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UNITED STATES SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, WASHINGTON, DC |
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and
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Case No. WA-CA-20820
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David R. Gray
Counsel for the Respondent
Ana de la Torre
Counsel for the General Counsel, FLRA
Robert W. Wildberger, Jr.
Pro se
Before: GARVIN LEE OLIVER
Administrative Law Judge
The unfair labor practice complaint alleges that Respondent
interfered with the Charging Party's exercise of rights guaranteed
by section 7102 of the Federal Service Labor Management Relations
Statute (the Statute), 5 U.S.C. § 7102, in violation of section
7116(a)(1), by prohibiting him from acting as the representative of
Marie Panzella in her appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board
(MSPB).
The Respondent answered the complaint, denying the allegations
and stating that it had followed MSPB regulations which
specifically provide parties to an MSPB appeal with an opportunity
to challenge a designated representative when a party believes
there is a reasonable likelihood of a conflict of interest or
position. The Respondent averred that the American Federation of
Government Employees (AFGE) is the incumbent exclusive labor
representative in both the offices where Ms. Panzella and Mr.
Wildberger were employed. The Respondent claimed it would have
violated its statutory and contractual obligations to the AFGE and
subjected it to an unfair labor practice charge if it has
acquiesced in Mr. Wildberger's representation of Ms. Panzella on
behalf of another union. The Respondent averred that a further
conflict would have existed in Mr. Wildberger's representation due
to his position with the Respondent, which position provided him
with access to confidential and sensitive management informa-tion
on the office where Ms. Panzella had been employed. The Respondent
also claimed that a conflict would have been created by virtue of
Mr. Wildberger's representation adversely impacting upon his
workload and performance. Lastly, Respondent asserted that Mr.
Wildberger's representation of Ms. Panzella was unauthorized
pursuant to section 7120(e) of the Statute since there was a
conflict or apparent conflict of interest.
A hearing was held in Washington, DC. The Respondent and the
General Counsel were represented by counsel and afforded full
opportunity to be heard, adduce relevant evidence, examine and
cross-examine witnesses, and file post-hearing briefs. The
Respondent and General Counsel filed helpful briefs, and the
proposed findings have been adopted where found supported by the
record as a whole. Based on the entire record,(1) including my observation of the
witnesses and their demeanor, I make the following findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations.
The employees in Respondent's Central Office in Washington, DC,
are part of a consolidated bargaining unit represented by the
National Office of the American Federation of Government Employees
(AFGE) with delegations of authority down to the local level. The
consolidated unit includes the Melville, New York Branch Office,
represented by AFGE, Local 3134. (Tr. 89-90).
The Charging Party, Robert Wildberger, was employed by
Respondent (SBA) from June 1980 until September 1992. From about
1986 until September 1991 Mr. Wildberger was on 100% official time
as President of AFGE, Local 2532. (Tr. 14).
During the fall of 1991, Wildberger, having been removed from
Union office by AFGE, ceased being on 100% official time and
resumed assigned duties at SBA as a Program Analyst, GS-13, in the
Office of Program Analysis and Quality Assurance (OPAQA), Office of
Compliance. (Tr. 14-15).
Mr. Wildberger's immediate office, the Office of Compliance, is
responsible for managing the Respondent's onsite field office
evaluation and review process. These reviews and the resulting
reports address specific management weaknesses and internal control
deficiencies in the Respondent's district and branch offices,
including opera-tional, performance, and personnel problems. The
Respondent regards these reports as a critical part of its
management system and they include highly sensitive management
information. (Tr. 54-58, 130-131).
Specifically, Mr. Wildberger's job responsibilities in OPAQA
were to review and edit draft reports prepared by the review teams
and to summarize these reports. (Tr. 15-16; 59-60). In doing so he
has access to highly sensitive and confidential management
information. (Tr. 59-60; 130-131). The reports did not deal with
positions the SBA planned to take before MSPB or the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). (Tr. 16).
Following his removal from Union office, Mr. Wildberger decided
to form a rival labor organization, Solidarity, USA (Solidarity),
which had as its initial focus the organizing of SBA employees.
(Tr. 17-18, 37-39). Solidarity filed a "Labor Organization
Information Report" with the U.S. Department of Labor and has been
assigned a file number for public disclosure purposes. (Tr. 17).
See 29 C.F.R. §§ 402.2, 402.7. Solidarity did not represent any
employee of Respondent as of the date of the hearing. (Tr. 94).
As an organizing tactic for Solidarity, Mr. Wildberger let it
be known that he was available to provide representational services
for SBA employees. As a result, Frank Puleo, a local President for
AFGE in SBA's Melville, New York office, contacted Mr. Wildberger,
complained about AFGE, and asked him to represent a number of SBA
employees, including Marie Panzella, before MSPB or EEOC, which Mr.
Wildberger agreed to do. (Tr. 18-19).
Marie Panzella, at the time of her removal from employment by
Respondent, was an employee of the Respondent's Melville, New York
Branch Office. On May 27, 1992, Ms. Panzella appealed her removal
to the MSPB and in her appeal form designated Mr. Wildberger as her
representative. (Respondent's Exhibit (Res. Exh.) 58). The appeal
form provided Mr. Wildberger's home address in Woodbridge, Virginia
for service purposes, but did not indicate that he was acting in
other than an individual capacity. (Res. Exh. 58).
Respondent, based upon its understanding that Mr. Wildberger's
representation of Ms. Panzella would be in an individual capacity,
filed a motion with the MSPB on June 15, 1992, seeking an extension
of time for it to consider whether to object to Ms. Panzella's
designation of Mr. Wildberger as her representative. (Res. Exh.
57).
MSPB regulation, 5 C.F.R. § 1201.31(b), provides:
(b) A party may choose any representative as long as that person is willing and available to serve. The other party or parties may challenge the designa-tion, however, on the ground that it involves a conflict of interest or a conflict of position. Any party who challenges the designation must do so by filing a motion with the judge within 15 days after the date of service of the notice of designation. The judge will rule on the motion before considering the merits of the appeal. These procedures apply equally to each designation of representative, regardless of whether the representative was the first one designated by a party or a subsequently designated representative. If a representative is disqualified, the judge will give the party whose representative was disqualified a reasonable time to obtain another one.
The Respondent pointed out in its motion that Mr. Wildberger had not complied with Respondent's regulations, 13 C.F.R. Part 105, requiring prior approval from its Standards of Conduct ("SOC") Counselor before undertaking an outside activity. The Respondent noted that an employee's failure to comply with the Respondent's SOC regulations could result in disciplinary action against the employee. Respondent requested that Mr. Wildberger be given five days to submit his request under the SOC regulations and that it be given an additional five days for its SOC Committee to consider the request, including whether there was a conflict of interest or the appearance of a conflict of interest. (Res. Exh. 57).
On June 16, 1992, the Respondent, through Charles Thomas, Mr.
Wildberger's immediate supervisor, notified Mr. Wildberger of the
MSPB request and of the Agency's regulation, 13 C.F.R. §
105.510(a), providing that an employee may not, except with the
written approval of the appropriate agency official, engage in any
outside employment, occupation or similar activity. Mr. Wildberger
was advised of the Agency's procedures for securing such approval
and advised, "If you still propose to engage in this
representational activity, you must immediately submit your
request, in writing. . . . Your failure to obtain specific Agency
approval for this activity could result in possible disciplinary
action against you." Mr. Wildberger was also advised that, "in the
event you request approval for this representational activity and
it is approved, you would be required to use your accrued annual
leave or leave without pay for any time spent on this
representational activity." (General Counsel (G.C.) Exh. 2; Tr.
20).
On June 19, 1992, Mr. Wildberger responded to the SBA,
objecting to the application of SOC regulations to his
representation of Panzella before the MSPB as National President of
Solidarity, and on behalf of Solidarity. Among other things, Mr.
Wildberger asserted that this representa-tional activity, as an
organizing tactic of Solidarity, was protected under section 7102
of the Statute. He also asserted that in his representation of
Panzella before the MSPB he would be enforcing the current labor
contract. He claimed that this was concerted activity and was also
protected activity under the Statute. He requested, under protest,
that his response be considered a request for approval of this MSPB
activity. (G.C. Exh. 3).
Respondent and AFGE are parties to a collective bargaining
agreement (Master Agreement) applicable at all relevant times to
the Central Office and Melville Branch Office. Article Ten
specifically recognizes AFGE as the exclusive representative with
rights and responsibilities. Article Eleven, Section 2, authorizes
official time for AFGE representatives for various representational
activities, including "preparing grievances and appeals of unit
employees." (Joint (Jt.) Exh. 1; Tr. 90-91).
On June 24, 1992, Respondent moved to disqualify Mr. Wildberger
as Ms. Panzella's representative before the MSPB pursuant to MSPB
regulation 5 C.F.R. § 1201.31(b) on the basis that his
representation would involve a conflict of interest. Respondent
asserted that Mr. Wildberger's letter of June 19, 1992 demonstrated
that he intended to represent Panzella solely as a representative
of Solidarity. Respondent stated that AFGE was the exclusive
representative of Agency employees and "the Agency cannot allow any
union other than AFGE to represent the Appellant without violating
both its contractual obligations to AFGE, and possibly subjecting
itself to the filing of an Unfair Labor Practice charge and the
issuance of a complaint. . . ." The Agency also pointed out that
even if Mr. Wildberger were to resubmit his request as an
individual, there were potential reasons for disqualifying him
based on the nature of his official duties and the amount of time
the representation might take. (Res. Exh. 51).
On June 22, 1992, the MSPB Judge issued a Notice directing Mr.
Wildberger and Respondent's officials to meet and discuss
Respondent's SOC procedures and the representa-tional issue.
Apparently, this Notice and the Respondent's Supplemental Motion
crossed in the mails. (Res. Exh. 53).
The parties met on June 29, 1992 and reviewed the SOC
procedures; however, the parties were unable to resolve the
representational issue. Moreover, while Mr. Wildberger refused
during the meeting to clarify whether he was proceeding in an
individual representative capacity or on behalf of Solidarity, he
asserted to the Respondent that he was entitled to official time in
representing Ms. Panzella. Counsel for Respondent responded, "Of
course, the Agency maintains that you absolutely are not entitled
to official time to do this." (Tr. 45-47; 80-82; Res. Exh. 48).
By letter to Mr. Wildberger dated July 1, 1992, Respondent, by
David R. Gray, reiterated Respondent's position, in part, as
follows:
As you are well aware, both the Washington, DC, Office Center,
where you are employed, and the Melville, NY Branch Office, where
Ms. Panzella was formerly employed, are exclusively represented by
the national consolidated unit of the American Federation of
Government Employees ("AFGE"). The Agency has, in the past,
repeatedly and consistently advised you that the Agency cannot
allow any union other than the AFGE to represent employees in such
covered offices. For the Agency to do so would violate its
statutory and contractual obligations to the AFGE and, in all
likelihood, result in unfair labor practice charges by the AFGE
against the Agency. Accordingly, for you to represent Ms. Panzella
in the name of Solidarity, U.S.A., would be a further violation by
the Agency of its statutory and contractual obligations to the AFGE
and prejudicial to the Agency's interests.
If you immediately submit to me a clear and unequivocal statement
to me [sic] that your intention to represent Ms. Panzella is in an
individual capacity, the Agency stands ready to process a request
for Standards of Conduct approval as soon as possible. If we
proceed in this manner, I will recommend to Mr. Thomas, as your
supervisor, that he immediately approve up to one hour of official
time for you to be used for purposes of providing the information
needed by the Standards of Conduct Counselor for his consideration
or that of the Standards of Conduct Committee. (G.C. Exh. 4).
Following the parties' inability to resolve the representational issue, the MSPB Judge held a telephone conference with Mr. Wildberger and Respondent's Representative on July 6, 1992 and asked for a written statement from Ms. Panzella confirming whether she still wanted Mr. Wildberger to represent her and in what capacity--as an individual or as an official of Solidarity. The Judge indicated Mr. Wildberger could also submit a response. (Res. Exh. 45-47).
Notwithstanding Respondent's objection to Mr. Wildberger's
representation of Ms. Panzella, if he were to act as an official of
Solidarity, Mr. Wildberger, on July 7, 1992, requested unqualified
approval from the Respondent "to respond and to undertake [Ms.
Panzella's] representation on behalf of Solidarity, U.S.A." Mr.
Wildberger further sought a statement from the Respondent that he
would not be in violation of the Respondent's SOC regulations
through his proposed representation of Ms. Panzella. (Res. Exh.
44).
On July 9, 1992, the Respondent answered, reiterating its
previous objection to his proposed representation of Ms. Panzella
on behalf of Solidarity. The Respondent reiterated previous advice
that if Ms. Panzella requested Mr. Wildberger to represent her in
an individual capacity and he, in turn, wanted to, he must still
request SOC approval, and the Respondent would give him one hour of
official time to so request. (Res. Exh. 42).
Mr. Wildberger responded on July 13, 1992, stating Ms. Panzella
continued to want his representation on behalf of Solidarity.
However, he advised he considered himself under order to withdraw
from the proposed representation and asked that the Respondent so
advise the MSPB Judge. (Res. Exh. 39). The Respondent received a
letter from Ms. Panzella dated July 10, 1992, confirming that she
wanted Mr. Wildberger to represent her on behalf of Solidarity.
(Res. Exh. 40).
In an effort to obtain a final resolution, the Respondent, on
July 13, 1992, filed with the MSPB Judge a renewal of its objection
to Ms. Panzella's designation of representative and requested a
ruling on the issue. (Res. Exh. 37).
By Notice dated July 20, 1992, the MSPB Judge ruled that Ms.
Panzella could respond to the Respondent's renewal of objection,
and directed the Respondent to allow Mr. Wildberger to prepare the
response, if desired by Ms. Panzella. (Res. Exh. 33).
On July 23 and 24, 1992, Mr. Wildberger requested unqualified
written approval to respond in his capacity as President of
Solidarity to the renewal of objection; to participate in the
telephone conference rescheduled for August 3, 1992; to provide
prehearing submissions; and to otherwise fully participate in the
case addressing all matters of substance and procedure. (Res. Exh.
30, 32).
On July 24, 1992, the Respondent advised Mr. Wildberger that,
while he was not entitled to any official time for such activity
under the Master Agreement or MSPB regulations, the Respondent
would not consider his preparation of a response on the limited
issue of disqualification of Ms. Panzella's choice of
representative to be in conflict with the Respondent's SOC
regulations. However, he was advised that any submissions or
participation that went beyond this and discussed the merits or the
procedures of the case would be considered in conflict with the SOC
regulations. Similarly, the Respondent advised that it would regard
his participation in the August 3, 1992 telephone conference for
the limited purpose of discussing the disqualification issue not to
be in conflict with the SOC regulations. (G.C. 11, Res. Exh.
29).
On July 30, 1992, Mr. Wildberger stated he would not
participate in the conference call under the circumstances. He
reiterated that he was entitled to representational time under
Agency SOP 36-302. (Res. Exh. 23, 59). Mr. Wildberger refused to
either respond to the renewal of objection or participate in the
telephone conference.
On August 3, 1992, the MSPB Judge issued a Notice in which she
denied the Respondent's motions objecting to Mr. Wildberger's
representation and concluded that no conflict of interest or
position existed. The MSPB Judge noted that the issue of whether
Mr. Wildberger's representation would interfere with his workload
would have to be resolved by Mr. Wildberger and his superiors.
(Res. Exh. 22).
On August 6, 1992, Mr. Wildberger sought representational time directly from the MPSB Judge. The MSPB Judge ruled on the same day that she had no authority to grant such time. (Res. Exh. 20 and 21).
On August 12, 1992, the Respondent filed motions with the MSPB
Judge asking that she reconsider her refusal to dis-qualify Mr.
Wildberger. Respondent alleged legal error as well as
newly-available evidence. The Respondent also asked that, if
reconsideration were denied, the MSPB Judge then certify the issue
to the full Board of the MSPB as an interlocutory appeal. (Res.
Exh. 18).
Respondent alleged that the newly-available evidence consisted of two new developments. The first had to do with Mr. Wildberger's position with the Respondent and the conflict of position which would result from his representation of Ms. Panzella. In October of 1991, an evaluation report was issued on the Melville Branch Office by the Office of Compliance. (Tr. 60-61) While Mr. Wildberger and Mr. Thomas disputed whether Mr. Wildberger had any specific work assignments involving the Melville report, he had potential access to it and a copy was found in his work area on August 3, 1992 together with a number of documents referring to Solidarity, the FLRA, and Ms. Panzella's appeal. Matters related to these three subject areas were unrelated to Mr. Wildberger's official duties. (Tr. 40-41, 61, 67, 73-76; Res. Exh. 18).
The other newly-available evidence proffered by Respondent to
the MSPB dealt with complaints Respondent had received on a number
of occasions, including April 2, April 21, and May 13, 1992, from
officials of the AFGE that it was improperly allowing Mr.
Wildberger to engage in organizing activities on behalf of
Solidarity. (Tr. 100-102; Res. Exh. 37). On August 6, 1992, the
President of AFGE, Local 2532 stated to Raymond Barnes, the
Respondent's Chief of Labor Relations, that if Mr. Wildberger did
not cease his attempts to organize AFGE bargaining unit employees
using official time, the AFGE would take appropriate action. (Tr.
102-104; Res. Exh. 18).
By Notice dated August 13, 1992, the MSPB Judge advised the
parties that she had decided to reconsider her August 3, 1992
ruling on the matter of whether Mr. Wildberger should be
disqualified as Ms. Panzella's representative. The Notice further
advised that she was providing Ms. Panzella and Mr. Wildberger with
an opportunity to respond. (Res. Exh. 17). Mr. Wildberger responded
on August 22, 1992. (Res. Exh. 11).
During a conference call on September 1, 1992, the MSPB Judge
announced to the Respondent's representative and Mr. Wildberger
that she intended to dismiss the case due to her MSPB time
constraints without prejudice to Ms. Panzella's right to refile an
appeal within a certain time frame. On September 21, the MSPB Judge
did dismiss the case without prejudice. The Decision did not
address the disqualification of representative issue, leaving it
unresolved. (Res. Exh. 7).
On September 16, 1992, Mr. Wildberger was removed by the
Respondent from Federal service. (Res. Exh. 5; Tr. 143).
On October 19, 1992, Ms. Panzella refiled her appeal before the
MSPB and again named Mr. Wildberger to represent her on behalf of
Solidarity. (Res. Exh. 6).
On November 3, 1992, the Respondent again filed an objection to
Mr. Wildberger's representation with the MSPB. Respondent stated
there was a continuing conflict by virtue of Mr. Wildberger's past
position in OPAQA and his past access to confidential and sensitive
information concerning management and the operations of the
Melville Branch Office. The Respondent stated that its previous
concerns over Mr. Wildberger's attempt to represent Ms. Panzella on
behalf of Solidarity and his ability to accomplish the duties and
responsibilities of his official position were alleviated since he
was no longer an employee of the Respondent and subject to its
control. (Res. Exh. 5).
The MSPB Judge did not rule on this objection as Mr. Wildberger
voluntarily withdrew as Ms. Panzella's representative, and Ms.
Panzella designated a representative of AFGE as her new
representative. (Tr. 36, 37, 145).
On January 14, 1993, the MSPB Judge in Ms. Panzella's appeal
issued a decision incorporating a last chance agreement between the
Respondent, Ms. Panzella, and their respective representatives and
dismissed Ms. Panzella's appeal. The last chance agreement resolved
Ms. Panzella's appeal to the MSPB.
Standing
Respondent contends that the complaint should be dismissed
because, although the complaint names Mr. Wildberger as an
"individual charging party," the actual charging party is
Solidarity, which is allegedly not a labor organization and lacks
standing to bring the charge.
The charge and amended charge against the Agency was signed by
Robert Wildberger. In answer to Item 2 of the FLRA charge form,
which asks for the name of the "charging labor organization or
individual," Wildberger identified himself as "Robert Wildberger,
President, Solidarity, U.S.A." The complaint alleged in paragraph 3
that "Robert Wildberger (Charging Party) is a person under 5 U.S.C.
§ 7103(a)(1)." and Respondent's answer admitted the allegation.
Section 7118(a)(1) of the Statute, and section 2423.3 of the
Authority regulations, provide that an unfair labor practice may be
charged "by any person." Section 7103(a)(1) of the Statute, and
section 2421.2(a) of Authority regulations, define the word
"person" as "an individual, labor organization, or agency."
Taking into consideration the fact that a charge may be filed
by "any person"; that the charge herein was admittedly filed by a
"person" within the meaning of the Statute and pertinent
regulations; and that a charge is not a formal pleading, but merely
serves to provide a basis for the General Counsel's investigation
into unfair labor practices, it is concluded the Respondent's
contention that the Charging Party lacks standing is without merit.
See National Aeronautics
and Space Administration, Headquarters, Washington, DC, 12
FLRA 480, 502-04 (1983).
Mootness
Respondent claims that developments subsequent to the charge,
complaint, and hearing have rendered the matters in controversy
moot; any rulings would amount to advisory opinions; and the case
should be dismissed. Respondent points out that Ms. Panzella's
concerns have been settled, and Mr. Wildberger is no longer an
employee of the Respondent or subject to its control. Therefore,
Respondent states it has no continuing concern about Mr.
Wildberger's representing employees on behalf of Solidarity.
Respondent states that there conceivably could be a prospective
conflict by virtue of Mr. Wildberger's past access to confidential
and sensitive information in OPAQA, but this would be a
fact-specific situation.
I conclude that the case is not moot. It alleges a violation of
employee rights under the Statute. The current status of Mr.
Wildberger and Ms. Panzella is not relevant to whether Respondent
committed a violation of the Statute, as alleged, although it might
be relevant to the affirmative relief ordered if a violation is
found. Internal Revenue Service, Washington,
D.C., 47 FLRA 1091 (1993).
The Merits
Mr. Wildberger, as President of Solidarity, was chosen by Marie
Panzella to represent her before the MSPB. Marie Panzella, in
pursuing a statutory appeal procedure to the Merit Systems
Protection Board to contest her removal, was entitled to choose her
own representative, and Respondent could not insist that only the
AFGE, the exclusive representatives of the unit, could represent
her before the MSPB. AFGE, the exclusive representative of the
unit, was not the exclusive representative for the statutory
appeal. 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(5); National Treasury
Employees Union v. FLRA, 800 F.2d
1165, 1170 (D.C. Cir., 1986); AFGE, Local
916 v. FLRA, 812 F.2d 1326, 1328
(10th Cir., 1987); Reid v. Dept. of Commerce, 793 F.2d 277, 283 (Fed. Cir., 1986)
American Federation of Government Employees, Local
1857, AFL-CIO, 46 FLRA 904, 918 (1992); Fort Bragg Association of Educators, National Education
Association, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 28 FLRA 908
(1987).
Mr. Wildberger, as President of Solidarity, intended to
represent Ms. Panzella before the MSPB as an organizing tactic for
Solidarity, a rival labor organization of the exclusive
representative, AFGE. While employees acting on behalf of a union
have a right under 7102 of the Statute to represent unit employees
in a statutory appeal process, the right is not without limitation.
Under section 7120(E) of the Statute, an employee is precluded from
"acting as a representative of a labor organization" where that
activity "would result in a conflict or apparent conflict of
interest or would otherwise be incompatible with law or with the
official duties of the employee." U.S. Department
of the Treasury, Office of the Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue
Service, National Office, 41 FLRA 402, 412-13 (1991).
Moreover, Mr. Wildberger was not entitled to use official time for
such representation under the collective bargaining agreement
between AFGE and the Respondent. The agreement provides official
time for duly appointed representatives of the exclusive
representative.(2) Further,
Respondent could not lawfully grant such time or other assistance,
such as Government services or facilities, to a labor organization,
Solidarity, when that union did not have equivalent status with the
exclusive representative of the agency's employees.(3) There is no contention that Solidarity
had attained equivalent status or that an exception applies.
See U.S. Department of the
Air Force, Barksdale Air Force Base, Bossier City,
Louisiana, 45 FLRA 659 (1992).
Mr. Wildberger consistently stated that he sought to represent
Ms. Panzella as an organizing tool for Solidarity. Section 7131(b)
of the Statute makes it clear that activities related to the
internal business of a labor organization, including solicitation
of membership, must be performed while in a non-duty status.
The complaint alleges that Respondent interfered with Mr.
Wildberger's exercise of rights guaranteed by section 7102 of the
Statute, in violation of Section 7116(a)(1), in three specific
respects:
1. By letter dated June 16, 1992, the Respondent, by Charles W.
Thomas, informed the Charging Party that Respondent's regulations
barring "outside employment" in section 105.510(a) require the
Charging Party to seek written permission before he could represent
one of Respondent's employees before the MSPB.
2. By letter dated July 1, 1992, Respondent, by David R. Grey
[sic], notified the Charging Party that he could not represent any
of Respondent's employees if the Charging Party's representation
was in his capacity as an official of Solidarity, U.S.A.
3. By letter dated July 24, 1992, Respondent, by David R. Kohler, informed the Charging Party that Respondent would consider any submissions or communications by the Charging Party to the MSPB on behalf of Marie Panzella to be representational activity violative of Respondent's standards of conduct.
1. The June 16, 1992 Letter
Respondent's June 16, 1992 letter to Mr. Wildberger did not
interfere with his rights under section 7102 of the Statute.
Respondent was unaware at the time that Mr. Wildberger was seeking
to represent Ms. Panzella on behalf of Solidarity. Moreover, the
letter merely sought Mr. Wildberger's compliance with the Agency's
standard of conduct regulations to enable the Agency to determine
whether Mr. Wildberger's representation of Ms. Panzella before the
MSBP would pose a conflict of interest or conflict of position.
Such a determination was not only consistent with Respondent's own
regulation, but the MSPB regulation, 5 C.F.R. § 1201.31(b),
specifically provides parties to an MSPB appeal with an opportunity
to challenge a designation of a representative on the ground that
the representation would involve a conflict of interest or
position. As noted, section 7120(e) of the Statute also precludes
an employee from "acting as a representative of a labor
organization" if that activity "would result in a conflict or
apparent conflict of interest or would otherwise be incompatible
with law or with the official duties of the employee."
2. The July 1, 1992 Letter
As set forth above, the July 1, 1992 letter notified Mr.
Wildberger, in effect, that the Agency could not allow him to
represent Ms. Panzella in the name of Solidarity inasmuch as both
the Washington, D.C. Office Center, where he was employed, and the
Melville, N.Y. Branch Office, where Ms. Panzella was formerly
employed, are exclusively represented by the American Federation of
Government Employees (AFGE). The Respondent further advised Mr.
Wildberger that for it to allow another union other than the AFGE
to represent employees in AFGE-covered offices would, in its view,
violate its statutory and contractual obligations to the AFGE and,
in all likelihood, result in unfair labor practice charges by the
AFGE against the Agency. Respondent stated, "Accordingly, for you
to represent Ms. Panzella in the name of Solidarity, U.S.A., would
be conduct directly prejudicial to the Agency's interests.
Likewise, for you to be granted any official time for such
representational activity would be a further violation by the
Agency of its statutory and contractual obligations to the AFGE and
prejudicial to the Agency's interests."
As discussed above, Respondent correctly informed Mr.
Wildberger that he could not be granted official time for such
representational activity; however, Respondent could not deny Mr.
Wildberger the right under section 7102 to represent employees
before the MSPB on behalf of Solidarity on the basis that only the
exclusive representative had such a right. As noted, AFGE, the
exclusive representative of the unit, was not the exclusive
representative as to the statutory appeal. Such advice interfered
with Mr. Wildberger's exercise of rights guaranteed by section 7102
of the Statute and violated section 7116(a)(1), as alleged.
The record does not support Respondent's assertion that its
denial of Mr. Wildberger's request to represent Panzella on behalf
of Solidarity was because of his unqualified requests for official
time. Respondent's July 1, 1992 letter clearly separated the denial
of organizational representation and the denial of official time.
Respondent's defense, that allowing Mr. Wildberger to represent
Panzella on behalf of Solidarity would have exposed it to a valid
unfair labor practice charge, is also rejected. Allowing such
representation would not have required Respondent to provide
Wildberger official time or the use of Government property for such
representation. Access to official time and Government property is
governed by applicable law and regulation, the collective
bargaining agreement, or as a matter of past practice. As noted,
Section 7120(e) of the Statute, pro-hibiting acting as a
representative of a labor organization in the event of a conflict
of interest or position, is also a qualification.
3. The July 24, 1992 Letter
Respondent's July 24, 1992 letter specifically authorized Mr.
Wildberger to appear before the MSPB and respond to the issue of
his disqualification as Ms. Panzella's representative. The July 24,
1992 memorandum did state that any submissions, communications, or
appearances, at that time, that went beyond the disqualification
issue and dealt with the substantive aspects of Ms. Panzella's
appeal would be considered by Respondent to be representational
activity and violative of the Respondent's standards of
conduct.
Respondent's July 24, 1992 letter did not interfere with Mr.
Wildberger's rights under section 7102 of the Statute. As noted,
the MSPB regulation, 5 C.F.R. § 1201.31(b), specifically provides
parties to an MSPB appeal with an opportunity to challenge a
designation of representative on the ground that the representation
would involve a conflict of interest or position. The regulation
also provides that the MSPB Judge "will rule on the motion before
considering the merits of the appeal."
Respondent had moved to disqualify Mr. Wildberger on the basis
that his representation would involve a conflict of interest. Mr.
Wildberger had not submitted the required information for
Respondent to make a determination in this respect under its
standards of conduct regulation. As noted, section 7120(e) of the
Statute also precludes an employee from "acting as a representative
of a labor organization" if that activity "would result in a
conflict or apparent conflict of interest or would otherwise be
incompatible with law or with the official duties of the employee."
Therefore, Respondent's advice to Mr. Wildberger, limiting his
response to the MSPB to the issue of his designation as a
representative, and precluding him from addressing the merits of
Ms. Panzella's appeal until the issue of his disqualification was
resolved, did not interfere with his rights under section 7102 of
the Statute.
It is concluded that Respondent violated section 7116(a)(1) of
the Statute, as alleged, on July 1, 1992 by advising Mr. Wildberger
that he could not represent Ms. Panzella before the MSPB on behalf
of a labor organization other than the exclusive representative. By
doing so, Respondent interfered with Mr. Wildberger's right as an
employee under section 7101 and 7102 of the Statute "to organize"
and "to form, join, or assist any labor organization." However,
Respondent did not violate the Statute by denying Mr. Wildberger
official time or other Government facilities for such
representation. Nor did Respondent violate the Statute by requiring
Mr. Wildberger to comply with its standard of conduct regulations
or by restricting his representation before the MSPB until
challenges to his designation on the basis of a conflict of
interest or conflict of position were resolved.
Although Mr. Wildberger is no longer employed by Respondent,
and Ms. Panzella's appeal to the MSPB has been resolved, there has
been no specific repudiation of the coercive conduct, or assurance
that in the future Respondent will not interfere with the right of
employees to form, join, or assist a labor organization other than
the exclusive representative in this manner. Therefore, an order
requiring the Respondent to cease and desist from such conduct and
to post an appropriate notice is required.
Based on the foregoing findings and conclusions, it is
recommended that the Authority issue the following Order:
Pursuant to section 2423.29 of the Federal Labor Relations
Authority's Rules and Regulations and section 7118 of the Statute,
it is hereby ordered that the United States Small Business
Administration, Washington, D.C., shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Interfering with, restraining, or coercing its
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by section 7102 of
the Statute, by advising employees that they cannot act as
representatives of a labor organization other than the exclusive
representative in statutory appeal procedures before the MSPB where
employees have designated such employee labor organization
representatives as their representatives before the MSPB.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining or coercing its employees in the exercise of their
rights assured by the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations
Statute.
2. Take the following affirmative action in order to effectuate
the purposes and policies of the Federal Service Labor-Management
Relations Statute:
(a) In accordance with law and regulation, permit
employees to act as representatives of a labor organization other
than the exclusive representative in statutory appeal procedures
before the MSPB where employees have designated such employee labor
organization representatives as their representatives before the
MSPB.
(b) Post at its facilities nationwide copies of the
attached Notice on forms to be furnished by the Federal Labor
Relations Authority. Upon receipt of such forms, they shall be
signed by the Director, and shall be posted and maintained for 60
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all
bulletin boards and other places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that
such Notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(c) Pursuant to section 2423.30 of the Authority's
Rules and Regulations, notify the Regional Director of the
Washington Region, 1255 22nd Street, NW, 4th Floor, Washington, DC
20037-1206, in writing, within 30 days from the date of this Order,
as to what steps have been taken to comply herewith.
3. The remaining allegations of the complaint are
dismissed.
Issued, Washington, DC, February 7, 1994
GARVIN LEE OLIVER
Administrative Law Judge
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
AS ORDERED BY THE FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY
AND TO EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF THE
FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS STATUTE
WE HEREBY NOTIFY OUR EMPLOYEES THAT:
WE WILL NOT interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in
the exercise of rights guaranteed by section 7102 of the Statute,
by advising employees that they cannot act as representatives of a
labor organization other than the exclusive representative in
statutory appeal procedures before the MSPB where employees have
designated such employee labor organization representatives as
their representatives before the MSPB.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain
or coerce our employees in the exercise of their rights assured by
the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute.
WE WILL, in accordance with law and regulation, permit employees to
act as representatives of a labor organization other than the
exclusive representative in statutory appeal procedures before the
MSPB where employees have designated such employee labor
organization representatives as their representatives before the
MSPB.
(Activity)
Date: ____________________ By: ___________________________
(Signature) (Title)
This Notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the
date of posting and must not be altered, defaced or covered by any
other material.
If employees have any questions concerning this Notice or
compliance with any of its provisions, they may communicate
directly with the Regional Director of the Federal Labor Relations
Authority, Washington Region, 1255 22nd Street, NW, 4th Floor,
Washington, DC 20037-1206, and whose telephone number is: (202)
653-8500.
Dated: February 7, 1994
Washington, DC
1. Respondent's Motion for Leave to Reply to the General Counsel's brief is denied. The transcript, page 6,
lines 7-10, is hereby corrected to read, "Relations Authority. The decision will be based strictly upon the record made here today, including the transcript of testimony, the formal pleadings, exhibits, and any other documents specifically authorized for filing herein."
2. The record does not establish that Mr. Wildberger was entitled to official time for MSPB representation under any other applicable statute, regulation, or past practice. (Res. Exhs. 23, 59; Tr. 139).
3. Under section 7116(a)(3) it is an unfair labor practice for an agency -
(3) to sponsor, control, or otherwise assist any labor organization, other than to furnish, upon request, customary and routine services and facilities if the services and facilities are also furnished on an impartial basis to other labor organizations having equivalent status[.]