[ v21 p253 ]
21:0253(35)CA
The decision of the Authority follows:
21 FLRA No. 35
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION AND SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION, FIELD OPERATIONS
NEW YORK REGION
Respondent
and
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO
Charging Party
Case No. 2-CA-40303
2-CA-40304
2-CA-40343
2-CA-40350
DECISION AND ORDER
I. Statement of the Case
This unfair labor practice case is before the Authority because of
exceptions filed by the General Counsel and the Charging Party to the
attached Decision of the Administrative Law Judge. The issue concerns
whether the Respondent violated section 7116(a)(1), (5) and (8) of the
Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (the Statute) by
failing and refusing to furnish the Charging Party with information it
had requested pursuant to section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute.
II. Background and Judge's Conclusion
The instant case involves a consolidated complaint. In each of the
cases involved in the complaint, the record reveals that the Charging
Party requested the following information: (1) Case No. 2-CA-40303 --
unsanitized copies of the official time and attendance records for all
employees in the East New York Office for the period of October 1, 1983
to March 13, 1984; (2) Case No. 2-CA-40304 -- unsanitized copies of
progress reviews and performance appraisals for all bargaining unit
employees in the Murray Hill Office for the period of January 1, 1983 to
March 15, 1984; (3) Case No. 2-CA-40343 -- unsanitized copies of all
progress reviews and performance appraisals for all Title II Claims
Representatives in the Jamaica Office for the period of January 1, 1983
to March 20, 1984; and (4) Case No. 2-CA-40350 -- unsanitized copies of
various information related to Title II Claims Representatives in the
Downtown District Office (e.g., annual performance appraisals,
performance improvement plans, weekly District Office Work Report (DOWR)
statistics, interviewing time studies, etc.) for the period of January
7, 1983 to February 29, 1984.
The Judge observed that the record revealed that the Charging Party
requested the information to use in connection with a grievance or to
determine whether to file grievances; however, these reasons were never
disclosed to the Respondent. When the Respondent sought more
information concerning the Charging Party's requests, the Charging Party
responded with "cryptic and conclusionary references" to certain
provisions of the Statute. The Judge found that the necessity of the
requested data was never conveyed to the Respondent by the Charging
Party and that it was not apparent from the surrounding circumstances
why such requested data was necessary. He therefore concluded that the
obligation to establish the necessity of the data had not been met and
thus the Respondent was not obligated under the Statute to furnish it.
The Judge further addressed the arguments raised by the parties in
connection with the Privacy Act, particularly, the Respondent's
assertion that the "presumptive relevance theory" asserted by the
General Counsel was inapplicable to the information requests because of
Privacy Act considerations and the General Counsel's contention that the
requirements of the Privacy Act had been met. In addressing these
assertions, the Judge cited the Supreme Court's decision in Detroit
Edison Company v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301 (1979), among other cases, and
noted that even assuming the information requested were presumptively
relevant, since the Charging Party was seeking unsanitized data of a
personal nature, the Respondent's obligation to adhere to the Privacy
Act had to be balanced against the Charging Party's need for the
information. Considering the Respondent's obligations under the Privacy
Act and the Statute, he found no merit to the General Counsel's
"presumptive relevance theory" in the circumstances of this case where
the necessity of the data to the Charging Party was never conveyed to
the Respondent and such necessity was not apparent from the surrounding
circumstances.
In view of the above, the Judge ordered that the consolidated
complaint be dismissed in its entirety.
III. Positions of the Parties
The General Counsel basically argues that the information sought by
the Charging Party was necessary and relevant to enable it to determine
whether a grievance or EEO complaint should be filed under the parties'
agreement or to take other appropriate action; that the requirement for
establishing relevancy and necessity was met because the information was
"presumptively relevant"; and that the Judge erred by failing to find
the violations as alleged. Further, both the General Counsel and the
Charging Party assert that the "routine use" exception in the Privacy
Act permits the disclosure of the requested information. More
specifically, the General Counsel asserts that section 552(a)(b)(3) of
the Privacy Act permits the disclosure of the requested information
which is contained in a system of records maintained by the Office of
Personnel Management (OPM) identified as OPM/GOVT-2, "Employee
Performance File System Records." Additionally, they argue that the
Judge erroneously concluded that the Charging Party waived its right to
data related to the DOWR statistics in Case No. 2-CA-40350.
IV. Analysis
In agreement with the Judge, the Authority finds that the General
Counsel has not met the burden of proving that the Respondent failed to
comply with section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute in violation of section
7116(a)(1), (5) and (8) of the Statute when it failed to furnish the
requested information to the Charging Party. In reaching this
conclusion, the Authority rejects the General Counsel's contention that
the information sought was presumptively relevant. Rather, as the
Authority has previously held, section 7114(b)(4)(B) of the Statute
requires that the information requested be "reasonably available and
necessary," Social Security Administration, Office of Hearings and
Appeals, Region II, New York, New York, 19 FLRA No. 47 (1985), and that
a union's bare assertion that it needs data to process a grievance does
not automatically oblige the agency to supply such data, but the duty to
supply data under section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute turns upon the
nature of the request and the circumstances in each particular case.
Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES), Fort Carson, Colorado, 17
FLRA 624 (1985), petition for review filed sub nom. American Federation
of Government Employees, Local 1345 v. FLRA, No. 85-1378 (D.C. Cir. June
21, 1985). In the instant case, the record reveals that the necessity
for the requested information was not apparent from the circumstances
and that the Charging Party failed to divulge the reasons why it was
seeking the information despite management's reasonable requests for
clarification so that it could make an informed judgment as to whether
or to what extent the information sought was necessary for collective
bargaining purposes. The Charging Party failed even to state that it
was seeking the information in connection with a grievance or to
determine whether to file a grievance. Thus, under such circumstances,
the Authority finds that the Respondent did not unlawfully refuse to
furnish the data sought by the Charging Party. See Internal Revenue
Service, Buffalo District, Buffalo, New York, 7 FLRA 654 (1982). /*/
Additionally, the Authority finds, without passing upon the Judge's
conclusion that the Charging Party waived its right to obtain DOWR
statistics in Case No. 2-CA-40350, that under the circumstances the
Respondent never refused to furnish such information. Rather, the
evidence reveals that the Charging Party simply refused to follow
through on its arrangement with the Respondent under which the DOWR
statistics were made available for photocopying by the Charging Party.
V. Conclusion
Pursuant to section 2423.29 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations
and section 7118 of the Statute, the Authority has reviewed the rulings
of the Judge made at the hearing, finds that no prejudicial error was
committed, and thus affirms those rulings. The Authority has considered
the Judge's Decision, the exceptions to that Decision, the positions of
the parties and the entire record, and adopts the Judge's findings,
conclusions and recommended Order except as noted in the footnote. We
therefore conclude that the Respondent did not fail to comply with
section 7114(b)(4) in violation of section 7116(a)(1), (5) and (8) of
the Statute when it refused to provide the information sought by the
Charging Party. Accordingly, the complaint shall be dismissed in its
entirety.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that the consolidated complaint in Case Nos.
2-CA-40303, 2-CA-40304, 2-CA-40343 and 2-CA-40350 be, and it hereby is,
dismissed.
Issued, Washington, D.C., April 14, 1986.
/s/ Jerry L. Calhoun, Chairman
/s/ Henry B. Frazier III, Member
FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY
-------------------- ALJ$ DECISION FOLLOWS --------------------
Case Nos. 2-CA-40303, 2-CA-40304, 2-CA-40343, 2-CA-40350
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION AND SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, FIELD
OPERATIONS, NEW YORK REGION
Respondent
and
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO
Charging Party
Thomas H. Gabriel, Esq.
For the Respondent
Douglas Chauvin
For the Charging Party
Joel Hornstein, Esq. and
E. A. Jones, Esq.
For the General Counsel
Before: SALVATORE J. ARRIGO
Administrative Law Judge
DECISION
Statement of the Case
This matter arose under the Federal Service Labor-Management
Relations Statute, Chapter 71 of Title 5 of the U.S. Code, 5 U.S.C.
Section 7101, et seq.
Upon an unfair labor practice charge filed by the American Federation
of Government Employees, AFL-CIO (herein referred to as AFGE or the
Union) against the Department of Health and Human Services, Social
Security Administration and Social Security Administration, Field
Operations, New York Region (herein referred to as Respondent), the
General Counsel of the Authority, by the Regional Director for Region
II, issued a Consolidated Complaint and Notice of Hearing alleging
Respondent violated section 7116(a)(1)(5) and (8) of the Statute
essentially by failing and refusing to furnish the Union with various
information requested by the Union.
A hearing on the Complaint was conducted in New York, New York at
which all parties were represented and afforded full opportunity to
adduce evidence, call, examine and cross-examine witnesses and argue
orally. The parties submitted a Stipulation of Facts and thereafter,
briefs were filed by Respondent and Counsel for the General Counsel
which have been carefully considered.
Upon the entire record in this matter I make the following:
Findings of Fact /1/
At all times material the Union has been the exclusive collective
bargaining representative of various of Respondent's employees including
employees located in Respondent's East New York Branch Office, the
Murray Hill Branch Office, the Jamaica District Office and the Downtown
District Office. The unit employees in the four New York area offices
mentioned above were, by delegation of authority, represented by AFGE
Local 3369 (herein sometimes referred to as the Union). At all times
material Respondent and the Union were parties to a collective
bargaining agreement the terms of which applied to all unit employees
represented by Local 3369.
Case No. 2-CA-40303, -- East New York Office
On or about March 13, 1984 Douglas L. Chauvin, a Vice President of
AFGE Local 3369, was contacted by the AFGE Local 3369 on-site union
representative from Respondent's East New York Branch Office. The local
representative informed Chauvin that a bargaining unit employee at the
East New York Branch Office, upon returning to work from a day of sick
leave, had been told by her supervisor that sick leave restrictions
might be placed upon her. As a result of the discussion with the
on-site representative the Union believed that a potential grievance
existed regarding the imposition of sick leave restrictions at
Respondent's East New York Branch Office. /2/ Accordingly, on March 13,
1984 Chauvin sent the following letter to Lester Gray, Manager of
Respondent's East New York Branch Office where the Union represents 16
bargaining unit employees out of a total compliment of 42 employees:
"Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 7103(a)(9) and 5 U.S.C. 7114, I would
like unsanitized copies of the official time and attendance
records for all of the employees in your office for the period
October 1, 1983 through March 13, 1984. This information is
necessary and relevant so Local 3369 can fairly and adequately
represent the interests of the employees in your office.
"Please provide me with this information at the address below
on or before March 23, 1984." /3/
On March 15, 1984 Gray replied to Chauvin as follows:
"In response to your letter of March 13, 1984, I am requesting
that you provide more information concerning the need for the
material you seek. Before this data can be released to you, I
must make a determination whether it is relevant and necessary."
Chauvin's March 22 reply to Gray stated:
"I received your letter dated March 15, 1984 in which you
refuse to provide me with the information I requested in my letter
dated March 13, 1984. My letter provides the appropriate
statutory references for you to make your determination. You may
also want to refer to Article 24 of the national negotiated
agreement.
"Please provide me with the information I requested before the
close of business on March 29, 1984."
The parties engaged in no other communication concerning the
requested information and Respondent has never supplied the Union with
the information.
Although its reasons were never communicated to Respondent, the Union
requested the information to determine sick leave patterns in
Respondent's East New York Branch Office, how unit employees were
treated regarding excessive sick leave usage, whether such treatment
conformed to the collective bargaining agreement and because the Union
believed that such information would be relevant to a determination on
whether to file a grievance or to take other appropriate action. In the
Union's opinion the information sought was required in unsanitized form
in order to permit it to fully investigate and pursue a potential
grievance.
The information requested was not available to the Union from any
other source and was normally maintained by Respondent in the regular
course of business, was reasonably available to Respondent and did not
constitute guidance, advice, counsel or training provided for management
officials or supervisors relating to collective bargaining.
Case No. 2-CA-40304 -- Murray Hill Office
In or around early March 1984 Local 3369 Vice President Chauvin was
contacted by the AFGE Local 3369 on-site union representative from
Respondent's Murray Hill Branch Office. The local representative told
Chauvin she had handled the first and second steps of a performance
appraisal grievance for a bargaining unit employee but was not familiar
with step 3 proceedings. As a result of the discussion with the on-site
representative, the Union believed that it would need certain
information relevant to the processing of the grievance at the third
step. Accordingly, on March 15, 1984 Local 3369 sent the following
letter to David Gold, the Manager of Respondent's Murray Hill Branch
Office where the Union represents approximately 15 bargaining unit
employees:
"Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 7103(a)(9) and 5 U.S.C. 7114, I would
like unsanitized copies of progress reviews and performance
appraisals for all of the bargaining unit employees in your office
for the period January 1, 1983 to March 15, 1984.
"I will expect your reply to this request on or before March
22, 1984. Please reply to the address below."
On March 27, 1984 Gold replied:
"This is in response to your request for information dated
March 15, 1984, received March 20, 1984, concerning 5 U.S.C.
7103(a)(9) and 5 U.S.C. 7114.
"Your request is deficient in that it does not identify the
issue upon which it is based, it does not explain why all job
categories are required and it does not indicate why unsanitized
copies are needed.
"I will give your request further consideration if you clarify
the deficiencies as stated above."
On or about March 27, 1984, Vice President Chauvin and Murray Hill
Branch Manager Gold telephonically discussed the Union's March 15, 1984
information request. In this conversation Gold asked Chauvin the issue
for which the information was being requested. He also asked Chauvin
why he wanted unsanitized information and whether it was related to a
grievance or grievances, Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint or
any other matter. Chauvin replied that the Charging Party's letter of
March 15, 1984, supra, was explicit enough for Respondent to release the
information sought. He also advised Gold that he would make another
request for the information.
Chauvin, on the same date, sent Gold the following letter:
"Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 7103(a)(9) and 5 U.S.C. 7114, I am making
this second request for unsanitized copies of progress reviews and
performance appraisals for all of the bargaining unit employees in
your office for the period January 1, 1983 to March 15, 1984.
This information is relevant and necessary for Local 3369 to
fairly and adequately represent an employee(s) in your office.
"Please provide this information to me at the address below on
or before the close of business on April 6, 1984."
Gold's reply to Chauvin of April 2, 1984 stated:
"Your second letter still does not identify what the issue
involves or even if there is an issue. Further, you have not
attempted to explain why all job categories are needed or why it
must be in unsanitized form. I requested the clarification in my
response to your first letter and in our telephone conversation of
February 27, 1984. In our telephone conversation you stated that
you are entitled to this information as the employee(s)
representative and you refused to clarify further. I, however,
must balance this intrusion into the personal privacy of the
employee(s) vs your need of the information in the form requested
by you. Consequently, I will give your request for information
further consideration if you advise me of the issue, the reason
for the need of unsanitized copies etc. etc."
On April 9, 1984 Chauvin sent the following letter to Gold:
"I regret that I have to make this third request for
information. My letters to you dated March 15, 1984 and March 27,
1984 provide sufficient reasons for you to release the information
I requested to me.
"In our phone conversation on March 27, 1984, not February 27,
1984 as you allege in your letter to me dated April 2, 1984, I
referred to the right of the exclusive representative to have
access to the information I requested and I gave as one example
the right of the exclusive representative to monitor the
employer's compliance with a collective bargaining agreement.
"The issue and the reason for the need of the information are
clearly specified in my letters dated March 15, 1984 and March 27,
1984. You might also want to refer to Article 24 of the
collective bargaining agreement. In addition, the information is
necessary for full and proper discussion, understanding, and
negotiation of subjects within the scope of collective bargaining.
"Unless I receive the information I requested in my letters
dated March 14, 1983 and March 27, 1984 on or before April 16,
1984, I will take other appropriate action with respect to my
requests for the information."
On April 16, 1984 Gold sent the following reply to Chauvin:
"This is in response to your letter of April 9, 1984. As I
have stated previously, since you have not identified an issue (or
even whether there is an issue), not explained why all positions
are needed, and not explained why the information must be
unsanitized I cannot release it to you. If and when you comply
with my request for clarification I will be glad to help you."
Other than the six letters and the conversation referred to above,
there were no other communications between Respondent and the Union
regarding the information requested herein and Respondent never
furnished the Union with the data.
Although its reasons were never communicated to Respondent, the Union
requested the information to assist it in its preparation for a third
step grievance. In the Union's opinion the information sought was
required in unsanitized form to permit it to fully investigate and
process the third step grievance. /4/
The information requested was not available to the Union from any
other source and was normally maintained by Respondent in the regular
course of business, was reasonably available to Respondent and did not
constitute guidance, advice, counsel or training provided for management
officials or supervisors relating to collective bargaining.
Case No. 2-CA-40343 -- Jamaica Office
In or around October 1983 Local 3369 Vice President Chauvin was
contacted by a bargaining unit employee who worked in Respondent's
Jamaica District Office. The employee told Chauvin she was dissatisfied
with her October 1983 appraisal and she suspected another unit employee
had received a better appraisal because of favoritism on the part of
their mutual supervisor. As a result of the discussion with the
bargaining unit employee, the Union believed that, inter alia, a
potential grievance existed regarding favoritism and on March 20, 1984
Local 3369 President John Riordan sent the following letter to Susan
Pike, Manager of Respondent's Jamaica District Office where the Union
represents approximately 104 bargaining unit employees of whom 21 or 22
are Title II Claims Representatives:
"Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 7103(a)(9) and 5 U.S.C. 7114, I would
like unsanitized copies of all progress reviews and performance
appraisals for all Title II Claims Representatives in your office
for the period January 1, 1983 to March 20, 1984. This
information is relevant and necessary so Local 3369 can fairly and
adequately represent the employees in your office.
"Please provide the information to the address below as soon as
possible but no later than April 6, 1984."
On March 26, 1984 Pike replied to Riordan as follows:
"This is in response to your request for Title II claims
representative appraisals and progress review materials for the
period January 1, 1983 to March 20, 1984.
"This is a request for further information necessary to process
your request and should not be construed as a denial of your
request.
"Please provide an explanation of the issue that prompted your
request. Your request for these materials will be given further
appropriate and responsible consideration upon receipt of your
reply."
Riordan's reply to Pike on April 2, 1984, stated:
"I received your letter dated March 26, 1984 in which you
respond to my request for information pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
7103(a)(9) and 5 U.S.C. 7114. My request was dated March 20,
1984.
"In addition to the statutory references cited above and in my
letter dated March 20, 1984, permit me to suggest that you also
refer to Article 24 of the negotiated agreement.
"The information I requested is necessary for full and proper
discussion, understanding, and negotiation of subjects within the
scope of collective bargaining. Please be assured that the
purpose of my request does not relate to internal union business.
"Please provide me with the information I requested in my
letter dated March 20, 1984 on or before the close of business on
April 12, 1984."
Pike responded to Riordan on April 5, 1984, stating:
"I have received your letter dated April 2, 1984. Regrettably,
you have not furnished me with sufficient information to release
in unsanitized form all 1983 progress reviews and appraisals as
well as 1984 progress reviews.
"As you know, we are required to supply the union, upon
request, with sufficient data to enable it to bargain
intelligently, including policing the agreement, as in grievance
matters. However, the union is not entitled to ask for data in
the abstract. Unfortunately your response did not clarify to me
the specific issue that generated your request.
"I would like to point out that timeframes for filing
grievances, etc. on 1983 performance data have elapsed and I am
not aware of any 1983 appraisal grievances at any level that were
timely filed that are still pending. Therefore, I am asking you
to identify the live issue(s) that generated your request for both
the 1983 as well as the 1984 documents.
"As you also know records of performance documentation are
generally sanitized to protect the privacy of the individual
employees. An exception may be made only if identification of
employees is necessary and relevant to the Union's
representational function. Therefore please identify specifically
why in this case you require non-sanitized documents.
"Finally, should it be finally determined, based on your
responses to my questions, that all of the 1983 and 1984 documents
will be released, I estimate that the volume will exceed 250-300
pages. Much of this material is maintained in the Regional
Personnel Office, rather than the Jamaica District Office. I
therefore ask that you narrow your request, perhaps to be limited
to all Title II CR's within one unit.
"Please be assured that I will act promptly upon receipt of
your response."
Riordan replied to Pike on April 16:
"I received your letter dated April 5, 1984 about my request
for information dated April 2, 1984. My letter was a second
request for information. I made my initial request on March 20,
1984.
"Your "awareness" of any grievances is irrelevant to your duty
to provide the information I requested.
"Sanitized documents are virtually useless to the union in
performing its representational functions.
"I am not willing to make my request more narrow. However, to
ease your burden, I am willing to designate someone from the union
to retrieve and photocopy the documents I requested."
On April 23, 1984, Pike answered Riordan:
"I have received your letter dated April 16, 1984.
"This is to inform you that performance documentation that you
requested on March 20, 1984 may not be released until I receive
the information requested in my correspondence dated March 26,
1984 and April 5, 1984."
The parties engaged in no other communication concerning the
requested data and Respondent has never furnished the information to the
Union.
Although its reasons were never communicated to Respondent, the Union
requested the information to ascertain whether favoritism existed in
Respondent's Jamaica District Office and because the Union believed that
such information would be relevant to a determination on whether to file
a grievance or to take other appropriate action. /5/ It was the Union's
opinion that the information sought was required in unsanitized form in
order to permit it to fully investigate and pursue a potential
grievance.
The information requested was not available to the Union from any
other source and was normally maintained by Respondent in the regular
course of business, was reasonably available to Respondent and did not
constitute guidance, advice, counsel or training provided for management
officials or supervisors relating to collective bargaining.
Case No. 2-CA-40350 -- Downtown Office
Shortly before February 16, 1984 Local 3369 Vice President Chauvin
learned that a bargaining unit employee in Respondent's Downtown
District Office (whom Chauvin was representing in an EEO complaint) had
received a performance progress review which stated, inter alia, that
the employee's within grade increase may be denied and termination or
demotion may result if the employee's performance did not improve by
August 1984. As a result of this knowledge the Union believed that a
potential discrimination complaint and/or grievance existed regarding
the employee's performance progress review and any adverse action that
might issue as a result of the performance progress review.
Accordingly, on February 16, 1984 Chauvin sent the following letter to
Jefferson Woodcox, Manager of Respondent's Downtown District Office
where the Union represents approximately 75 bargaining unit employees of
whom 11 are Title II Claims Representatives:
"Pursuant to 5 USC 7114, I am requesting the following
information so that Local 3369 can fairly and adequately represent
an employee in your office. Please provide in unsanitized form
all of the information listed below for the period January 1, 1983
through February 29, 1984 for all Title II Claims Representatives
in the Downtown District Office:
"1. annual performance appraisals
2. Claims Representative desk audits
3. Claims Representative interview audits
4. performance improvement plans
5. interviewing time studies
6. quality review deficiency flags(bounces)
7. weekly DOWR statistics for each Title II breakdown.
"I would appreciate your prompt reply to this request at the
address below."
On or about February 27, 1984, Vice President Chauvin and the
Assistant District Manager of Respondent's Downtown District Office,
Peggy Murphy, telephonically discussed the Union's February 16, 1984
information request. In this conversation Murphy asked Chauvin for
additional information so the request could be processed. Specifically,
Murphy asked Chauvin to state the issue and why the Union needed the
information in unsanitized form. Chauvin declined to provide further
particulars on the ground that the Union's letter of February 16, 1984
stated sufficient information to warrant the release of the data sought.
Subsequent communications between the parties on this request were as
follows:
-- February 28, 1984 -- Woodcox letter to Chauvin.
"This responds to your information request dated 2/16/84,
received February 22, 1984, involving 5 USC 7114.
"Your request is deficient in that it does not identify the
issue upon which it is based.
"In the telephone conversation with Peggy Murphy on 2/27/84,
you refused to provide any particulars as to the case or issue
related to your request.
"Should you identify an appropriate issue relevant to full &
proper discussion, understanding, negotiation of subject within
the scope of collective bargaining, your request will be given
further appropriate responsive consideration."
-- March 12, 1984 -- Chauvin letter to Woodcox.
"I am writing this letter in response to your letter to me
dated February 28, 1984 regarding my request for information dated
February 16, 1984.
"During the phone conversation I had with Ms. Peggy Murphy I
patiently pointed out to her that pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 7103(a)(9)
and Article 24 of the national negotiated agreement a grievance
means any complaint. Neither the statute nor the contract require
the union to identify the employee or employees in your office who
have a complaint.
"My request dated February 16, 1984 was not deficient and
accordingly with this letter I am making the same request again.
"Unless you provide me with the information I am requesting
before the close of business on March 22, 1984, I will take other
appropriate action with respect to my request."
-- March 15, 1984 -- Woodcox letter to Chauvin.
"In response to your letter dated March 12, 1984 which was
received by me on March 14, 1984 I wish to point out that at no
time have I or Peggy Murphy asked you to identify the employee or
employees in this office who have a complaint. What you have been
asked to provide is the specific issue upon which the complaint is
based. Is it a grievance involving an E.E.O. issue?
"In order for me to determine whether or not I can supply the
information you require in the format you specified I still need
to obtain more information from you before I can proceed.
"First, in deciding whether or not to release some or all of
the information you request in an unsanitized format I must
balance the intrusion into privacy of other employees against the
need for the information in the form requested by you.
"Secondly, the copies you requested on all of the weekly DOWR
statistics for each title II breakdown would be too burdensome to
supply; however, I would consider making them available at this
office for your inspection.
"Consequently, if you will advise me whether or not the
complaint involves an EEO issue I will give your request further
appropriate responsive consideration."
-- March 22, 1984 -- Chauvin letter to Woodcox.
"I received your letter dated March 15, 1984 in which you
refuse to provide the union with the information it requested on
February 16, 1984 and again on March 12, 1984.
"Both of my letters as well as my phone conversation with Ms.
Peggy Murphy on February 27, 1984 provide sufficient information
for you to make the information available to me.
"With respect to the weekly DOWR statistics, I am willing to
photocopy them myself so that neither you nor your staff will be
burdened by my request.
"Please provide me with the information I requested before the
close of business on March 29, 1984."
-- March 30, 1984 -- Woodcox letter to Chauvin.
"In response to your letter dated March 22, 1984, which was
received by me on March 26, 1984, it is apparent that you have
misunderstood both of my previous responses to your requests for
data.
"If you will simply re-read my last response, especially the
second and third paragraphs, you will clearly see that I did not
refuse to provide the information you requested. On the contrary,
I simply asked you for specific information (whether or not the
issue at hand was an E.E.O. complaint) so that I could come to a
decision on whether to release the information in a sanitized or
unsanitized format.
"You still have not answered my question and without knowing
the answer I can not make an informed judgment concerning the
intrusion into the privacy of other employees. Absent that
information, I will release extant copies of the first six items
in your letter of February 16, 1984, in a sanitized format.
"As far as item 7 on your list is concerned, if you will
contact my Operations Officer, Mrs. Sprizzo, at 264-9416, and
advise her of the date and time you wish to review the weekly DOWR
statistics for the Title II breakdowns, she will make those
records and a photocopy machine available to you for that purpose.
"In the interest of labor relations, as well as cost
effectiveness, I will provide you with an additional ten (10) days
to provide the information I require. If at the end of that time
I have either not heard from you or you have responded in the
negative, I will then submit items one through six in a sanitized
format. As that response will require my having to devote staff
and considerable time to the task of retrieving and copying that
data, I would not later entertain a request from you to resubmit
the data in an unsanitized format, should you subsequently answer
my question.
"Finally, I fail to understand your reluctance to make a simple
statement as to whether or not it is an E.E.O. issue. By
answering my question, you would neither reveal the employee'(s)
identity nor the issue(s) surrounding the complaint, but would
certainly expedite the deliverance of the data you require and
allow both of us to get on with our responsibilities."
-- April 7, 1984 -- Chauvin letter to Woodcox.
"I am responding to your letter to me dated March 30, 1984.
Your "offer" to provide me with sanitized information is
unacceptable.
"In the fifth paragraph of your letter you mention "cost
effectiveness" as one of the reasons for arbitrarily setting a
deadline for me to respond to your letter dated March 30, 1984.
If you are truly interested in being cost effective you would
provide the information to me in unsanitized form instead of
sanitized form or you could allow me to inspect and copy the
material I requested so you would not have to commit your staff to
retrieving and copying the data.
"My reluctance to identify individual(s) or provide you with
enough information so that you can identify them stems from my
knowledge of management's reprisal against individuals who
exercise their rights. As you know, the Federal Labor Relations
Authority has issued several complaints against you for violating
the rights of employees.
"The employees responded to your record in labor relations by
recently voting to have you removed from the Board of Directors of
the HEW Federal Credit Union. Fortunately for them, the election
was done by secret ballot.
"I will not call Ms. Sprizzo until you have provided me with
the rest of the information I requested in unsanitized form.
"Unless I receive the information I originally requested on or
before April 17, 1984, I will take other appropriate action with
respect to my request."
-- April 18, 1984 -- Woodcox letter to Chauvin.
"I am responding to your letter dated April 7, 1984, which was
received by me upon my return from Philadelphia, PA. on April 16,
1984.
"Based on your statements, "Your 'offer' to provide me with
sanitized information is unacceptable" and "I will not call Mrs.
Sprizzo . . . ", I am not going to forward the data to you in a
sanitized format.
"This should not be construed as a denial to provide
information, because if you subsequently advise me whether or not
the issue concerns an E.E.O. matter, I will then be be able to
make an informed decision consistent with the provisions of the
Privacy Act and send you the data requested in the appropriate
format.
Finally, I take exception to your distorted, malicious and
erroneous statements concerning Federal Labor Relations authority
actions that have never occurred and the Federal Credit Union
elections. Those issues have been referred to my personal
attorney for appropriate legal remedies."
The parties engaged in no other communication concerning the
requested data and Respondent has never furnished the information to the
Union.
Although its reasons were never communicated to Respondent, the Union
requested the information to compare the performance of the potential
grievant with that of other employees in Respondent's Downdown District
Office and because the Union believed that such information would be
relevant to a determination on whether to file a grievance or complaint
or to take other appropriate action. /6/ It was the Union's opinion
that the information sought was required in unsanitized form in order to
permit it to fully investigate and pursue a potential grievance and/or
complaint.
The information requested was not available to the Union from any
other source and was normally maintained by Respondent in the regular
course of business, was reasonably available to Respondent and did not
constitute guidance, advice, counsel or training provided for management
officials or supervisors relating to collective bargaining.
Discussion and Conclusions
The basic issue to be resolved herein is whether under section
7114(b)(4)(B) of the Statute Respondent was required to furnish the
Union with the information is requested from the four locations herein.
Counsel for the General Counsel essentially contends that since the data
was sought either for use in processing an existing grievance or to
determine whether to file a grievance, Respondent's refusal violated the
Statute. Respondent essentially contends that the Union was obligated
to state the relevance and necessity of obtaining the information in an
unsanitized format and the Union's failure to do so privileged
Respondent's refusal to furnish the data. Counsel for the General
Counsel argues the information sought was of such a nature as to be
presumptively relevant and necessary and therefore, the Union was not
required to provide Respondent with any specific showing of relevance
and necessity. Respondent argues that the presumptive relevance theory
is inapplicable to the requests herein, especially since the
requirements of the Privacy Act of 1974 /7/ must be considered. Counsel
for the General Counsel counters by contending that the circumstances of
the requests support a conclusion that the requirements of the Privacy
Act have been met.
The Authority, in United States Environmental Protection Agency,
Health Effects Research Laboratory, Cincinnato, Ohio, 16 FLRA No. 16
(1984) addressed the general status of the law under the Statute in this
area by stating:
"The Authority has previously held that section 7114(b)(4) of
the Statute requires management to furnish an exclusive
representative with information which would enable the union to
effectively carry out its representational obligation in
connection with the processing of an employee grievance or the
determination whether to file a grievance, and that management
violates the Statute if it refuses to do so. See, e.g., U.S.
Customs Service, Region VII, Los Angeles, California, 10 FLRA 251
(1982); Veterans Administration Regional Office, Denver,
Colorado, 7 FLRA 629 (1982); Department of the Navy, Portsmouth
Naval Shipyard, 4 FLRA 619 (1980). However, the information sought
must be necessary and relevant to assist the exclusive
representative in discharging its responsibilities under the
Statute, and therefore the Authority has dismissed complaints
where this requirement has not been established. See, e.g.,
Internal Revenue Service, Buffalo District, Buffalo, New York, 7
FLRA 654 (1982); Director of Administration, Headquarters, U.S.
Air Force, 6 FLRA 110 (1981)."
Thus, while management is clearly obligated to furnish a union with
information in connection with the processing of a grievance or
determining whether to file a grievance, it must be established that the
information is necessary and relevant to the matter.
In the case herein, the record reveals that the Union requested
information for use in a grievance in process or to determine whether to
file grievances. However, these reasons were never disclosed to
Respondent. Accordingly, with regard to the various requests,
Respondent sought: (1) more information concerning the need for the
material sought from the East New York Office; /8/ (2) the identity of
the issue involved, why information on all job categories was required
and why unsanitized data was needed from the Murray Hill Office; (3)
the "live" issue that generated the request and why unsanitized
documents were required at the Jamaica Office; and (4) the case or
issue related to the request for unsanitized information from the
Downtown Office. /9/ Essentially, Respondent was seeking to obtain
sufficient facts whereby it could make an informed judgment as to
whether the data sought was necessary and relevant for any legitimate
collective bargaining purpose, especially since the Union was seeking
unsanitized information. However,the Union replied merely by giving one
or more cryptic and conclusionary references to the Statutory sections
relating to the definitions of a grievance and the rights and duties of
labor organizations and agencies under the Statute; the duty of an
agency to provide information "necessary for full and proper discussion,
understanding and negotiation of subjects within the scope of collective
bargaining"; /10/ the necessity and relevance of information to "fairly
and adequately represent the interests of employees," the negotiated
grievance procedure; and monitoring the parties negotiated agreement.
In my view under United States Environmental Protection Agency,
supra, and cases cited therein, the Union was obligated to sufficiently
establish with Respondent how the information sought was necessary and
relevant to it carrying out its representational obligations. Obviously
what is required to fulfill this obligation will vary depending upon the
circumstances of the case. Indeed, in certain situations the relevance
and necessity might be apparent and no specific showing of relevance and
necessity would be required, for example where the request is made when
contract negotiations are imminent or actually in progress or where the
request is made during a discussion of a specific grievance. But in the
case herein the relevance and necessity of the requested data was never
conveyed to Respondent nor apparent from the surrounding circumstances.
Accordingly, I conclude the obligation to establish the relevance and
necessity of the data was not met and Respondent was not obligated under
the Statute to furnish the data sought. /11/
Counsel for the General Counsel argues that the requirement of
establishing relevancy and necessity was met in this case, contending
that the information sought was by its very nature "presumptively
relevant." Counsel for the General Counsel suggests that the approach
used in similar situations by the National Labor Relations Board (the
Board) with court approval in cases arising under the National Labor
Relations Act (the Act) should be applied to the case herein. The Board
summarized its approach in a recent decision, Bohemia, Inc., 272 NLRB
No. 178 (1984), as follows:
" . . . It is well established that an employer must provide a
union with requested information "if there is a probability that
such data is relevant and will be of use to the union in
fulfilling its statutory duties and responsibilities as the
employees' exclusive bargaining representative." Associated
General Contractors of California, 242 NLRB 891, 893 (1979), enfd.
633 F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385
U.S. 432 (1967). The Board uses a liberal, discovery-type
standard to determine whether information is relevant, or
potentially relevant, to require its production. NLRB v. Truitt
Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956). Information about terms and
conditions of employment of employees actually represented by a
union is presumptively relevant and necessary and is required to
be produced. Ohio Power Co., 216 NLRB 987 (1975), enfd. 531 F.2d
1381 (6th Cir. 1976). Information necessary for processing
grievances under a collective-bargaining agreement, including that
necessary to decide whether to proceed with a grievance or
arbitration, must be provided as it falls within the ambit of the
parties' duty to bargain. NLRB v. Acme Industrial, supra;
Bickerstaff Clay Products, 266 NLRB 983 (1983).
"However, when a union's request for information concerns data
about employees or operations other than those represented by the
union, or data on financial, sales, and other information, there
is no presumption that the information is necessary and relevant
to the union's representation of employees. Rather, the union is
under the burden to establish the relevance of such information.
Ohio Power, supra . . . "
Indeed, under the Act it has been long held that wage or related
information, since it concerns the core of the employer-employee
relationship, is presumptively relevant and a union is not required to
show the precise relevance of it unless effective employer rebuttal
comes forth. See Curtiss-Wright Corp., Wright Aero Division v. NLRB,
347 F.2d 61, at 69 (3d Cir. 1965).
The logic behind the Board's approach was expressed by Board Chairman
Gray Farmer, with majority agreement, earlier in Whitin Machine Works,
108 NLRB 1537 at 1541 (1954), enf'd, NLRB v. Whitin Machine Works, 217
F. 2d 593 (4th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 905 (1955). In that
case Chairman Farmer stated:
"I would not require that the union show the precise relevancy
of the requested information to particular current bargaining
issues. It is enough for me that the information relate to the
wages or fringe benefits of the employees. Such information is
obviously related to the bargaining process, and the union is
therefore entitled to ask and receive it.
"My interpretation of the employer's obligation under Section
8(a)(5) in this respect, of course, also presupposes that the
bargaining agent, in this area as in all others, will seek the
wage-rate information as a good-faith act in the discharge of its
duty as the representative of the employees. I would, therefore,
hold that, short of evidence that union requests for wage data are
used as an harassing tactic and not in good-faith effort to secure
pertinent bargaining information, the employer has a continuing
obligation to submit such data upon request to the bargaining
agent of his employees. This does not, of course, preclude the
employer from requiring the union to enter into reasonable
arrangements for the compilation of the requested data including
provisions for bearing the additional cost to the employer of
furnishing the requested information. I am convinced, after
careful consideration of the import of the problem on the
collective bargaining process, that this broad rule is necessary
to avoid the disruptive effort of the endless bickering and
jockeying which has theretofore been characteristic of union
demands and employer reaction to requests by unions for wage and
related information. The unusually large number of cases coming
before the Board involving this issue demonstrates the disturbing
effect upon collective bargaining of the disagreements which arise
as to whether particular wage information sought by the bargaining
agent is sufficiently relevant to particular bargaining issues. I
conceive the proper rule to be that wage and related information
pertaining to employees in the bargaining unit should, upon
request, be made available to the bargaining agent without regard
to its immediate relationship to the negotiation or administration
of the collective-bargaining agreement."
Notwithstanding the Board and court cases and principles stated
above, the Supreme Court in Detroit Edison Company v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301
(1979), 99 S.Ct. 1123 at 1131 stated:
"A union's bare assertion that it needs information to process
a grievance does not automatically oblige the employer to supply
all the information in the manner requested. The duty to supply
information under Section 8(a)(5) turns upon "the circumstances of
the particular case," NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S., at 153,
76 S.Ct., at 756, and much the same may be said for the type of
disclosure that will satisfy that duty. See e.g., American
Cyanamid Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 683, 684 (1960)."
In Detroit Edison a union sought certain information about employee
aptitude tests to prepare for arbitration of a grievance. The Court,
after noting that no absolute rule has ever been established wherein a
union's interests in arguably relevant information must always
predominate over all other interests, however legitimate, id at 1132,
1133, went on to balance the conflicting interests of the parties to
resolve the matter. Thus, it is apparent that where a request for
"arguably relevant" information is at issue, all the circumstances of
the request must be considered in balancing conflicting interests. It
follows that similar consideration should be accorded a request for
"presumptively relevant" data.
The Authority used this approach in Veterans Administration Regional
Office, Denver, Colorado, 7 FLRA 29 (1982). In that case the union,
while investigating an employee's grievance alleging preselection in a
promotion, sought the names of other candidates so it could match known
ratings of a rating panel with particular employees. Veterans
Administration, Denver, relying on prior similar cases which arose under
Executive Order 11491, /12/ balanced privacy rights against the union's
Statutory right for information and found the union's right and need for
data to substantially outweigh the employee's right to privacy in the
circumstances therein. /13/
In the case herein, the Union made broad requests for unsanitized
information in situations wherein the necessity to the Union was not
immediately apparent nor in such circumstances that Respondent could be
expected to have known the relevance and necessity of the information to
a particular concern of the Union. Thus, unsanitized time and
attendance records for all employees, which would obviously include
non-unit employees at the East New York Office, were sought. At the
other offices the Union sought unsanitized appraisal information and
other data of a particular personal nature at a time when no
negotiations were planned or in progress, no particular dispute was
occurring and no indication was given to management the data sought was
necessary for a grievance in progress or being considered. /14/
In evaluating the request herein, even assuming arguendo that the
requested information was generally presumptively relevant to collective
bargaining, since the Union was seeking unsanitized data of a personal
nature, I conclude Respondent's obligation to adhere to the
proscriptions of the Privacy Act must be balanced against the Union's
need for such information. Respondent is placed in a situation of being
required to follow the dictates of two statutes, one requiring the
production of information and one limiting production. It is obvious
that in such situations an employer must have some information relative
to why the Union needs the data in order to balance the necessity and
relevance of the data against the obligations imposed by the Privacy
Act. Indeed, section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute only requires the
production of data " . . . to the extent not prohibited by law" and the
Privacy Act permits the disclosure to a union of otherwise personal
employee information where that data is "relevant and necessary" for the
union to perform its proper representational functions. But how can an
employer decide if particular information is relevant and necessary
unless it has some idea of why the union needs the information?
In my view there is no merit to the claim that a "presumptive
relevance" theory would satisfy the requirement of the Privacy Act and
the section 7114(b)(4)(B) of the Statute in a situation as herein.
Veterans Administration Regional Office, Denver, supra, and Detroit
Edison Company, supra. Rather, I conclude that under the Statute when
unsanitized personal information is sought wherein Privacy Act
considerations are legitimately raised, sufficient facts demonstrating a
union's need must be available to an agency so the employer can balance
the union's need for the information against the employer's duties and
obligations under the Privacy Act and the Statute. /15/
Accordingly, in view of the entire foregoing and under the particular
circumstances herein I conclude that no violation of the Statute
occurred by Respondent's refusal to furnish the Union with the requested
data and I recommend the Authority issue the following:
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Consolidated Complaint in Case Nos.
2-CA-40303, 2-CA-40304, 2-CA-40343 and 2-CA-40350 be, and hereby is,
dismissed.
/s/ SALVATORE J. ARRIGO
Administrative Law Judge
Dated: March 8, 1985
Washington, D.C.
--------- FOOTNOTES$ -----------
(*) In view of the finding that the information sought by the
Charging Party was not shown to be necessary within the meaning of
section 7114(b)(4)(B) of the Statute, the Authority finds it unnecessary
to pass upon the Judge's findings pertaining to his consideration of the
Privacy Act or the contention that the "routine use" exception in the
Privacy Act permits the disclosure of the requested information.
(1) The record in this case consists solely of stipulated facts and
documentary exhibits submitted in connection therewith.
(2) Article 24 of the parties' collective bargaining agreement
contains a grievance procedure under which an employee, or the Union on
behalf of an employee or employees, may file a grievance regarding
matters concerning sick leave.
(3) Section 7103(a)(9) of the Statute sets forth the following
definition:
"(9) 'grievance' means any complaint --
"(A) by any employee concerning any matter relating to the
employment of the employee;
"(B) by any labor organization concerning any matter relating
to the employment of any employee; or
"(C) by any employee, labor organization, or agency concerning
--
"(i) the effect or interpretation, or a claim of breach, of a
collective bargaining agreement; or
"(ii) any claimed violation, misinterpretation, or
misapplication of any law, rule, or regulation affecting
conditions of employment(.)"
Section 7114 of the Statute sets forth various representation rights
and duties of labor organizations and agencies and includes, inter alia,
the following:
"(b) The duty of an agency and an exclusive representative to
negotiate in good faith under subsection (a) of this section shall
include the obligation --
"(1) to approach the negotiations with a sincere resolve to
reach a collective bargaining agreement;
"(2) to be represented at the negotiations by duly authorized
representatives prepared to discuss and negotiate on any condition
of employment;
"(3) to meet at reasonable times and convenient places as
frequently as may be necessary, and to avoid unnecessary delays;
"(4) in the case of an agency, to furnish to the exclusive
representative involved, or its authorized representative, upon
request and, to the extent not prohibited by law, data --
"(A) which is normally maintained by the agency in the regular
course of business;
"(B) which is reasonably available and necessary for full and
proper discussion, understanding, and negotiations of subjects
within the scope of collective bargaining; and
"(C) which does not constitute guidance, advice, counsel, or
training provided for management officials or supervisors,
relating to collective bargaining . . . "
(4) Under Article 24, Section 9(a) of the collective bargaining
agreement, a Step 2 grievance may be appealed to the Step 3 level within
five (5) workdays after receipt of the Step 2 decision.
(5) Under Article 24, Section 9 of the collective bargaining
agreement an employee, or the Union on behalf of an employee, can file a
grievance concerning any matter relating to the employment of the
employee.
(6) Under Article 24 of the parties' collective bargaining agreement
a grievance may be filed concerning a performance progress review or an
Equal Employment Opportunity matter.
(7) The Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. Section 552a, provides in relevant
part:
"(b) Conditions of disclosure. -- No agency shall disclose any
record which is contained in a system of records by any means of
communication to any person, or to another agency, except pursuant
to a written request by, or with the prior written consent of, the
individual to whom the record pertains, unless disclosure of the
record would be --
. . . . .
(3) for a routine use as defined in subsection (a)(7) of this
section and described under subsection (e)(4)(D) of this section .
. . "
The parties acknowledge that the materials requested are contained in
a "system of records" within the meaning of the Privacy Act and the
"routine use" exception, above, would permit Respondent:
"To disclose information to officials of labor organizations
recognized under 5 U.S.C. chapter 71 when relevant and necessary
to their duties of exclusive representation concerning personnel
policies, practices, and matters affecting working conditions."
(8) This request was for information concerning all employees in the
Office, not merely data confined to bargaining unit employees.
(9) Since Union Vice President Chauvin volunteered to photocopy the
DOWR statistics and Respondent agreed to make them available on that
basis but the Union ultimately declined to follow through with this
arrangement until all data requested was provided in an unsanitized
fashion, I conclude the Union waived its right to obtain this data.
(10) See section 7114(b)(4)(B) of the Statute.
(11) In view of this resolution I find it unnecessary to decide
whether the Union's request might have been deficient or other grounds
as urged by Respondent in its brief.
(12) Department of Defense, State of New Jersey, 3 FLRC 285 (1975), 5
A/SLMR 499 (1975), 3 A/SLMR 591 (1973); Department of the Treasury,
Internal Revenue Service, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 8 A/SLMR 113, A/SLMR No.
974, aff'd 6 FLRA 797 (1978); Internal Revenue Service, Chicago,
District Office, 8 A/SLMR 309, A/SLMR No. 1004 (1978); Department of
Health, Education and Welfare, Region VIII, 8 A/SLMR 949, A/SLMR No.
1109 (1978); Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service and
IRS Milwaukee District, 8 A/SLMR 1125, A/SLMR No. 1133 (1978).
(13) The cases under the Executive Order were decided based upon
section 10(e) of the Order under which an exclusive representative was
entitled and responsible to represent the interests of all employees in
the unit. Although in Veterans Administration, Denver, supra, the
Authority specifically rejected the theory that an exclusive
representative's right to information derived from section 7114(a)(1) of
the Statute, which is virtually identical to the language of section
10(e) of the Executive Order, the Authority nevertheless did not reject
the procedure of balancing conflicting rights an interests in these
situations.
(14) Indeed, when management sought to ascertain, even in a general
way, how the data sought was relevant and ne essary to a legitimate
Union concern, the Union refusal to give management even a reasonable
hint to support its request.
(15) As indicated previously, all the circumstances surrounding the
request for information must be considered when assessing how much
detail must be provided management relative to a union's need for data.
I find noteworthy, especially when considering the particular facts of
the case herein and the Authority's decision in United States
Environmental Protection Agency, supra, the following language used by
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in NLRB v. F.W. Woolworth Co.,
235 F.2d 319 at 322 (9th Cir. 1956); rev'd 352 U.S. 938 (1956):
"We do not hold that a request must painfully, laboriously or
absolutely demonstrate in detail a relevancy, but we do believe
that at sometime or someplace some specific relevancy should be
asserted or facts should be shown whereby one could say that the
employer ought to know anyway without demonstration the relevancy
of the information to the relationship of the parties. It must be
something more than Micawber's "something may turn up."