This unfair labor practice (ULP) case comes before the Authority on exceptions to the attached decision by Administrative Law Judge Richard A. Pearson (Judge) filed by the Respondent. In his decision, the Judge determined that the Respondent violated § 7116(a)(1) and (5) of the Federal Service               Labor-Management Relations Statute (the Statute)^[1] when the Respondent dealt directly with a bargaining-unit employee (the employee) and bypassed the Union by asking the employee if he would move floors as a means of resolving complaints filed against him. The Respondent now challenges two findings that support the Judge’s conclusion that the Respondent bypassed the Union.

 

First, the Respondent alleges that the Judge erred in finding that the Respondent dealt directly with the employee and bypassed the Union when a supervisor sought to arrange directly with the employee a “consensual settlement of complaints made against” him (grievance-bypass finding).^[2] Because the Respondent fails to demonstrate that the Judge erred in his determination, we deny this exception.

 

As the facts are set forth in detail in the Judge’s decision, we will only briefly summarize them here. This matter involves complaints two coworkers made against the employee and the actions the employee’s supervisor took in response to the complaints. Two coworkers of the employee separately filed “Behavioral Code of Conduct Report” forms alleging misconduct by the employee. After receiving the complaints, the employee’s supervisor sent an email to the employee stating that he “[n]eed[ed] to discuss something with [him].”^[3] The two met and discussed the complaints against the employee. At a certain point during the fifteen-minute conversation, the supervisor indicated to the employee that the complaints might be settled if the employee voluntarily moved to a different floor. The employee refused. However, one of the complaining coworkers moved instead.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

                As an initial matter, the Judge determined that the original charge encompassed the Union’s charge of bypass. The Judge noted that, although the original charge did not specifically mention the term “bypass,” “[t]he charge directs the Respondent’s attention to the meeting . . . and it further accuses the Respondent of discussing [the employee]’s conditions of employment and threatening to reassign him during the meeting.”^[4] The Judge thus determined that “the charge alleged the critical facts underlying a bypass allegation, and the Respondent had adequate notice of what it was being accused.”^[5]

 

                As to the second allegation in the GC’s complaint, the Judge determined that the Respondent bypassed the Union when it dealt directly with the employee concerning a change in the employee’s conditions of employment – that is, the employee’s move from one floor to another. Considering the differences in patients on the different floors, the Judge also determined that the effects of such a change would have been more than de minimis. The Judge rejected the Respondent’s contention that the supervisor was merely gathering information or an opinion from the employee. The Judge stated that the supervisor was “specifically trying to obtain [the employee]’s consent to a change in his conditions of employment, in a way that would avoid involving the Union.”^[6] In addition, the Judge found that the Respondent had bypassed the Union when the supervisor “sought to directly arrange with                   [the employee] a consensual settlement of the complaints made against him.”^[7]

 

 

 

The Respondent alleges that the Judge erred in finding that a “single, brief question was an attempt to arrange a change in working conditions directly with     [the employee] and an attempt to resolve a grievance directly with [the employee].”^[9] Agencies unlawfully bypass an exclusive representative when they communicate directly with bargaining-unit employees concerning grievances, disciplinary actions, and other matters relating to the collective-bargaining relationship.^[10] Such conduct constitutes direct dealing with an employee and violates § 7116(1)(a) and (5) of the Statute because that conduct interferes with the Union’s rights under § 7114(a)(1) of the Statute to act for and represent all employees in the bargaining unit.^[11] 

 

The Respondent alleges that the Judge “erred in finding that [the supervisor] attempted to ‘directly arrange with [the employee] a consensual settlement of the complaints made against him’ and thereby bypassed the Union.”^[12] The Respondent raises three contentions to support this exception. 

 

First, the Respondent argues that the Judge erred in his grievance-bypass finding because “[t]he ‘grievances’ at issue were, in fact, not grievances as contemplated by the Statute.”^[13] The Respondent argues that “they were brief and informal written statements complaining only about [the employee]’s conduct in the workplace.”^[14] There is no dispute concerning the application of the statutory definition of “grievance” here. Considering the broad definition the Statute assigns to the term grievance,^[15] a complaint by employees concerning the conduct of another employee in the workplace meets the statutory definition – “any complaint . . . by any employee concerning any matter relating to the employment of that employee.”^[16] Furthermore, the Authority has found that § 7103(a)(9) of the Statute does not limit the definition of grievance to formal grievances.^[17] Consequently, the Respondent has not demonstrated that the Judge erred in concluding that the conversation concerned grievances as defined under the Statute.

 

Second, the Respondent argues that “the meeting was a ‘rather haphazard, unorganized, [and] brief discussion’” which could not be construed as an attempt to settle the complaints against the employee.^[18] However, the Respondent does not challenge the Judge’s factual finding that the supervisor “indicated to           [the employee] that the complaints might be settled if [the employee] moved to the second floor.”^[19] As such, regardless of the brevity of the conversation, the supervisor “communicate[d] directly with [a] bargaining[-]unit[-]employee[] concerning [a] grievance[].”^[20] This argument fails to demonstrate that the Judge erred in his determination.

 

Third, the Respondent argues that there could be no settlement of the grievances because the employee “had no real ability to achieve a settlement of [the] allegations made against him by his co[]workers and, therefore, [the supervisor] could not have bypassed the Union in this context.”^[21] However, by attempting to reach a resolution of the grievance, regardless of the viability of the solution, the supervisor communicated directly with a bargaining-unit employee concerning a grievance, and, by doing so, bypassed the Union.^[22] Consequently, the Respondent’s argument fails to demonstrate that the Judge erred in his determination.

 

 

Additionally, the Respondent alleges that the Judge erred in his working-conditions-bypass finding.^[23] This finding was in addition to the Judge’s         grievance-bypass finding, a finding sufficient to support the Judge’s conclusion that “the Respondent violated § 7116(a)(1) and (5) of the Statute”^[24] by dealing directly with the bargaining-unit employee by asking him to move to a different floor. However, we find that the      working-conditions-bypass determination provides an additional basis for the Judge’s conclusions, and we find it appropriate to address the Respondent’s exceptions to the working-conditions-bypass determination.

 

First, the Respondent argues that a “single, solitary question from [the Agency] . . . cannot be a negotiation, as contemplated by the Statute, requiring the Union’s involvement.”^[25] Although the Respondent reads the extent of negotiations as a limiting factor of the statutory definition of negotiations, the Statute does not support such an interpretation. Whether the negotiations concern a single issue addressed in a single question or an entire bargaining agreement addressed over months of negotiations, the Agency has a duty to negotiate with the Union on those matters outlined in the Statute. Consequently, the length of the negotiations is immaterial, and this argument fails to demonstrate that the Judge erred.

 

Second, the Respondent argues that relocation of an employee “is a management right not subject to collective bargaining,” and that the supervisor “could have involved the Union in any required negotiations on the impact and implementation of such a reassignment” – but that “there is no evidence that [the supervisor] even seriously considered moving” the employee.^[26] However, the Judge found that the supervisor “asked                   [the employee whether] he would move” to a different floor, and that, “[b]y doing this, [the supervisor] sought to deal directly with [the employee] to change his conditions of employment, without involving the Union.”^[27] The Respondent provides no basis for finding that the Judge erred in this regard, or for concluding that the supervisor did not “even seriously consider[] moving” the employee.^[28] Further, to the extent that the Respondent is arguing that it had no obligation to bargain because relocation allegedly involves a management right, that is irrelevant. Even if relocation would involve the exercise of a management right in the circumstances of this case – an issue that we need not (and do not) decide – the Respondent still had an obligation to bargain over procedures and appropriate arrangements related to the relocation, if the relocation would have more than a de minimis effect on conditions of employment      (which, as discussed below, it would).^[29] Thus, the Respondent’s argument provides no basis for reversing the Judge.

The Respondent also argues that the change was de minimis and not subject to collective bargaining.^[30] As noted above, an agency exercising a management right is not required to negotiate the impact and implementation of that decision if the change has no more than a de minimis effect on conditions of employment.^[31] The Respondent contends that there was “little evidence that . . . any change in working conditions would have been more than de minimis.”^[32] The Judge determined that the change was more than de minimis based on his evaluation of witness testimony and his credibility findings regarding that testimony.^[33] We will not overrule a Judge’s determination regarding credibility of witnesses unless a clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence demonstrates that the determination was incorrect. We have examined the record carefully, and find no basis for reversing the Judge’s credibility findings.^[34] Consequently, the Respondent has not demonstrated that the Judge erred in finding a more than de minimis change.  

 

Further, the Respondent – arguing that “the facts and conclusions in [U.S. Department of the Treasury, IRS (IRS) ^[35]] are inapposite to the present matter” – claims that the Judge erred in his application of IRS.^[36] Under IRS, an agency may question employees directly, provided that it does not do so in a way that amounts to negotiating directly with them concerning matters that are properly bargainable with their exclusive representative.^[37] Management has the latitude to gather information, including opinions, from bargaining-unit employees to ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of its operations.^[38] However, the Judge found that the Respondent was

 

 

 

 

 

                As a final matter, we note the concurrence’s statements that (despite the Respondent’s failure to raise these issues): we “overlook[]”^[40] the issue of whether the Union’s original charge alleged a bypass; the Authority’s ULP Regulations require that ULP charges contain certain information;^[41] and we have “required absolute and total acquiescence to the filing requirements that are set forth in the Authority’s Regulations.”^[42]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

                Accordingly, the Authority has held that:        “(1) the [ULP] charge serves merely to initiate an investigation and to determine whether a complaint in a matter should be issued; (2) a charge is sufficient in [an] administrative proceeding [] if it informs the alleged violator of the general nature of the violation charged against him; and (3) where a procedural defect exists concerning the charge, a respondent must be prejudiced by the alleged defect” in order for the Authority to decline to resolve the allegedly defective claim.^[45] 

 

                Moreover, even after an FLRA regional office has investigated a ULP charge and a complaint has issued, the Authority “does not [even] judge [the] complaint based on rigid pleading requirements.”^[46] Instead, “the Authority will consider matters that are fully and fairly litigated between the parties, even where such matter is not specified in a complaint.”^[47] As the Authority previously has noted, this is consistent with private-sector precedent.^[48]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

                To support its position, the concurrence cites decisions that addressed the burdens that parties have when they file, with the Authority, exceptions to arbitration awards^[49] or submissions that the Authority’s Regulations do not expressly allow.^[50] Those types of filings are wholly different from filing a ULP charge with a regional office of the FLRA, which – as stated above – is merely the starting point for the ULP process.^[51] 

 

                The concurrence also cites the Office of the GC’s (OGC’s) 2008 revisions to the FLRA’s ULP regulations, and implies that the “strict requirements” set forth in those revisions rendered the above-stated ULP principles inapplicable.^[52] But in the proposed regulatory revisions, the OGC stated that the pertinent regulation was “substantially unchanged,”^[53] and in the final rules, the OGC stated that the pertinent requirement was “not a new requirement.”^[54] Thus, there is no basis for finding that the 2008 regulatory revisions were intended to change the above-stated, well-established ULP principles.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

                Inexplicably, however, the Agency never addresses the fact that the second charge was “untimel[y],”^[55] or whether the first charge included allegations that could be construed as raising a charge of bypass. Because the Agency never addressed this issue, I agree that this exception should be denied.

 

                I also disagree with the majority, to the extent the terms “conditions of employment” and “working conditions” are used interchangeably throughout the decision. For the reasons that the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held in NTEU v. FLRA^[56] and that I explained in General Services Administration, Eastern Distribution Center,    Burlington, N.J., those terms “[do] not mean the same thing.”25

 

 

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On May 27, 2011, the American Federation of Government Employees, Local 2145, AFL-CIO            (the Union) filed an unfair labor practice charge against the Department of Veterans Affairs, Veterans Affairs Medical Center, Richmond, Virginia (the Agency or Respondent). GC Ex. 1(a). The Union filed an amended charge on January 18, 2012.^[1] GC Ex. 1(b). After investigating the charges, the Regional Director of the FLRA’s Washington Region issued a Complaint and Notice of Hearing on May 24, 2012, alleging that the Respondent violated §§ 7114(a)(2)(A)^[2] and 7116(a)(1) and (8) of the Statute by failing to give the Union notice and an opportunity to be represented at a formal discussion between a management official and a bargaining unit employee, and that the Respondent violated § 7116(a)(1) and (5) of the Statute by bypassing the Union at that same meeting. GC Ex. 1(c). The Respondent filed its Answer to the Complaint on June 6, 2012, denying that it had violated the Statute.

 

 

 

 

 

                On April 7 and 14, 2011,^[3]two kinesiotherapists (bargaining unit employees) filed separate “Behavioral Code of Conduct Report” forms (Reports of Contact) with their supervisors, each objecting to statements made to them by physical therapist Wayne Church. Jt. Exs. 2 & 3. Since kinesiotherapists and physical therapists work under different supervisors, the complaints were subsequently referred to the Chief of the Physical Therapy and Rehabilitation Service, Dr. Shane McNamee. Tr. 113-14. One employee objected to a comment Church made about joining the Union            (Jt. Ex. 3), while the other employee objected to Church referring to her age and describing her as “jail bait”       (Jt. Ex. 2). Dr. McNamee had only become service chief the previous August, and he had never handled such a complaint before, so he discussed the cases first with someone in Human Resources (HR), who suggested that he discuss the complaints with Church. Tr. 88, 90-91.  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Regarding the bypass allegation, the GC contends that McNamee attempted to convince Church to transfer to a different work location, and that to induce Church to accept a transfer, McNamee offered to resolve the charges against him or to make the complaints disappear. Id. at 9-10. Reassigning an employee to a different work location is a change in a condition of employment, and the Agency was obligated to negotiate with the Union, not Church, on this matter. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, Air Force Materiel Command, Space & Missile Sys. Ctr., Detachment 12, Kirtland AFB, N.M., 64 FLRA 166 (2009) (Kirtland AFB). By dealing directly with Church on this issue, the Agency violated § 7116(a)(1) and (5) of the Statute.^[4] Iowa Nat’l Guard & Nat’l Guard Bureau, 8 FLRA 500, 513 (1982).       

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The facts of the Allenwood case are instructive regarding our own case. There, the union filed a charge alleging that the agency unlawfully refused to furnish it with crediting plans pursuant to a June FOIA request. After investigating the charge, the General Counsel issued a complaint alleging that the agency had unlawfully refused to furnish the union with the same crediting plans pursuant to a September request made under both FOIA and § 7114(b)(4) of the Statute. 40 FLRA at 450. Despite the absence of any reference to the September information request or to § 7114(b)(4) in the ULP charge, the charge “put the Respondent on general notice of the allegation that it had violated the Statute by refusing to furnish the requested crediting plan” and the complaint was closely related to the events cited in the charge. Id. at 455. In contrast, in U.S. Dep’t of Agric., FSIS, Wash., D.C., 59 FLRA 68 (2003), the Authority held that a charge alleging bad faith bargaining and unlawful domination of a local union could not serve as the basis for a complaint alleging that the agency had bypassed a different entity of the union, which was the exclusive representative of the employees. Not only did the charge fail to allege an unlawful bypass, but it also cited management communications with local union officials as violative, whereas the essential violation alleged in the complaint was communicating directly with members of the bargaining unit. 59 FLRA at 73 (majority opinion).^[6] By failing to mention “a critical factual element of a bypass allegation[,]” the charge failed to inform the agency of the general nature of a bypass charge. Id. The pleadings in our case are comparable to those in Allenwood: the charge specifically cites statements by McNamee that discussed conditions of employment, threatened reassignment, and attempted to resolve the complaints against Church without the involvement of the Union. Thus, the charge alleged the critical facts underlying a bypass allegation, and the Agency had adequate notice of what it was being accused of. See also U.S. Penitentiary, Florence, Colo., 53 FLRA 1393, 1401-03 (1998).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

                McNamee asked to talk to Church, and get his views, about two Reports of Contact, both of which alleged that Church had made objectionable comments to them while they were working. The one in particular that seems to have attracted everyone’s attention and concern was the comment attributed to Church about a young female employee being “jail bait,” because everyone understood that this could be construed as sexual harassment, which could result in disciplinary action against Church. See, e.g., GC Ex. 2; R. Ex. 1 at 1; Tr. 103. Both of the Reports of Contact were “complaints” by bargaining unit employees against Church,^[8] and both concerned matters relating to their employment. Therefore, the Reports of Contact satisfy the plain statutory definition of a grievance, and the May 13 meeting “concerned” a grievance.

                In finding that the meeting was a grievance, I acknowledge that most decisions interpreting § 7114(a)(2)(A) have involved discussions occurring in the context of a negotiated grievance procedure or some form of statutory appeal. Thus, management discussions with employees regarding MSPB^[9] appeals and EEO complaints^[10]have been found to be grievances, as have discussions in preparation for arbitration hearings,^[11] and even discussions at the informal stages of a negotiated grievance procedure.^[12] In INS Rosedale, the Authority left unresolved the question of whether “the definition of ‘grievance’ [extends] beyond the filing of either a statutory appeal or an informal or formal grievance[,]” but Member Wasserman stated his view that it does. 55 FLRA at 1035 n.7. In U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, 436th Airlift Wing, Dover AFB, Dover, Del., 57 FLRA 304, 308 (2001) (Dover AFB), the Authority analyzed the statutory language of § 7103(a)(9) and interpreted the repeated use of the word “any” as an indication of Congress’s intent to define the term “grievance” as inclusively as possible.^[13] In Luke AFB, the Authority stated that the meaning of “grievance” is not dependent on the scope of the parties’ negotiated grievance procedure. 54 FLRA at 730. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The evidence regarding the May 13 meeting indicates that McNamee understood the meeting triggered Church’s right to a Union representative under § 7114(a)(2)(B); he advised Church of this, but Church (at least initially) declined a Union representative.^[14] In these circumstances, can the meeting separately trigger the Union’s right to prior notice and an opportunity to attend under subparagraph (A)?

 

                Initially, the Authority seems to have answered this question in the negative, as it interpreted the legislative history of the two subparagraphs of § 7114(a)(2) as creating a distinct dichotomy of rights: if a manager is “conducting an investigation by examining . . . employees for the purpose of gathering facts[,]” the case “must perforce be decided under section 7114(a)(2)(B) and consideration under section 7114(a)(2)(A) is inapposite.” Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., Soc. Sec. Admin., 18 FLRA 42, 43, 46 (1985) (SSA II). In this decision, the Authority determined that “the employees were examined in connection with an investigation. This being so, there occurred no ‘formal discussion’ within the meaning of section 7114(a)(2)(A).” Id. at 46.^[15]         

 

                Two years later, however, the Authority significantly restricted the applicability of SSA II in McClellan I.^[16] When a management lawyer sought to interview, in preparation for an arbitration hearing, a bargaining unit employee who had been named as a union witness, it did so without notifying the union or allowing it to attend, and it cited SSA II in defense of its conduct. While the Authority reaffirmed the analysis in SSA II  that § 7114(a)(2)(A) and (B) establish “separate rights to representation[ ]” and “serve distinct purposes[,]” it rejected the concept that “a union’s right to representation at fact-gathering interviews conducted in preparation for third-party hearings depends solely on meeting the requirements of § 7114(a)(2)(B) and cannot be considered under the provisions of section 7114(a)(2)(A)[.]”   29 FLRA at 600. Rather, it said, “the particular facts of each individual case will determine the provisions of the Statute which are pertinent.” Id. In contrast to the employee interviews in SSA II, which did not occur in the context of an upcoming third-party hearing, the Authority in McClellan I considered the union’s interest in representing employees at hearings and in assuring the noncoerciveness of management interviews of union witnesses entitled the union to be present at such interviews. Id. at 600-02. It reiterated this analysis in Dep’t of the Air Force,          F.E. Warren AFB, Cheyenne, Wyo., 31 FLRA 541, 552 (1988), stating, “[w]e reject the Judge’s conclusion that agency management may treat interviews as one kind of meeting or another at its option . . . Whether section 7114(a)(2)(A) or (B) applies is determined by the facts of each case.”       

The Respondent argues that if the complaints made against Church are considered grievances under § 7114(a)(2)(A), then an employee’s right to request union representation under § 7114(a)(2)(B) could be rendered “meaningless” and “redundant”.^[17]  R. Br. at 9. But the Authority has made clear that the two subparagraphs of 7114(a)(2) protect separate and distinct rights and have different purposes, and that allegations of formal discussion violations will be evaluated within the criteria specified in (A). In the NLRB case, the agency protected itself, the union, and the various employees being interviewed by advising each employee of his right to union representation and by also advising the union of its right to attend the interviews. A similar practice could have been followed here. In our case, the Union had a distinct interest in participating in McNamee’s meeting with Church – even if Church didn’t think he needed a representative – and the Agency has not shown that notifying the Union in advance of the meeting would have destroyed the purpose of interviewing him. 

 

 

 

 

In this case, the indicia of formality do not fall uniformly on one side of the scale or the other. Instead, some indicia point toward formality and some point toward informality. On the whole, however, considering the totality of the circumstances, I conclude that the May 13 meeting was not formal.^[18] 

 

 

 

Weighing against formality are the facts that there was no agenda for the meeting, no notes were taken by McNamee or anyone else, Church was not asked or required to keep the meeting confidential, no other management representative attended, and the meeting was brief. Indeed, the overall impression conveyed by the testimony of both Church and McNamee is one of an unscripted encounter in which McNamee was hoping to short-circuit what might otherwise become a formal investigation, and to avoid the contentious arguments that would be made in a formal investigation, by talking personally to the various protagonists. Although McNamee had discussed the Reports of Contact with someone in HR, it is clear that he went into the May 13 meeting with no notes, pre-drafted questions, or anything of the sort – rather, he just wanted to get Church’s “take” on the allegations and see “what they were really about.” Tr. 90-91. And while McNamee did not admit that he offered to drop the employees’ complaints if Church agreed to move his workstation to the second floor, I believe that McNamee was looking for a way to satisfy everyone without the complaints being addressed through a formal administrative process.^[19] Once Church made it clear that he was not going to settle the matter quietly, McNamee had no desire to pursue his questioning further, and he turned the complaints over to the EEO office for a determination. Tr. 95, 99.  

 

 

The short length of the meeting further supports the idea of informality.^[20] Although the GC argues that the Authority has found meetings of ten to fifteen minutes to be of sufficient duration to connote formality, the case it cites for this point demonstrates the contrary. The meeting in Dep’t of the Air Force, Sacramento Air Logistics Ctr., McClellan AFB, Cal., 35 FLRA 594, 604 (1990) (McClellan II), was found to have taken between fifteen and twenty-five minutes; thus it was significantly longer than the meeting in our case. More importantly, the questioning that occurred in McClellan II offers a good contrast to McNamee’s questioning of Church here. An agency lawyer contacted an employee who had been identified as a possible union witness at an upcoming arbitration hearing, and he asked a series of questions to elicit what the employee knew about the incident in dispute.  Id. at 596, 604, 613-14. Even though the lawyer’s questions were not written down in advance, it is evident that he asked a considerable number of factual questions and follow-up questions to ascertain whether the employee’s account would support or conflict with the agency’s knowledge of the facts. McNamee did nothing of the sort in his meeting with Church, however. His questions were not systematic or detailed, and all we can discern from the two witnesses’ accounts of the conversation is that McNamee asked him whether the complaints against him were valid. Therefore, McClellan II does not help the GC’s case. 

 

 

 

 

 

Section 7114(a)(1)^[21]of the Statute affirms the principle of a union’s exclusive representation of employees in a bargaining unit, and this principle requires an agency to “deal only with” that representative “on matters that are within the sole authority of that exclusive representative.” Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees, Nat’l Council of HUD Locals 222, 54 FLRA 1267, 1276-77 (1998) (HUD). As the Authority stated in Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., Soc. Sec. Admin,      Balt., Md., 39 FLRA 298, 311 (1991), “Agencies unlawfully bypass an exclusive representative when they communicate directly with bargaining unit employees concerning grievances, disciplinary actions and other matters relating to the collective bargaining relationship.”    

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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