight the system what with letters of recommendations and records." At the end of the meeting, Andrews told McAllister, "I really think you should consider this before you proceed, consider your future with the government." In this regard I credit McAllister's version of the conversation, /14/ because his memory with respect to this meeting is more reliable and detailed than Andrews'. Discussion and Conclusions General Counsel contends that Customs violated Sections 7116(a)(1), (5) and (8) of the Statute by conducting formal discussions with bargaining unit employees without providing the Union with notice and an opportunity to be present. Section 7114(a)(2)(A) provides, inter alia: "(2) An exclusive of an appropriate unit in an agency shall be given the opportunity to be represented at-- (A) any formal discussion between one or more representatives of the agency and one or more employees in the unit or their representatives concerning any grievance of any personnel policy or practices or other general condition of employment." There is no dispute that the dress code is a personnel policy, practice and general condition of employment within the meaning of Section 7114(a)(2)(A) of the Statute. /15/ Respondent contends, however, that the March 17 meeting was not formal within meaning of Section 7114(a)(2)(A) of the Statute. In so contending Respondent relies upon Department of Defense, U.S. Navy, Norfolk Naval Shipyard, FLRC No. 77A-141, 6 FLRC 1103 (1978). The Federal Labor Relations Council, interpreted Section 10(e) of Executive Order 11491. /16/ The Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) has, however, addressed itself to Section 7114(a)(2)(A) of the Statute. In Norfolk Naval Shipyard, 6 FLRA No. 22 (1981) the FLRA found that two meetings in question, which were regular meetings called by the crane operator foremen at the beginning or end of shifts to advise the crane operators of important developments, were formal discussions within the meaning of Section 7114(a)(2)(A). In light of the foregoing it is concluded that the meeting of the Logistics Management Division concerning the dress code called and conducted by Lackey, was "formal" within the meaning of Section 7114(a)(2)(A). In this regard it is noted that the meeting was neither happenstance nor merely a chance encounter of some employees with a supervisor. Rather it was a meeting of a division called by the director of that division for the very purpose of advising the employees of fact that the dress code would be strictly enforced. Section 7114(a)(2)(A) pertains to a "formal" meeting when it constitutes a "discussion" the issue next presented is whether it constituted a discussion. Although a mere statement to employees setting forth agency policy, absent more, might not constitute a discussion, /17/ the instant case, involves substantially more than a mere statement of the dress code. There was discussion involving employees questioning the application of the dress code, expressing displeasures with it and discussing the possible disciplinary actions for failure of compliance. Such a meeting is analogous to the orientation meetings which the FLRA held to be formal discussions within the meaning of Section 7114(a)(2)(A) of the Statute, Department of Health Education and Welfare, Region IV, Atlanta, Georgia and Department of Health and Human Services, Region IV, Atlanta, Georgia, 5 FLRA No. 58 (1981). In that case new employees were given work information and questions were answered, but there was no evidence that there was any "bargaining" or that the "personnelists" had the authority to or did vary or change any personnel policy or general conditions of employment. Cf. Department of Health Education and Welfare, Region IV, Atlanta Georgia, etc., supra. Similarly, Customs' further contention that there was no obligation to notify the Union pursuant to Section 7114(a)(2)(A) of the Statute because Lackey was not empowered to make any change in conditions of employment is rejected. I conclude, in light of the foregoing, that pursuant to Section 7114(a)(2)(A) the March 17 meeting was a formal discussion concerning a "personnel policy or practice or other general condition of employment . . . " about which the Union was entitled to prior notice and at which the Union was entitled to an opportunity to be represented. Respondent's failure to afford NTEU the requisite notice and opportunity to be represented at the March 17 meeting constituted a violation of Section 7116(a)(1), (5) and (8) of the Statute. It is concluded that the March 19, 1980 meeting between Andrews and McAllister also constituted a formal discussion within the meaning of Section 7114(a)(2)(A) of the Statute about which NTEU was entitled to notice and at which it was entitled to be represented. The subjects of a Section 7114(a)(2)(A) meeting are "any grievance or any personnel policy or practices or other general condition of employment." As already discussed, the dress code is a personnel policy, a practice or general condition of employment within the meaning of Section 7114(a)(2)(A) of the Statute. "Grievance" is defined in Section 7103(a)(9) of the Statute as any complaint "(A) by any employee concerning any matter relating to the employment of the employee . . . ." This is a broad definition of the term grievances and would encompass McAllister's displeasure and unhappiness with the dress code. Cf. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 3 FLRA No. 116 (1980). Respondent contends that because the "grievance" involves the application of the dress code to McAllister it does not have sufficiently broad application to be encompassed within Section 7114(a)(2)(A) of the Statute. On the contrary, the application and interpretation of the dress code with respect to McAllister would necessarily have bearing on its application to the other employees. NTEU would therefore have a very legitimate interest in being present at any discussion involving the dress code's application and interpretation with respect to McAllister. It is the very type situation to which an application of Section 7114(a)(2)(A) of the Statute would be most appropriate. There seems to be some dispute as to whether the meeting was held at the request of McAllister or Andrews. It is irrelevant at whose request the meeting was held. Respondent knew the subject of the meeting, the dress code, and of McAllister's unhappiness with respect to the dress code's application. Further Andrews actually set up and scheduled the meeting. In such circumstances the identity of the person who originally requested the meeting would not change the fundamental nature of the meeting or the Union's right to notification and to be present. In this regard it must be noted that almost all employee grievances would result in meetings initiated by employees. Customs further contends that NTEU had actual notice of the March 19, 1980 meeting and chose not to attend. Thus, Respondent urges there was no failure on its part to comply with the requirements of Section 7114(a)(2)(A) of the Statute. Such a contention must be rejected. Although NTEU knew a meeting was in the offing, it had not been advised of the time and place of meeting. Further, when viewed in light of Segars' statements to McAllister that the Union's presence would make Respondent more rigid, any notice to the Union could hardly be interpreted as an invitation to attend the meeting. Rather, Customs made it quite clear the NTEU would not be welcome. Andrews, after advising McAllister of the time and place of the meeting, merely advised NTEU that its presence was not wanted by McAllister, he did not advise NTEU of the time and place of the meeting. This could hardly satisfy Respondent's statutory obligations. Cf. Norfolk Naval Shipyard, supra. Accordingly NTEU was, pursuant to Section 7114(a)(2)(A) of the Statute, entitled to prior notice of the March 19, 1980 meeting and an opportunity to be present. Customs' failure to provide the required notice to NTEU constituted a violation of Sections 7116(a)(1), (5) and (8) of the Statute. Section 7116(a)(1) of the Statute provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an agency to "interfere with, restrain or coerce any employee in the exercise by any employee of any right under this chapter." Section 7102 of the Statute guarantees Federal employees the "right to form, join or assist any labor organization . . . freely and without fear of penalty or reprisal, and each employee shall be protected in the exercise of such right." In the subject case when McAllister told Segars he wished to have his Union present when he met with management to discuss the dress code and its application to him, a formal discussion the Union had a right to attend. McAllister, in seeking the assistance of his union, was attempting to exercise a right guaranteed by Section 7102 of the Statute. Segars' reply that "she didn't know whether it was a good idea to have a Union representative present at the meeting between Paul Andrews and (McAllister) . . . it could possibly change the situation or make the situation more rigid," indicated that if the employee chose to have a Union representative present the agency would be more rigid and less flexible. Such a statement would reasonably indicate to an employee that the agency would deal with the employee and his complaint more sympathetically, i.e. less rigidly, if the employee did not exercise his right to have a Union representative present and if the union did not exercise its right to be present. It would restrain an employee from joining a union because to seek such a union's assistance would be harmful to the employee's interest. Thus it is concluded that Segars' statement violated Section 7116(a)(1) of the Statute because it was ominous and was a veiled threat of reprisal if the employee exercised his protected right. Cf. Navy Resale System, Field Support Office Commissary Store Group, 5 FLRA No. 42 (1981). General Counsel urges that Andrews' statement to McAllister prior to the March 19 meeting that Andrews did not think it was necessary that McAllister have a Union representative at the meeting constituted a violation of 7116(a)(1) of the Statute because it interfered with an employees right to be represented by a Union. Andrews' statement was merely a statement of opinion and does not contain any threat or promise of benefit, implies or explicit, and it is concluded that it did not violate Section 7116(a)(1) of the Statute. See Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center, Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma, 6 FLRA No. 32 (1981). General Counsel contends that Andrews' statements to McAllister at the March 19 meeting violated Section 7116(a)(1) of the Statute because it threatened McAllister with reprisals if he filed a grievance. From my evaluation of the evidence I conclude that Andrews' statements, although perhaps not so intended by Andrews, /18/ would reasonably have been understood and interpreted by an employee as a threat of retaliation for filing a grievance and a threat that the grievance system is ineffective in protecting employees and their rights. Such a statement would necessarily, interfere with and discourage an employee from exercising the rights to file a grievance guaranteed by Section 7121 of the Statute. Cf. Navy Resale System, Field Support Commissary Store Group, supra; and San Antonio Logistics Center, Kelly Air Force Base, 5 FLRA No. 24 (1981). Accordingly it is concluded that Andrews' statements at the March 19 meeting violated Section 7116(a)(1) of the Statute. In view of the foregoing I recommend the FLRA adopt the following Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 2423.29 of the rules and regulations of the Federal Labor Relations Authority and Section 7118 of the Statute, the Authority hereby orders that the United States Customs Service Region VIII, San Francisco, California shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) refusing to give the National Treasury Employees Union prior notice and the opportunity to be represented at formal discussions conducted Ray Lackey, Paul Andrews or any other agency representative which are attended by members of the bargaining unit represented by National Treasury Employees Union, and where personnel policies and practices or other general conditions of employment are discussed. (b) Interfering with, restraining or coercing its employees by making threats of reprisal because they sought representation by National Treasury Employees Union or because they sought to file grievances. (c) In any like or related manner, failing or refusing to comply with any provision of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute; (d) In any like or related manner, interfering with, restraining, or coercing any employee in the exercise of any right under the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute. 2. Take the following affirmative action in order to effectuate the purpose and policies of the Statute: (a) Give the National Treasury Employees Union the opportunity to be represented at the formal discussions which involve the employees in its bargaining unit. (b) Post at United States Customs Service, Region VIII, San Francisco, California, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix" on forms to be furnished by the Federal Labor Relations Authority. Upon receipt of such forms they shall be signed by the Principal Regional Official and shall be posted and maintained by her for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all bulletin boards and other places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that such notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Pursuant to Section 2423.30 of the Authority's rules and regulations, notify the Regional Director, Region IX, Federal Labor Relations Authority, in writing, within 30 days from the date of this Order, as to what steps have been taken to comply herewith. SAMUEL A. CHAITOVITZ Administrative Law Judge Dated: November 12, 1981 Washington, D.C. APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES PURSUANT TO A DECISION AND ORDER OF THE FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY AND IN ORDER TO EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF CHAPTER 71 OF TITLE 5 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS WE HEREBY NOTIFY OUR EMPLOYEES THAT: WE WILL NOT refuse to give the National Treasury Employees Union prior notice and the opportunity to be represented at formal discussions conducted by Rae Lackey, Paul Andrews or any other agency representative and which are attended by members of the bargaining unit represented by National Treasury Employees Union, and where personnel policies and practices or other general conditions of employment are discussed. WE WILL NOT interfere with, restrain, and coerce employees in the exercise of their Statutory rights by threatening them with reprisal because they seek representation by National Treasury Employees Union or because they seek to file grievances. WE WILL NOT, in any like or related manner, fail or refuse to comply with any provision of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute. WE WILL NOT, in any like or related manner, interfere with, restrain, or coerce any employee in the exercise of any right under the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute. (Activity or Agency) Dated: By: (Signature) This Notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any questions concerning this Notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Regional Director of Region IX for the Federal Labor Relations Authority whose address is: 530 Bush Street, Suite 542, San Francisco, California 94108; and whose telephone number is (415) 556-8105. --------------- FOOTNOTES$ --------------- /1/ The General Counsel and the Charging Party moved to strike from the record Respondent's request that the Authority take "judicial notice" of a Judge's decision in a matter before the Authority. In reaching its decisions, the Authority may, of course, take official notice of decisions by its Administrative Law Judges. Therefore the motion to strike is denied. /2/ The Respondent excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Judge. The demeanor of witnesses is a factor of consequence in resolving issues of credibility, and the Judge has had the advantage of observing the witnesses while they testified. The Authority will not overrule the Judge's resolution with respect to credibility unless a clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence demonstrates that such resolution was incorrect. The Authority has examined the record carefully and finds no basis for reversing the Judge's credibility findings. Based on these findings, the Authority agrees with the Judge's conclusions with respect to several alleged violations of section 7116(a)(1) of the Statute. /3/ The Respondent asserts in its exceptions that the Judge failed to rule on its motion to strike part of the amended complaint. By issuing his decision on the merits, the Judge in effect denied the motion to strike those allegations from the complaint. /4/ Section 7116 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Sec. 7116. Unfair labor practices (a) For the purpose of this chapter, it shall be an unfair labor practice for an agency-- (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce any employee in the exercise by the employee of any right under this chapter; * * * * (5) to refuse to consult or negotiate in good faith with a labor organization as required by this chapter; * * * * (8) to otherwise fail or refuse to comply with any provision of this chapter. /5/ Section 7114(a)(2)(A) provides as follows: Sec. 7114. Representation rights and duties * * * * (a)(2) An exclusive representative of an appropriate unit in an agency shall be given the opportunity to be represented at-- (A) any formal discussion between one or more representatives of the agency and one or more employees in the unit or their representatives concerning any grievance or any personnel policy or practices or other general condition of employment(.) /6/ With regard to the requirements that must be satisfied for the Authority to find a formal discussion, see Bureau of Government Financial Operations, Headquarters, 15 FLRA No. 87 (1984). /7/ As to the meaning of the term "discussion" as used in section 7114(a)(2)(A) of the Statute, see Department of Defense, National Guard Bureau, Texas Adjutant General's Department, 149th TAC Fighter Group (ANG) (TAC), Kelly Air Force Base, 15 FLRA No. 111 (1984), which held generally that the term "discussion" in section 7114(a)(2)(A) of the Statute does not require that actual dialogue, debate or argument must occur. /8/ The Judge also based his finding that the meeting was formal in part on his conclusion that the subject of the meeting, i.e., the application of the dress code to the employee, was encompassed within the meaning of the term "grievance" under section 7114(a)(2)(A) of the Statute. However, the Authority has concluded that the subject matter discussed is not a factor to be considered in determining whether a meeting is "formal." See Defense Logistics Agency, Defense Depot Tracy, Tracy, California, 14 FLRA 475 (1984). See also Bureau of Government Financial Operations, Headquarters, 15 FLRA No. 87 (1984). /9/ Based upon the Authority's conclusion that the March 19, 1980 meeting did not constitute a formal discussion, it is necessary to pass upon the Judge's findings with respect to the definition of the term "grievance" under section 7114(a)(2)(A) of the Statute, and with respect to whether the Union had actual notice of the meeting. /10/ See Defense Logistics Agency, Defense Depot Tracy, Tracy, California, 14 FLRA 475 (1984). /11/ There is some dispute as to precisely what was said. The differences are not determinative with respect to the outcome of this matter. In determining what in fact occurred I note that the two versions, Segars' and McAllister's, are not substantially different and the differences appear attributable to some confusion in communication. /12/ Segars admits telling McAllister that she did not think it would be a good idea for McAllister to have a Union representative present at the meeting with Andrews. Segars testified that McAllister just nodded his head and "seemed to accept that". I, however, credit McAllister's version of the conversation, because his version seems more consistent with surrounding circumstances. /13/ McAllister and Andrews had previously had meetings concerning McAllister's displeasure with the dress code and its application to him. /14/ Andrews' version of the conversation did not differ substantially from McAllister's, except Andrews denied that he said the quoted portions set forth above. /15/ Respondent so concedes on page 8 of its posthearing brief. /16/ Section 10(e) of Executive Order 11491 was the geniuses of Section 7114(a)(2)(A) and contains reference to a "formal discussion". /17/ Cf. Department of Defense, National Guard Bureau, Texas Adjutant General's Department, 149th TAC Fighters Group, Kelly Air Force Base, 6-CA-210, OALJ-81-121 (1981); contra. Department of Health and Human Service, Social Security Administration, 9-CA-855, OALJ 81-174 (1981). /18/ See, United States Department of Navy, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, 3 FLRA No. 27 (1980).