In NASA, Goddard Flight Center, Wallops Island, Virginia (NASA Goddard),^[1] the Authority addressed the Petitioner’s application for review of the attached decision by Regional Director (RD) Barbara Kraft of the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA). The RD had dismissed as untimely a petition for decertification (decertification petition) filed by the Petitioner, finding that the Agency and the Exclusive Representative (AFGE) had a lawful, written,      collective-bargaining agreement (the agreement) in place and that the petition was not filed within the applicable time period before expiration of the agreement (the open period). Accordingly, the RD had found that the agreement constituted a “[c]ontract bar”^[2] to the petition. 

 

                Addressing the Petitioner’s application for review, the Authority found an absence of precedent regarding whether the contract bar applies to decertification petitions, which may be filed only by individuals.^[3] The Authority directed the parties to file briefs addressing this question. The Authority also permitted other interested persons to address the same question. 

 

 

 

 

                The Petitioner opposed AFGE’s motion. The Petitioner argued that the Authority has never applied the contract bar to decertification petitions and that, in any event, the parties’ agreement cannot serve as a bar because it lacks clear and unambiguous effective and expiration dates, as § 2422.12(h) of the Authority’s Regulations^[5] (the wording of which is set forth in Section IV.B. below) requires.  

 

                The RD found that Authority precedent supports applying the contract bar to decertification petitions. And the RD rejected the Petitioner’s claim that the agreement’s effective and expiration dates are not clear and unambiguous. In this regard, she found it “undisputed” that the effective date of the initial,       three-year agreement was October 23, 2000 (the date when NASA Headquarters approved it), and that this effective date appears on both the cover and the signature page of the agreement.^[6] She also found that although the agreement initially terminated in October 2003, it “rolled over for one-year terms” each year since then.^[7] In this connection, she determined that Article 37, Section 37.01 of the agreement “clearly and unambiguously” provides that the agreement “renews ‘year to year,’” and that Section 37.02 “clearly states that the initial term expiration date and subsequent expiration dates of the [agreement] determine when the parties must notify each other of their intent to modify its terms.”^[8] According to the RD, “[a] common[-]sense reading of these two sections is that the reference to ‘subsequent expiration dates’ is to the expiration dates of the renewed one-year agreements.”^[9] Thus, she stated that “the expiration or termination date each year is October 23, and the effective date of the new one-year agreement is October 23, absent the parties having modified that date in a manner consistent with the requirements of” Section 37.02.^[10] Noting that “the [p]arties continued to follow” the agreement after its effective date,^[11] she concluded that the agreement meets the requirements for serving as a contract bar. 

 

                Based on her finding that the agreement expires and renews on an annual basis, the RD found that § 2422.12(d) of the Authority’s Regulations – which addresses contracts “for three . . . years or less”^[12]             – applies in this case. She further found that the open period for filing the petition ran from July 10, 2013, to August 26, 2013. Because the petition was filed on June 17, 2013 – outside that period – the RD found that the petition was untimely, and she dismissed it. 

 

                The Petitioner then filed the application for review, and, in NASA Goddard, the Authority granted the application in part, finding an absence of Authority precedent on whether the contract bar applies to decertification petitions.^[13] The Authority directed the parties to file briefs addressing the following question:

 

 

 

The Authority also published a notice in the Federal Register, allowing interested persons to file briefs as amicus curiae addressing the same question.^[15] The Authority found it “premature”^[16] at that time to address claims by the Petitioner that the RD committed clear and prejudicial errors concerning substantial factual matters by rejecting certain Petitioner arguments that the agreement lacked necessary attributes to constitute a “lawful, written[,] collective[-]bargaining agreement” under § 7111(f)(3).^[17]

 

 

                The Federal Register notice stated that any briefs “must be received [by the Authority] on or before March 31, 2014.”^[18] The Authority did not receive NFFE’s brief until April 4, 2014 – after the due date. Accordingly, we findthat NFFE’s brief is untimely, and we do not consider it.

 

                Some briefers argue that the contract bar applies to decertification petitions;^[19] others argue that it does not.^[20] To resolve the issue, we begin with the plain wording of the Statute, which expressly addresses the contract bar only in § 7111(f)(3).^[21] Section 7111 is entitled “[e]xclusive recognition of labor organizations”^[22] and provides, in subsection (f)(3), the following:

 

 

 

 

                Thus, § 7111(f)(3) addresses “petition[s] for exclusive recognition.”^[24] As some briefers note,^[25] § 7111(f)(3) is silent regarding other petitions, including decertification petitions, which § 7111(b)(1)(B) defines as petitions stating, “in the case of an appropriate unit for which there is an exclusive representative, that [thirty] percent of the employees in the unit allege that the exclusive representative is no longer the representative of the majority of the employees in the unit.”^[26] We note that § 7111(f)(3) does not state that it applies “only” to petitions for exclusive recognition; it neither provides for its application to decertification petitions nor precludes such application. 

 

                The Petitioner argues that because § 7111(f)(3) specifies application of the contract bar only to petitions for exclusive recognition, Congress implicitly indicated that it applies only to such petitions.^[27] And it is well established that “where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another . . . , it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”^[28] But that presumption does not resolve the issue before us. In this regard, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that

 

 

The U.S. Supreme Court has also stated that “[s]tatutory construction is a holistic endeavor,” and that a statutory provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation may be clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme.^[30] And a plain-meaning interpretation of a statute should be rejected if that interpretation would produce an “absurd result.”^[31]

 

                Inferring that the statutory silence in § 7111(f)(3) precludes application of the contract bar to decertification petitions would be contrary to “other textual and contextual evidence of congressional intent.”^[32] As an initial matter, declining to find that the contract bar applies to decertification petitions would be – in at least three ways – in serious tension, and even conflict, with other provisions of the Statute. 

 

                First, as some briefers argue,^[33] there is support in § 7111 itself for applying the contract bar to decertification petitions. In this connection, § 7111(b) of the Statute allows “any person”^[34] to file a decertification petition.^[35] If such a petition is filed, then a labor organization that “has been designated by at least [ten] percent of the employees in the unit specified in [the] petition” may intervene and be placed on the ballot in any election with regard to the petition.^[36] And a labor organization that “receives the majority of the votes . . . shall be certified . . . as the exclusive representative.”^[37]

 

                Thus, if the contract bar did not apply to decertification petitions, then the following scenario could occur, even where there is a lawful, written, collective-bargaining agreement in place: a decertification petition is filed; a non-incumbent union obtains a ten-percent showing of interest and is placed on the ballot; and that union wins the election and is certified as the exclusive representative. Under that scenario, if the contract bar did not apply to the decertification petition, then the non-incumbent union would be able to circumvent § 7111(f)(3)’s express direction that “[e]xclusive recognition shall not be accorded to a labor organization” when a lawful, written,                  collective-bargaining agreement is in place.^[38] This would be an “absurd result”^[39] that is avoided simply by interpreting the Statute’s silence as to application of the contract bar to decertification petitions as not precluding such application. The Supreme Court’s admonition that absurd results should be rejected^[40] supports an interpretation of § 7111 as applying the contract bar to such petitions.

 

                Second, as some briefers argue,^[41] refusing to apply the contract bar to decertification petitions would effectively give preferential treatment to those petitions, thereby making it easier to decertify than to certify a union. As one briefer argues,^[42] interpreting the Statute this way would be inconsistent with § 7101(a) of the Statute, which states that labor organizations and collective bargaining are in the public interest.^[43]

 

collective-bargaining agreement, perhaps as little as one day before the agreement expires. And this would be permitted even if the parties to the contract had bargained and reached agreement on a new contract. That is, as one briefer notes,^[44] after parties have spent their resources (and perhaps the Authority’s as well) to negotiate and reach agreement, any individual could – at any            time – essentially render those efforts meaningless. As another briefer notes,^[45] such a result would be inconsistent with § 7101(b) of the Statute, which states that “[t]he provisions of [the Statute] should be interpreted in a manner consistent with the requirement of an effective and efficient [g]overnment.”^[46]

 

 

 

 

                Additionally, as several briefers argue,^[47] applying the contract bar to decertification petitions would be consistent with precedent established by the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management Relations (the Assistant Secretary) and the Federal Labor Relations Council (the Council) under the executive order – the “predecessor” to the Statute^[48] – as well as       private-sector precedent under the Act. We note that, in interpreting the contract bar under § 7111(f)(3) of the Statute, the Authority previously has relied on      contract-bar rulings under both the executive order and the Act.^[49] 

 

                As for the executive order, the Assistant Secretary and the Council applied the contract bar to decertification petitions,^[50] despite the absence of any wording in the executive order providing for such a bar.^[51] As some briefers note,^[52] § 7135(b) of the Statute provides, in pertinent part, that “[p]olicies, regulations,    . . . procedures . . . and decisions issued under” the executive order “remain in full force and effect until revised or revoked by the President, or unless superseded by specific provisions of [the Statute] or by regulations or decisions issued pursuant to [the Statute].”^[53] Although § 7135(b) does not bar the Authority from reevaluating precedent under the executive order, where “Congress adopted the provision in the [e]xecutive [o]rder in virtually unchanged form[,] and nothing in the legislative history suggests any congressional dissatisfaction with the prior application,” the Authority must “treat the administrative precedent with the same deference as it would its own prior . . . decisions” and, “[a]t a minimum, acknowledge the precedent and provide a reason for departure.”^[54]   

 

                The executive order differs from the Statute in one pertinent way: while the executive order was completely silent regarding a contract bar,^[55] the Statute does expressly recognize one in § 7111(f)(3), which applies (on its face) only to petitions for exclusive recognition.^[56] But § 7111(f)(3) is in a section of the Statute that discusses “[e]xclusive recognition of labor organizations”^[57] generally and addresses several situations in which such recognition shall not be granted.^[58] And, importantly, nothing in the wording of § 7111(f)(3), or any other provision of the Statute, “suggests any congressional dissatisfaction with the prior application” of the contract bar.^[59] As set forth above, § 7111(f)(3)’s silence with regard to decertification petitions does not necessarily indicate a congressional intent to preclude applying the contract bar to such petitions.^[60] 

 

                As for private-sector precedent, the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) has long applied a contract bar^[61] – including to decertification petitions^[62] – even though there is no wording in the Act providing for such a bar.^[63] And courts have upheld the contract bar.^[64] As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the     D.C. Circuit stated, “the structure, role, and functions of the Authority were closely patterned after those of the [Board],” and “relevant precedent developed under the [Act] is . . . due serious consideration.”^[65] And nothing in the Statute’s legislative history indicates a congressional intention to depart from precedent under the executive order or the Act with respect to this issue.^[66]

 

                Further, as several briefers argue,^[67] various policies – based on and intertwined with the wording of the Statute, discussed above – support applying the contract bar to decertification petitions. To begin, as the Authority previously has acknowledged,^[68] theStatute’s legislative history indicates that Congress’s intent in enacting the contract bar in § 7111(f)(3) was, among other things, to “lend stability to collective[-]bargaining relationships by precluding continuous challenges to an exclusive representative’s status.”^[69] The bar provides a “period during which . . . parties may negotiate a collective[-]bargaining agreement, free from the disruption of” an election petition.^[70] Further, under the executive order, both the Council and the Assistant Secretary recognized (in the context of applying the contract bar in successorship situations) that the contract bar “restore[s] the predictability of periods when representation petitions may be filed”; “enable[s] the . . . employer and incumbent representative to engage in long[-]range planning free from unnecessary disruption”; and “promote[s] effective dealings and efficiency of agency operations.”^[71]

 

                Similarly, in the private sector, the contract bar was adopted, among other reasons, “to protect the bargaining atmosphere”^[72] and to “promote the stability of collective-bargaining agreements.”^[73] In the latter regard, the Board stated that:

 

Contracts established the foundation upon which stable labor relations usually are built. As they tend to eliminate strife [that] leads to interruptions of commerce, they are conducive to industrial peace and stability. Therefore, when such a contract has been executed by an employer and a labor organization[,] the Board has held that postponement of the right to select a representative is warranted for a reasonable period of time.^[74] 

 

The Board acknowledged that, “from an administrative viewpoint, the establishment of a definite period will have the salutary effect” of permitting the Board’s regional offices, “by obtaining a limited amount of information, to dismiss prematurely filed petitions, thus preventing a large percentage of such cases from being processed until an appropriate time.”^[75] As the Authority has recognized, the purpose of the contract bar is the same in both the federal and private sectors.^[76] Therefore, these private-sector policy considerations are also relevant to application of the contract bar in the federal sector.

 

                As some briefers argue,^[77] declining to apply the contract bar to decertification petitions would make it difficult to administer collective-bargaining agreements. And this would adversely affect both the exclusive representative and management. In this connection, as noted above, declining to apply the contract bar to decertification petitions could result in such a petition being filed on the last day of the term of a contract, even if the parties to the contract had already negotiated a successor agreement. As one briefer argues, “management – having expended time and resources bargaining with the existing union for a             collective[-]bargaining agreement – could lose the benefit of its bargain and the predictability and stability that flows from having reached an agreement governing its workforce.”^[78] Also, as one briefer claims, “[d]uring the term of a contract, the agency must have confidence that the current exclusive representative is the entity [that] it should work with for purposes of administering the contract,” and “[u]ncertainty is injected into that relationship . . . by any decertification petition.”^[79] 

 

                By contrast, applying the contract bar to decertification petitions would, as one briefer states, allow parties “to engage in meaningful bargaining and build relationships to the benefit of both bargaining[-]unit members and the agency as a whole.”^[80] Such an application would lend stability to collective-bargaining relationships by precluding continuous challenges to an exclusive representative’s status, while at the same time giving employees the opportunity at reasonable intervals to choose a different exclusive representative, or no representative at all. In addition, it restores the predictability of periods when representation petitions may be filed, enables the employer and incumbent representative to engage in long-range planning free from unnecessary disruption, and promotes effective dealings and efficiency of agency operations.^[81] Further, from an administrative viewpoint, it would have the “salutary effect” of enabling the Authority’s regional offices, “by obtaining a limited amount of information, to dismiss prematurely filed petitions, thus preventing a large percentage of such cases from being processed until an appropriate time.”^[82] 

 

                The Petitioner argues that § 7111(b) of the Statute supports a contrary conclusion because “[t]he only limit on the right to petition for decertification is found in [§] 7111(b)(2), which provides for a          twelve-month election bar.”^[83] In this connection, § 7111(b) provides that when a decertification petition is filed, and the Authority finds that a question concerning representation exists, the Authority must conduct an election unless “a valid election” under § 7111 of the Statute has been held “in the preceding [twelve] calendar months.”^[84] But for reasons stated above, § 7111(b)’s silence with respect to the contract bar is not dispositive.^[85] Further, the Act – which, as also stated above, has been interpreted to provide a contract bar to decertification petitions^[86] – contains wording that is nearly identical to § 7111(b) of the Statute. Specifically, § 9(c)(1) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that if the Board “finds upon the record of [a] hearing that a question of representation exists, it shall direct an election,”^[87] with only one exception: when, during the preceding twelve months, a “valid election” was held.^[88] And the Authority and the courts have stated that “[w]hen there are comparable provisions under the Statute and the [Act], decisions of the [Board] and the courts interpreting the [Act] have a high degree of relevance to similar circumstances under the Statute.”^[89] That § 9(c)(1) of the Act has not been found to preclude application of the contract bar supports finding that § 7111(b) of the Statute also does not preclude such an application.

 

                Moreover, as one briefer notes,^[90] the Statute is silent as to when an individual may file a decertification petition. But, as some briefers acknowledge,^[91] Congress gave the Authority the powers to: (1) “establish rules governing any . . . election” under § 7111 of the Statute;^[92] (2) prescribe “regulations to carry out the provisions of [the Statute]”;^[93] (3) “supervise or conduct elections . . . and otherwise administer the provisions of [§] 7111 . . . relating to the according of exclusive recognition to labor organizations”;^[94] and (4) “take such other actions as are necessary and appropriate to effectively administer the provisions of” the Statute.^[95] In this connection, as the U.S. Supreme Court has stated, the Statute makes the Authority “responsible for implementing the Statute through the exercise of broad adjudicatory, policymaking, and rulemaking powers.”^[96] 

 

 

 

As one briefer argues,^[98] the plain wording of § 2422.12(d) provides that the contract bar applies to “a petition seeking an election.”^[99] Without question, a decertification petition is a petition seeking an election: a decertification election.^[100] Thus, by its plain terms, the contract bar in § 2422.12(d) applies the contract bar to decertification petitions. We note, in this regard, that the Petitioner acknowledges that § 2422.12(d) “does not plainly state that it applies only to labor organizations,” but contends that “because it was created to enforce a statutory right that is plainly limited to labor organizations, the regulation is constrained by the plain language of the Statute.”^[101]  However, for the reasons discussed above, the plain wording of the Statute does not preclude applying the contract bar to decertification petitions, and the Statute expressly gives the Authority broad power to promulgate regulations in representation matters. Accordingly, the Petitioner’s claim does not provide a basis for declining to apply § 2422.12(d) to decertification petitions.

                The Agency asserts that the Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM’s) “Glossary of Federal Sector Labor Management Relations Terms” provides that a contract bar applies only to petitions for exclusive recognition.^[102] But OPM’s opinion on this matter is not authoritative, because the issue here involves an interpretation of the Authority’s own Statute.^[103] And we note that OPM has taken no position in this case.  

 

                The Petitioner argues that interpreting the Statute to apply the contract bar to decertification petitions would be inconsistent with the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.^[104] Specifically, the Petitioner contends that the Petitioner and other unit employees are “being forced to associate with the Union and have it speak on their behalf in collective bargaining,” which is “forced speech” that “implicat[es] both the employees’ right to speak and to petition the government.”^[105] According to the Petitioner, this results in unit employees being “[g]agged from presenting to the government their own views about collective bargaining” because “[t]heir views are presented by a [u]nion they never had an opportunity to vote upon.”^[106]

                In support, the Petitioner cites (only)              U.S. Supreme Court decisions involving compulsory union fees or dues,^[107] Board jurisdiction over religiously affiliated schools,^[108] and a state statute requiring an organization to admit women as voting members.^[109] But these decisions have nothing to do with either the facts of this case or the statutory and regulatory provisions involved here. Further, the Petitioner cites no authority for its claim that being exclusively represented by a union violates the First Amendment. In fact, the Supreme Court has held that public employees have no constitutional right, as either members of the public or as employees, to have the government listen to or bargain with them, apart from the government’s dealings with their exclusive representative.^[110] In this regard, the Court stated that “[a] person’s right to speak is not infringed when government simply ignores that person while listening to others,” and employees’ “associational freedom” is not impaired when a public-sector employer deals only with an exclusive representative on certain matters.^[111] 

 

                Moreover, as the Authority,^[112] the Board,^[113] the courts,^[114] and several briefers^[115] recognize, the contract bar strikes an appropriate balance between ensuring stability in labor relations, on the one hand, and the right of individual employees to change or decertify their representative, on the other. The contract bar ensures that individuals need not wait more than three years to file decertification petitions.^[116] And, during those three years, petitions are not limited solely to the open period; they also “may be filed at any time when unusual circumstances exist that substantially affect the unit or majority representation.”^[117] Additionally, as discussed below, in order to serve as a bar, an agreement must meet certain requirements that are designed to ensure that petitioners know when they are able to file.^[118] Moreover, § 7114(a)(1) of the Statute requires the exclusive representative to “represent[] the interests of all employees in the unit it represents without discrimination and without regard to labor[-]organization membership.”^[119] This duty of fair representation is protection for employees whose “individual rights” may be affected by the “grant of power to a union to act as [their] exclusive bargaining representative.”^[120] Thus, although the contract bar places a time limitation on when employees may exercise their right to choose a different exclusive representative, or no representative at all, that limitation is not absolute – and the Statute provides protections for employees who are exclusively represented by a union.

 

                Additionally, in its brief responding to the Federal Register notice, the Petitioner claims – for the first time before the Authority – that the plain wording of § 7111(f)(3) of the Statute does not allow the contract bar to “apply beyond the initial three-year term of . . . an agreement.”^[121] But it is well established in Authority precedent that the contract bar applies to agreements that automatically renew.^[122] And the Petitioner could have argued – but did not argue – in its application for review that this “[e]stablished law or policy warrants reconsideration.”^[123] Further, the Federal Register notice did not invite the parties and amici to address this issue. 

 

 

Preserving the ability of parties to avail themselves of the benefit of automatic renewal of agreements is consistent with the purposes and policies of the Statute. In addition to promoting labor[-]management stability, a policy permitting automatic renewal is consistent with effective and efficient [g]overnment in that it preserves the time and resources that would be expended in renegotiating      collective[-]bargaining agreements where renegotiation is otherwise deemed unnecessary by the parties.^[124] 

 

                Finally, one briefer who filed his brief as an amicus curiae argues that “the Authority should permit decertification petitions to be adjudicated at times other than the open period upon a regional determination that the incumbent union is defunct.”^[125] But the parties to this case have not made this argument. And the Authority considers amicus briefs only to the extent that they address issues raised by the parties.^[126] Consistent with this practice, we do not resolve the merits of that issue.

                As stated previously, in NASA Goddard, the Authority found it premature to addressthe Petitioner’s claims that theRD committed clear and prejudicial errors concerning substantial factual matters when she found that the agreement bars the petition.^[127] Given our finding to find that the contract bar applies generally, it is necessary to resolve the Petitioner’s arguments here.

 

                In order to bar a petition, an agreement must contain a clear and unambiguous effective date and must clearly set forth its duration so that any potential challenging party may determine when the open period will occur.^[128] In this regard, § 2422.12(h) of the Authority’s Regulations provides that                 collective-bargaining agreements, including agreements that automatically renew without further action by the parties, “are not a bar to a petition seeking an election . . . unless a clear effective date, renewal date where applicable, duration, and termination date are ascertainable from the agreement and relevant accompanying documentation.”^[129] The effective date of an agreement that automatically renews is “the date previously set by the parties for the renewal of the agreement.”^[130]

 

                The Petitioner claims that the RD erred by failing to find that the agreement lacks a clear and unambiguous effective date.^[131] For support, the Petitioner asserts that Article 37, Section 37.02’s “use of the term ‘expiration date’ is in direct conflict with Section 37.01’s use of the term ‘continue in effect from year to year.’”^[132] In addition, the Petitioner claims that the RD erred by finding that the agreement renews from year to year.^[133] In this connection, the Petitioner notes that the agreement states that it “shall continue in effect from year to year unless amended, modified, or terminated,”^[134] and does not use the words “renew, renewal, or rollover.”^[135] According to the Petitioner, there are “significant legal difference[s]” between these various terms.^[136] Specifically, the Petitioner contends that the term “continue” does notimply that the agreement “expires annually and then automatically renews with a new effective date every year.”^[137] Instead, the Petitioner asserts, “the effectivedate of the [agreement] remains October 23, 2000,” and the agreement’s “duration is seamless and has no expiration date.”^[138]

 

                As stated above , the RD found it “undisputed” that the effective date of the initial, three-year agreement was October 23, 2000, the date when NASA Headquarters approved it, and that this effective date appears on the cover and the signature page of the agreement.^[139] And, contrary to the Petitioner’s claim, the terms of the agreement are not in conflict. In this regard, Article 37, Section 37.01 provides that the agreement continues “in full force and effect for three . . . years from the date of approval by the NASA Administrator”             – October 23, 2000 – “and thereafter shall continue in effect from year to year unless amended, modified[,] or terminated in accordance with this Article.”^[140] Article 37, Section 37.02 provides that either party may give written notice and proposed modifications “not more than ninety . . . , nor less than sixty . . . [,] calendar days prior to the [three-year] expiration date and each subsequent expiration date,”^[141] and that the agreement “will remain in full force and effect until modifications are agreed upon and approved by the NASA Administrator or his/her designee.”^[142] Nothing in these two contractual sections, alone or in combination, is unclear. And the Petitioner cites no authority for the proposition that an agreement must use such words “renew, renewal, or rollover”^[143] in order to be considered agreements that terminate and then automatically renew. Accordingly, the Petitioner’s arguments are without merit. 

 

                In addition, the Petitioner argues that the RD erroneously failed to find that AFGE cannot be regarded as having exclusive representation, based on the fact that the agreement is with AFGE, Local 2755.^[144] In this connection, the Petitioner claims that since Local 2755 has not been active at the Agency since February of 2009, “AFGE no longer exclusively represents the employees.”^[145] The Petitioner states that the Agency and AFGE “have informally been following the terms of the” agreement, but claims that this “current arrangement . . . [is] aninformal and non-binding extension of the original” agreement.^[146] Citing National Park Service, Harpers Ferry, West Virginia (Park Service),^[147] the Petitioner claims that “there [is] no lawful [agreement] between [the Agency] and AFGE[,] Local 1923.”^[148] And, citing Department of the Army, Corpus Christi Army Depot, Corpus Christi, Texas    (Army Depot),^[149] the Petitioner claims that the Agency and AFGE, Local 1923 “are operating on a verbal[,] temporary agreement” that is not a bar to the petition.^[150]

 

                These arguments focus solely on the identities of the parties who signed the agreement. But, as AFGE argues,^[151] and the Petitioner does not dispute, AFGE was properly certified to replace AFGE, Local 2755 following the procedures set forth in Veterans Administration Hospital, Montrose, New York^[152] – which include a secret-ballot election.^[153] And there likewise is no dispute that AFGE thereafter designated AFGE, Local 1923 to serve as the representative.^[154] Unions are permitted to make such designations.^[155] As such, the arguments are meritless. We note, in this connection, that under the executive order, the contract bar applied to agreements that carried over in cases of successorship,^[156] which necessarily involve changes in the designation of one of the parties to the agreement.^[157] Further, the Authority decisions that the Petitioner cites are inapposite: Park Service involved an agreement that had been disapproved by an agency head,^[158] and Army Depot involved a situation where an agreement expired, and, rather than extending it for another year, as the agreement allowed them to do, the parties merely corresponded that they had an intention to negotiate.^[159]

 

                For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the RD did not err in finding that the agreement bars the Petitioner’s petition. In reaching this conclusion, we note that the Petitioner admits that he was aware of the general statutory requirements to file his petition during the statutory-bar period, and that, on the petition form, he intentionally chose not to fill in the appropriate block that is provided “for the expiration date of the current agreement.”^[160] In other words, the Petitioner was aware of the § 7111(f)(3) requirement but chose, instead, to make an alternative argument that the term “continue” in the parties’ agreement “does not imply that the [agreement] expires annually and then automatically renews.”^[161] We further note that because the agreement originally terminated in October of 2003, and has renewed once a year, every year, since then, the Petitioner has had the opportunity to file a petition every year since 2003. And unless circumstances change      (for example, if the Agency and AFGE negotiate a new agreement with a longer duration), the Petitioner will continue to have the opportunity do so, including next year, during the statutory time frame specified in § 7111(f)(3).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

---

 

 

 

 

 

 

---