31:0181(22)NG - NTEU and Treasury and Customs Service -- 1988 FLRAdec NG
[ v31 p181 ]
31:0181(22)NG
The decision of the Authority follows:
31 FLRA NO. 22 31 FLRA 181 22 FEB 1988 NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION Union and DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY AND U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE Agency Case No. O-NG-1431 DECISION AND ORDER ON NEGOTIABILITY ISSUES I. Statement of the Case This case is before the Authority because of a negotiability appeal filed under section 7105(a)(2)(E) of the Federal Service Labor - Management Relations Statute (the Statute) and concerns the negotiability of (1) five provisions of a collective bargaining agreement which were disapproved by the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) under section 7114 (c) of the Statute, and (2) seven proposals which were declared nonnegotiable by the U.S. Customs Service (Customs) during negotiations between Customs and the Union. 1 On July 24, 1987, Treasury disapproved certain provisions in the agreement. Thereafter, by letter dated July 29, 1987, Customs served on the Union a declaration of nonnegotiability with respect to certain proposals that had been advanced in negotiations. On July 31, 1987, Customs and the Union entered into a memorandum of understanding amending certain sections in the agreement. Following these changes, Treasury withdrew its previous disapproval except as it pertained to seven provisions. Subsequently, the Union timely filed the instant negotiability appeal of the provisions disapproved by Treasury as well as the proposals declared nonnegotiable by customs. For the reasons discussed below, we find that Provisions 1 and 2, which concern the reassignment of a Union officer or steward, are nonnegotiable because they directly interfere with management's rights to assign employees and to assign work under section 7106(a)(2)(A) and (B) of the Statute, and are not negotiable appropriate arrangements under section 7106(b)(3). Provision 3, which concerns conflicts of interest involving an employee's immediate family members, is outside the duty to bargain because it is inconsistent with Executive Order 11222 and its implementing regulations, 5 C.F.R. Part 735. As to Provision 4, which concerns an excepted service employee's right to grieve a disciplinary action, we conclude that it is within the duty to bargain because Congress did not intend to exclude excepted service employees from coverage of negotiated grievance procedures. Provision 5, which concerns the Union's right to unit employees' names and home addresses, is negotiable because the release of this information is not barred by the Privacy Act. We further find that Proposal 1, which concerns part-time work for employees returning from maternity leave, concerns a negotiable procedure in connection with Customs' implementation of its part-time program, pursuant to the Federal Employees Part - Time Career Employment Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. 3401 et seq., and therefore is within the duty to bargain. Proposals 2 and 3, which grant employees attending the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center the option of living in Government housing or making their own housing arrangements, do not conflict with Government-wide rules or regulations, 5 U.S.C. 5911(e), or Comptroller General decisions, and thus are within the duty to bargain. Proposal 4, which allows an employee to grieve a promotion action, is within the duty to bargain because it is not barred from negotiations by Federal Personnel Manual (FPM), chapter 335, subchapter 1-6 or by section 7106(a)(2)(C) of the Statute. Finally, we find that Proposals 5, 6, and 7, which require management to pay travel and per diem to employee Union representatives on official time, are within the duty to bargain because they are not inconsistent with Federal law or Government-wide regulations. II. Provisions Disapproved by Treasury - Under Section 7114 (c) of the Statute A. Provisions 1 and 2 (Provision 1) Article 20, Section 15A In order to avoid any conflict of interest, or apparent conflict of interest, no employee may be detailed or temporarily promoted to a supervisory position while simultaneously serving as a Union officer or steward. However, an eligible Union officer or steward will be considered for such a detail and/or temporary promotion, and, if selected, be offered the opportunity to relinquish all Union responsibilities for the duration of the detail and/or temporary promotion. (Provision 2) Article 33 In order to avoid any conflict of interest, or apparent conflict of interest, no steward, chief steward, or Union officer may be detailed or temporarily promoted to a supervisory position while simultaneously serving as a Union officer or steward. However, an eligible Union officer or steward will be considered for such a detail and/or temporary promotion, and, if selected, be offered the opportunity to relinquish all Union responsibilities for the duration of the detail and/or temporary promotion. 1. Positions of the Parties Treasury contends that Provisions 1 and 2 are outside the duty to bargain because they interfere with management's rights to assign employees and assign work under section 7106(a)(2)(A) and (B) of the Statute. According to Treasury, by conditioning a detail or temporary promotion of an employee on the employee's voluntary relinquishment of all Union responsibilities, the provisions would, in effect, subject management's decision to the control of the employee and thereby interfere with its right to assign employees and assign work under the Statute. The Union asserts that the provisions are negotiable because they do "nothing more than ensure the right of employees to exercise their (section) 7102 rights." Union Response to Treasury Statement of Position at 3. Citing Department of the Navy, Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, Virginia, 15 FLRA 867 (1984), the Union contends that a balancing test must be applied to an employee's rights under section 7102 and management's rights under section 7106. Alternatively, the Union states that the provisions are negotiable as an appropriate arrangement under section 7106(b)(3). 2. Discussion We find that Provisions 1 and 2 are outside the duty to bargain because they directly interfere with management's right to assign employees and to assign work under section 7106(a)(2)(A) and (B) of the Statute, and do not constitute appropriate arrangements under section 7106(b)(3). a. Whether Provisions I and 2 Directly Interfere With Management's Rights Provisions 1 and 2 would prevent management from detailing or temporarily promoting an employee who is a Union officer or steward to a supervisory position unless the employee voluntarily relinquished all Union responsibilities. We agree with Treasury that under the provisions, an employee who refused to relinquish his or her Union responsibilities could effectively prevent management from assigning supervisory responsibilities. Management's right to assign an employee and to assign work would be subject to the control of that employee. The provisions would prevent management from assigning an employee to a temporary supervisory position or assigning supervisory duties to the employee--even in cases where the Union officer or steward may be the only qualified individual--unless the employee agreed to relinquish his or her Union responsibilities. The provisions are to the same effect as Proposal 7 in American Federation of Government Employees, AFL - CIO, Local 2272 and Department of Justice, U.S. Marshals Service, District of Columbia, 9 FLRA 1004, 1014-15 (1982). in that case, the Authority held that the proposal, which would have prohibited the agency from assigning certain duties to employees who were also union officials unless the officials consented, violated management's right to assign work under section 7106(a)(2)(B). Therefore, consistent with U.S. Marshals Service, we find that Provisions 1 and 2 violate management's right to assign work under section 7106(a)(2)(B). Similarly, we find that the provisions would prohibit management from reassigning an employee who was a Union officer or a steward to a temporary supervisory position unless the employee consented. By so doing, the provision would interfere with management's right to assign employees under section 7106(a)(2)(A). b. Whether Provision 1 and 2 Constitute Appropriate Arrangements Within the Meaning of Section 7106(b)(3) We turn now to the question of whether the provisions constitute negotiable appropriate arrangements under section 7106 (b) (3) of the Statute. To determine whether the provisions constitute appropriate arrangements, we must determine whether the provisions are: (1) intended to be arrangements for employees who are adversely affected by the exercise of a management right; and (2) appropriate because they do not excessively interfere with the exercise of management's right. National Association of Government Employees, Local R14-87 and Kansas Army National Guard, 21 FLRA 24 (1986). We find, based on the Union's explanations, that the provisions are intended to be arrangements to (1) protect employees from the loss of effective representation should management decide to assign a Union officer or steward to a temporary supervisory position or to assign work involving supervisory duties, and (2) allow an employee to continue to exercise his or her statutory right to participate in a labor organization. We find also that the provisions excessively interfere with the exercise of management's rights. The provisions make no allowances for situations where the Union officer or steward may be the only qualified employee to perform the work, but rather give an employee a right to reject a reassignment regardless of whether the employee is the only one able to perform the assignment. Provisions 1 and 2, therefore, do not take into account management's interest in ensuring that the work of a supervisory position is accomplished. Rather, the provisions would enable an employee who is a Union officer or steward to veto an assignment. We find, therefore, that the provisions excessively interfere with management's rights to assign employees and to assign work and do not constitute an appropriate arrangement within the meaning of section 7106(b)(3). Based on the above, we find Provisions I and 2 to be outside the duty to bargain. B. Provision 3 Article 26 Section 5 Employees may permit members of their family to engage in any activity or employment they choose, so long as such activity does not create a direct conflict of interest between such activities and the employee's official Customs duties. For the purpose of this Section, "immediate family" means the spouse, child or any relative of the customs employee who is dependent upon and/or who resides within the employee's household. 1. Positions of the Parties Treasury contends that this provision is nonnegotiable because it is contrary to law and Government-wide regulations governing standards of conduct for Federal employees. In particular, Treasury asserts that Provision 3 establishes a standard for determining conflict of interest matters which is inconsistent with the standard established by Executive Order 11222 and its implementing regulations, 5 C.F.R. 735.201a. The Union disagrees with Treasury's assertions, and argues that the standard set forth in the provision is consistent with the conflict of interest test established by the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) in Lane v. Department of the Army, 19 MSPR 161 (1984). 2. Discussion We find that Provision 3 is outside the duty to bargain because it is inconsistent with law and Government-wide regulations. Provision 3 would establish a direct conflict standard for determining whether the employment or other activities of immediate members of an employee's family create a conflict of interest between the family member's activities and the employee's official duties. Executive Order 11222 requires that Federal employees adhere to certain standards of conduct. The implementing regulations of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) are set forth at 5 C.F.R. Part 735. Executive Order 11222, Section 201(c) and 5 C.F.R. 735.201a prohibit conduct by Federal employees which creates either a direct conflict of interest or the appearance of a conflict. Also, "(t)he interest of a spouse, minor child, or other member of an employee's immediate household is considered to be an interest of the employee." FPM, chapter 735, subchapter 4-7. The disputed provision would limit management's ability to discipline an employee in conflict of interest situations to circumstances in which it could demonstrate a direct relationship between a family member's activities and the employee's official duties. By limiting management's ability to discipline an employee to a showing of direct conflict, the provision precludes management from initiating action against an employee based on an appearance of a conflict, an action which the Agency is authorized to take pursuant to Executive Order 11222 and its implementing regulations. The provision, therefore, is inconsistent with Executive Order 11222 and its implementing regulations, 5 C.F.R. Part 735, which are Government-wide regulations. See Defense Logistics Agency, Council of AFGE Locals, AFL - CIO and Department of Defense, Defense Logistics Agency, 24 FLRA 367 (1986) The Union contends that in Lane v. Department of the Army, the MSPB articulated the "direct and predictable" standard as the only standard an agency may apply to sustain an action against an employee based on an alleged conflict of interest involving a family member. Union Reply to Treasury Statement of Position at 8. We disagree with this interpretation of Lane. In reaching its conclusion in Lane, the MSPB reviewed the removal action under both the direct conflict standard and the "appearance" standard. MSPB found that the record did not support a finding of a direct conflict or of an apparent conflict of interest. Thus, MSPB applied both standards for determining conflict of interest as provided in Executive Order 11222 and its implementing regulations. We therefore find, contrary to the Union's assertion, that the Lane case does not support its position that under law, only a direct conflict of interest standard applies to conflict of interest cases involving immediate family members. We find, therefore, that Provision 3 is outside the duty to bargain. C. Provision 4 Article 30, Section 14 A. The provisions of this Article apply to employees specifically covered by this Agreement who are in the competitive service or the excepted service who are not serving a probationary or trial period under an initial appointment or who have completed one (1) year of current continuous employment under other than a temporary appointment limited to one (1) year or less; except that a non-preference eligible in the excepted service may not exercise an option to appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board under Section 10 of this Article. B. The provisions do not apply to: (1) a suspension or removal in the interests of national security initiated under Section 7532 of Title 5, United States Code; (2) a reduction in force action under Article 12 of this Agreement; or (3) a reduction in grade or removal based upon unacceptable performance initiated under Article 29 of this Agreement. I. Positions of the Parties Treasury Contends that to the extent that Provision 4 permits excepted service employees to grieve disciplinary actions, it is nonnegotiable because it is contrary to "Chapter 75, Subchapter II of the Civil Service Reform Act" and 5 C.F.R. 752.401(b), a Government-wide regulation. Treasury Statement of Position at 15. Treasury asserts that the provision is contrary to chapter 75 because this chapter does not include excepted service employees in the defined categories of employees who are to be provided procedural protection against adverse actions. Treasury also relies on Department of Justice v. FLRA, 709 F.2d 724 (D.C. Cir. 1983), where the court found nonnegotiable a proposal to bring the termination of probationary employees within the scope of the parties' negotiated grievance procedure. Treasury requests the Authority to reconsider its decision in National Treasury Employees Union and Department of Health and Human Services, Region V, Chicago, Illinois, 25 FLRA 1110 (1987), petition for review filed sub nom. United States Department of Health and Human Services v. FLRA, No. 87-1595 (7th Cir. April 13, 1987), where the Authority found a proposal which included excepted service employees within the coverage of the parties' negotiated grievance procedure to be negotiable. The Union, relying on NTEU and RHS, disputes Treasury's contentions and argues that the provision is within the duty to bargain. 2. Discussion Provision 4 would permit excepted service employees to grieve adverse actions under the parties' negotiated grievance procedure. This provision is to the same effect as the proposal in NTEU and HHS. In that case, the Authority found negotiable a proposal which would include excepted service employees within the coverage of grievance, adverse action, and arbitration articles of the parties' negotiated agreement. The Authority considered the same arguments as those presented in this case and found that Congress did not intend to exclude excepted service employees from coverage of negotiated grievance procedures. We also note the Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Fausto, 56 U.S.L.W. 4128 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1988) (No. 86-595), reversing 791 F.2d 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The Court found that the comprehensive nature of the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) precluded nonpreference eligible excepted service employees from seeking judicial review under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1191, based on the Back Pay Act. The Court did not address the issue involved in NTEU and HHS and this case: the right of excepted service employees to grieve disciplinary actions under negotiated grievance procedures established under section 7121 of Title VII of the CSRA. We therefore find that the Court's decision in U.S. v. Fausto is not dispositive of the issue raised by these cases, and we reaffirm our decision in NTEU and HHS. We find nothing in the record which warrants a different conclusion as to Provision 4 from that which the Authority reached in NTEU and HHS. Consequently, for the reasons more fully set forth in that case, we find Provision 4 to be within the duty to bargain. D. Provision 5 Article 34, Section 8.C The employer agrees to furnish to the Union, for its internal use, and consistent with applicable law and regulation, a list which will contain the names and home addresses of bargaining unit employees. This list will be initially supplied within one (1) month after the effective date of this Agreement. The Employer agrees that such a list will be updated on a monthly basis to reflect additions to the bargaining unit and changes in present employee addresses. 1. Positions of the Parties Treasury contends that the provision is nonnegotiable because the disclosure of unit employees' names and home addresses is prohibited by law, namely the Privacy Act of 1974. The Union states that Provision 5 is within the duty to bargain because it is similar in effect to the proposal found negotiable by the Authority in National Labor Relations Board Union and National Labor Relations Board Office of the General Counsel and the Board, 24 FLRA 917 (1986), petition for review filed sub nom. National Labor Relations Board v. FLRA, No. 87-1108 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 26, 1987). The Union also cites Farmers Home Administration Finance Office, St. Louis Missouri, 23 FLRA 788 (1988) (Farmers Home), enforced in part and remanded sub nom. U.S. Department of Agriculture and Farmers Home Administration Finance Office, St. Louis Missouri v. FLRA, No. 86-2579 (8th Cir. Jan. 15, 1988), petitions for rehearing filed. 2. Discussion Provision 5 would require the Agency to provide the union with a list of the names and home addresses of bargaining unit employees. The provision is similar in effect to the proposal which the Authority found to be negotiable in Office of the General Counsel and the Board. In that case, relying on Farmers Home, the Authority stated that the release of the type of information sought by the Union--the names and home addresses of unit employees--was not barred by law and was related to a union's ongoing representational responsibilities. Consequently, the Authority concluded that the proposal was within the duty to bargain. We therefore find, consistent with Office of the General Counsel and the Board, that Provision 5 is within the duty to bargain. See also National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 1655 and Adjutant General of Illinois, 24 FLRA 3 (1986); U.S. Department of the Air Force, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois v. FLRA, Nos. 87-1143, 87-1272 (7th Cir. Jan. 27, 1988), affirming Department of the Air Force, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, 24 FLRA 226 (1986); Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security Administration v. FLRA, 833 F.2d 1129 (4th Cir. 1987), petition for rehearing filed Jan. 8, 1988, affirming Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security Administration, 24 FLRA 543 (1986); Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security Administration and Social Security Administration Field Operations, New York Region, 24 FLRA 583 (1986); Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security Administration, 24 FLRA 660-(1986). III. Proposals Declared Nonnegotiable by Customs A. Proposal 1 Article 13, Section 55C An employee returning from maternity leave may request to work part time or to participate in a job-sharing program on a temporary or permanent basis. The request will be made in writing at least 45 days in advance of the employee's return. The employer will consider such requests and make a determination based on the employer's need for the employee's services, suitability of the position for conversion to part time, availability of resources and or impact on the efficiency of the Service. After consideration of these factors, unless to do so would have an adverse effect upon the efficiency of the service, such requests will be granted. The employer will provide the employee with a written decision within 30 days from the date of the request. Thereafter, a grievance may be initiated at the Step 3 level as set forth in Article 31 Grievance Procedure. 1. Positions of the Parties Customs contends that the proposal directly interferes with management's right to assign work under section 7106(a)(2)(B) of the Statute and is, therefore, outside the duty to bargain. According to Customs, the proposal would prevent management from denying an employee's request if it could not demonstrate negative impact on the efficiency of the service. Customs also claims that the proposal would limit management's ability to require an employee to return to full-time status if needed, since the decision to do so would be left to the discretion of the employee. Customs further asserts that the proposal is not within the duty to bargain because it involves the numbers, types, and grades of employees under section 7106(b)(1) of the Statute. The Union states that Proposal 1 is consistent with Agency regulations as well as Government-wide rules and regulations implementing part-time employment. The Union further asserts that the proposal does not infringe on management's right to assign work or to determine the numbers, types, and grades of employees. The union maintains that Proposal 1 constitutes a negotiable procedure under section 7106(b)(2) of the Statute. 2. Discussion Proposal 1 describes how employees returning from maternity leave could request part-time employment or job sharing on a temporary or permanent basis. The proposal would require Customs to grant an employee's request to work part-time or in a job sharing capacity unless to do so would have an adverse effect upon the efficiency of the service. The Union asserts that the proposal would not infringe on management's rights because the proposal specifically identifies "suitability of the position for conversion to part-time" as one of the criteria to be used by the Agency in granting the request. Union Reply to Customs Statement of Position at 6. The Union claims that its proposal "only requires the Agency to evaluate an employee's request for part-time work and, if after evaluation it determines the granting of part-time status meets the needs of the Service, to grant the employee's request." Id. at 5. We find that Proposal 1 concerns a negotiable procedure to be followed in connection with Customs' implementation of its part-time employment program, pursuant to the Federal Employees Part - Time Career Employment Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. 3401 et seq., and, therefore, is within the duty to bargain under section 7106(b)(2) of the Statute. We find that the proposal does not conflict with the Agency's right to assign work under section 7106(a)(2)(B) of the Statute and does not interfere with Customs' right under section 7106(b)(1) to determine the numbers, types, and grades of employees to perform part-time work. Considering the Union's explanation of how the proposal would operate in conjunction with the wording of the second and fourth sentences, in our view the proposal would not interfere with management's right to assign work. The proposal specifically allows management to take into consideration the need for the employee's services when considering an employee's request. There is no indication from the wording of the proposal that the phrase "adverse effect upon the efficiency of the Service" is intended to restrict management's control over deciding and defining what the demands of its work require and the personnel needed to accomplish the work. The proposal clearly allows management to consider the employee's request to work part-time or in a job sharing capacity on the basis of the need for the employee's services, availability of resources, and the impact on the efficiency of the service. In view of this wording, we find that the proposal would not prevent management from denying an employee's request to work part-time or requiring an employee to return to full-time work if management determined that the assignment would have an adverse effect on the efficiency of the service. We find, therefore, that the proposal does not interfere with management's right to assign work. See, for example, National Federation of Federal Employees and Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, 29 FLRA 1491, 1514 (1987), petition for review filed sub nom. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management v. FLRA, No. 87-1838 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 29, 1987). See also American Federation of Government Employees, Local 2185 and Tooele, Army Depot, Tooele, Utah, 23 FLRA 193 (1986) (Proposal 3). Compare American Federation of Government Employees, AFL - CIO, Local 3804 and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Madison Region, 21 FLRA 870 (1986), where the Authority found that Proposal 2 interfered with the right to assign work because it precluded the agency from requiring an employee to return to work at any point during a period of leave for maternity reasons, even if the employee was able to do so and the agency determined that it needed the employee's services. We now examine Customs' claim that the proposal is outside the duty to bargain because it involves the numbers and types of employees or positions needed to perform the Agency's work under section 7106(b)(1). We find, contrary to Customs' argument, that the proposal would not infringe on this right. We find that the proposal would not directly interfere with management's right to determine the numbers and types of employees or positions assigned to a work project, tour of duty, or organizational unit under section 7106(b)(1). Management could deny an employee's request if it determined that converting a full-time position to part-time was not suitable. Nothing in the proposal or the record suggests that management would be obligated to convert certain positions to part-time if it determined that to do so would make its staffing patterns unacceptable. Therefore, the proposal would not infringe on the Agency's discretion to determine whether to use part-time employees; rather, it sets forth a procedure to be used by the Agency in evaluating an employee's request for part-time work. Compare National Treasury Employees Union and Department of Health and Human services, Region X, 25 FLRA 1041 (1987), where the Authority found that Proposal 6, which concerned the use of part-time employees, was nonnegotiable under section 7106(b)(1) because it forced the agency to make conversions when possible despite the agency's judgment as to their desirability. The proposal in that case, unlike the proposal here, did not take into account the agency's need for the employee's services, suitability of the position for conversion, or the impact of the conversion on the efficiency of the agency. We find, therefore, that the proposal does not interfere with management's right to determine the numbers, types, and grades of employees or positions under section 7106(b)(1), and is within the duty to bargain. B. Proposals 2 and 3 Article 23 (Proposal 2) Employees attending Glynco training center will not be required to live on base or in government provided housing. Those choosing to make their own housing arrangements will be reimbursed an amount equivalent to that which Customs pays Glynco per student for room and board. If requested, these funds will be provided to the employee before his departure from his duty station. (Proposal 3) Bargaining unit employees attending the Glynco training center or traveling on official business for any other purpose will not be required to share a room. 1. Positions of the Parties Customs asserts that Proposals 2 and 3 are nonnegotiable under section 7117(a)(1) of the Statute because they are inconsistent with: (1) regulations governing the operation of the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), which are Government-wide regulations; and (2) 5 U.S.C. 5911(e), which regulates government housing for employees. Customs Statement of Position at 3. According to Customs, FLETC's operational directives, which contain on-site lodging policy for students attending the training center, apply to a substantial segment of the Federal work force, that is, to all agencies which use the facility, and therefore constitute Government-wide rules or regulations. Id. at 5. Customs states that 50 Federal agencies use the FLETC, and that once an agency decides to use the training center, it must comply with the center's directives. Id. The Union states that the lodging requirement promulgated by the FLETC director does not constitute a Government-wide rule or regulation because the on-site policy was promulgated by the director and not the Secretary of the Treasury. Union Response to Customs Statement of Position at 7. The Union states that the FLETC is an organizational entity within the Department of the Treasury and, therefore, its director has no legal authority to impose such a requirement. Finally, citing National Weather Service Employees Organization, MEBA, AFL - CIO and Department of Commerce, National Weather Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 21 FLRA 590 (1986), the Union states that Customs' argument concerning 5 U.S.C. 5911(e) is without merit. 2. Discussion Proposal 2 grants employees attending the FLETC the option of living in Government-provided housing or making their own housing arrangements. If employees elect to make their own arrangements, the proposal would require Customs to reimburse these employees an amount equal to what Customs would pay for room and board if the employees stayed in Government-provided housing. Proposal 3 provides that employees attending the FLETC or traveling on official business for any other purpose would not be required to share a room. a. Whether the Proposals are Inconsistent with a Government-wide Rule or Rule or Regulation Customs contends that the proposals are outside the duty to bargain because they conflict with a Government-wide rule or regulation governing lodging at the FLETC. In National Treasury Employees Union, Chapter 6 and Internal Revenue Service, New Orleans District, 3 FLRA 748 (1980), the Authority determined that he term "Government-wide regulation" was intended to include regulations and official declarations of policy which apply to the Federal civilian work force as a whole, although not necessarily to every Federal employee. FLETC is an organizational entity within the Department of the Treasury. The directive which Customs contends constitutes a Government-wide rule or regulation was issued by the director of the training center, governs only the internal operations of the FLETC, and applies to Federal employees only insofar as they are students at the facility. We conclude, contrary to Customs' position, that the directive is not a Government-wide regulation within the meaning of section 7117(a)(1). The directive applies only to those Federal employees who attend the training center. The directive is unlike the Department of State Standardized Regulations (DSSRs) which the Authority found to be Government-wide regulations in Overseas Education Association, Inc. and Department of Defense, Office of Dependents Schools, 22 FLRA 351 (1986) (Proposal 2), affirmed sub non. Oversea Education Association v. FLRA, 827 F.2d 814 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The DSSRs are aplicable to all civilian Federal employees travelling or working overseas on behalf of the Federal Government, and are not limited in their application to employees while located at one facility. Thus, tbey apply throughout the Federal Government in a manner in which the directive does not. Based on the above analysis, we find that the directive at issue here does not constitute a Government-wide rule or regulation within the meaning of section 7117(a)(1). b. Whether the Proposals are Inconsistent with 5 U.S.C. 5911(e) Customs contends that the proposals are also outside the duty to bargain because they conflict with 5 U.S.C. 5911(e), which states that "the head of an agency may not require an employee . . . to occupy quarters on a rental basis, unless the agency head determines that necessary service cannot be rendered, or that property of the Government cannot adequately be protected, otherwise." Customs also contends that the proposal is inconsistent with Comptroller General Decision B-177752 (May 17, 1973) (unpublished) and the cases cited therein. Customs, arguments are similar to arguments considered and rejected by, the Authority in National Weather Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 21 FLRA 590 (1986). In that case, the proposal allowed employees who were students at the National Weather Service Training Center to arrange for their own housing instead of being required to stay in agency-arranged housing. The Authority found that 5 U.S.C. 5911(e) did not preclude negotiations on the proposal. The Authority found that the proposal was not inconsistent with 5 U.S.C. 5911(e) because that provision did not mandate that agencies require employees who are students to reside in agency-contracted housing. Rather, the Authority found that under 5 U.S.C. 5911(e), the agency's decision concerning housing was a matter within the discretion of the agency so that management could agree to allow those employees to contract for their own housing without violating law. Similarly, the Agency here would not be precluded by 5 U.S.C. 5911(e) from agreeing to allow employees who are students at the Glynco training center to contract for their own housing while at the center. In the decision cited by Customs, the Comptroller General found that, under 5 U.S.C. 5911(e), the agency had properly denied payment of the housing expenses of an employee who had stayed in a motel during his training rather than in Government-provided housing. The denial of payment was proper, the Comptroller General held, because the agency had determined that the use of Government-provided housing was necessary for the completion of the employee's training. The Comptroller General stated that where that determination had been made, the payment of housing expenses for housing obtained by the employee was impermissible. The requirement for that determination, however, does not preclude bargaining over the subject matter of the determination. National Treasury Employees Union and Department of the Treasury, U.S. Customs Service, 21 FLRA 6 (1986), affirmed Department of the Treasury, W.S. Customs Service v. FLRA No. 86-1198 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 19, 1988). We therefore find, consistent with National Weather Service, National Oceanic and At Administration, that the proposals here are not inconsistent with 5 U.S.C. 5911(e) or Comptroller General Decision B-177752. Accordingly, the proposals are within the duty to bargain. c. Proposal 4 Article 31, Section 4(A)(9) The following matters are specifically excluded from the coverage of this Article: (9) Nonselection for promotion from a group of properly ranked and certified candidates unless grievance involves an alleged violation of Articles 3, 4, or 6. (Only the underlined portion of the proposal is in dispute.) 1. Positions of the Parties Customs contends that Proposal 4 is outside the duty to bargain because it: (1) is inconsistent with the FPM, chapter 335, subchapter 1-6, a Government-wide rule and regulation; and (2) interferes with management's right under section 7106(a)(2)(C) to choose among candidates from appropriate sources in filling a vacancy. The Union merely arcgues that the proposal establishes an employee's right to grieve a nonselection for promotion if the employee alleges the nonselection was based on a violation of employees' rights under section 7102 of the Statute, union rights under section 7114, or a prohibited personnel practice under 5 U.S.C. 2302. 2. Discussion Proposal 4 would allow an employee to grieve a promotion action in matters involving an allegation of a violation of: (1) an employee's section 7102 rights; (2) a prohibited personnel practice under 5 U.S.C. 2302; or (3) union rights under section 7114. Customs argues that the FPM, chapter 335, subchapter 1-6 expressly states that "non-selection for promotion is not grievable." Customs Statement of Position at 6. We find, contrary to Customs' argument, that OPM regulations cannot limit the statutorily prescribed scope of the negotiated grievance procedure. Our finding is consistent with American Federation of Government Employees, AFL - CIO, Local 2782 and Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Washington, D.C., 6 FLRA 314, 322 (1981). In that case, the Authority considered a similar argument with respect to FPM chapter 335, subchapter 1-6, and concluded that "OPM regulations . . . may not be applied in a manner inconsistent with the scope of negotiated grievance procedures allowed under section 7121 of the Statute." The Authority noted that the list of matters excluded from the coverage of the negotiated grievance procedures by section 7121(c) of the statute did not include the nonselection of a repromotion eligible. The Authority held that the Statute and its relevant legislative history required that grievance procedures negotiated under section 7121 cover all matters that under the provisions of law could be submitted to the grievance procedure unless the parties exclude them through bargaining. Our finding in this case is also consistent with the holding of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in EEOC v FLRA, 744 F.2d 842, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. dismissed, 476 U.S. 19 (1986), wherein the court stated that "(t)here is no indication in the (Statute) or elsewhere of a congressional intent to allow agencies to limit by regulation the statutorily defined grievance procedure." We conclude, therefore, that FPM, chapter 335, subchapter 1-6 does not bar the proposal from negotiations. We now consider Customs' contention that the proposal is inconsistent with section 7106(a) (2) (C) of the Statute because it would result in review by an arbitrator of management's decision to make selections from appropriate sources. Consistent with our decision in Newark Air Force Station and American Federation of Government Employees, Local 2221, 30 FLRA 616, 636 (1987), we reject customs' contention. In that case, we concluded that arbitral review of a management action to determine whether the action complied with law or regulation is consistent with congressional intent concerning the functions which arbitrators perform under the Statute. Although Newark Air Force Station involved exceptions to an arbitrator's award, he same principle applies to the negotiability of a proposal which seeks to ensure that management will exercise its section 7106 rights consistent with law. In determining whether an employee has not been selected for a position for reasons which are inconsistent with sections 7102 and 7114 of the Statute or 5 U.S.C. 2302, an arbitrator would be determining whether the nonselection of the employee complied with law. See also General Services Administration and American Federation of Government Employees, AFL - CIO National Council 236, 27 FLRA 3, 7-8 (1987). The Authority has held that the award of an arbitrator in a case involving a disputed selection action does not violate management's right under the Statute to make selections for promotion where the arbitrator finds a direct connection between improper agency action and the failure to select a specific employee for promotion. U.S. Naval Ordnance Station, Louisville, Kentucky and International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Local Lodge 830, 22 FLRA 382 (1986). Specifically, to order the selection of a particular employee for a promotion, an arbitrator must reconstruct what the responsible selecting official would have done if the unwarranted agency actions had not occurred and must find on the basis of that reconstruction that the responsible selecting official would have selected the grievant but for the unwarranted actions. Id. Where the arbitrator does not reconstruct the selection action, the arbitrator may order the agency to rerun or reconstruct the selection action as a remedy. See Local R-1-185, National Association of Government Employees and the Adjutant General of the state of Connecticut, 25 FLRA 509 (1987). However, the Authority has also held that the incumbent employee in these cases is entitled to be retained in the position pending corrective action unless it is specifically determined that the incumbent could not originally have been properly selected under law and regulation and the parties' collective bargaining agreement. See, for example, American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1546 and Sharpe Army Depot, Department of the Army, Lathrop, California, 16 FLRA 1122 (1984). There is nothing in the proposal or in the record in this case which indicates that in reviewing a selection action claimed to violate the parties' contract, an arbitrator would be empowered to act in any manner that is inconsistent with applicable law. Thus, under this proposal Customs retains its right to make selections. We therefore conclude that Customs has not sustained its contention that this proposal violates section 7106(a)(2)(C) of the Statute. We find that Proposal 4 does not directly interfere with management's right under section 7106(a)(2)(C) to make selections to fill positions and, therefore, that it is within the duty to bargain. D. Proposals 5, 6, and 7 (Proposal 5) Article 21 The union will be represented by up to six (6) bargaining unit employees plus National staff members. Bargaining unit employees participating in these negotiations will be granted official time necessary to travel to and participate in all aspects of the negotiation process. In addition, bargaining unit employees shall receive necessary travel and per diem expenses. (Proposal 6) Article 31 During the negotiations of the National Agreement between the U.S. Customs Service and the National Treasury Employees Union, each party had the opportunity to discuss and negotiate Article 31, Grievance Procedure. As a result of those discussions, the parties have agreed to form a joint working group, consisting of an equal number of Employer and Union representatives, to identify the existing problems concerning the administration of the third step of the grievance procedure. The committee will make recommendations to the Deputy Commissioner of Customs to resolve the identified problems. Union representatives shall receive necessary travel and per diem expenses incurred while participating on this joint working group. (Proposal 7) Article 37, Section 7(4) Where negotiating meetings are required, the meetings will be conducted as follows: (4) An employee representing the Union in negotiations on official time under this Article shall be entitled to reimbursement for travel and per diem expenses if otherwise eligible under applicable law and regulations. (Only the underlined sentences are in dispute.) 1. Positions of the Parties Customs contends that Proposals 5, 6, and 7 are nonnegotiable because they violate the Travel Expense Act, 5 U.S.C. 5701 et seq. and its implementing regulations, the Federal Travel Regulations. Customs requested the Authority to stay this case until the court issued its decision in Department of the Treasury, U.S. Customs Service v. FLRA, No. 86-1198 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 19, 1988). Citing the Authority's decision in National Treasury Employees Union and Department of the Treasury, U.S. Customs Service, 21 FLRA 6 (1986) (Customs), the Union contends that its proposals requiring Customs to pay travel and per cdiem expenses for employees engaged in labor relations activity are within the duty to bargain. The Union also states that its proposals are to be applied "in accordance with (G)overnment-wide rules and regulations." Union Petition for Review at 9. 2. Discussion Proposals 5, 6, and 7 would require Customs to pay travel and per diem to employee Union representatives on official time while engaged in labor relations activities. In Customs, the Authority rejected arguments similar to those in this case and determined that a proposal which required the payment of travel and per diem for union officials on official time was not inconsistent with Federal law or Government-wide regulations. The Authority found that agencies have discretion under the Travel Expense Act to determine whether and under what circumstances travel attendant to labor-management relations activities is sufficiently within the interest of the United States so as to constitute official business and, hence, to pay for resulting appropriate expenses from Federal funds. The Authority further found that the exercise of that discretion is subject to the negotiation process. In Department of the Treasury, U.S. Customs Service v. FLRA, No. 86-1198 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 19, 1988), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit enforced the Authority's decision in Customs. The court concluded that the Authority "correctly decided that there is a large measure of discretion in the determination of an agency's convenience and the government's primary interest (under the Travel Expense Act), and that the (A)gency . . . must bargain as to its exercise of that discretion." Slip op. at 10. Consistent with our decision in Customs, therefore, we find that Proposals 5, 6, and 7 are within the duty to bargain. IV. Order The petition for review is dismissed as to Provisions 1, 2, and 3. The Department of Treasury must rescind its disapproval of Provisions 4 and 5. The U.S. Customs Service must upon request, or as otherwise agreed to by the parties, bargain concerning Proposals 1-7. 2 Issued, Washington, D.C., February 22, 1988. Jerry L. Calhoun, Chairman Jean McKee, Member FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS FOOTNOTES Footnote 1 The Union withdrew its appeal as to Article 16, Section 14A and Article 24, Section 7(b). Union Response to Treasury, Statement of Position at 1-2. These provisions will not be considered. Footnote 2 In deciding that certain provisions and proposals are within the duty to bargain, we make no judgment as to their merits.