[ v31 p305 ]
31:0305(28)AR
The decision of the Authority follows:
31 FLRA NO. 28 31 FLRA 305 23 FEB 1988 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEPENDENTS SCHOOLS-- PACIFIC REGION Activity and OVERSEAS EDUCATION ASSOCIATION Union Case No. 0-AR-1413 DECISION I. Statement of the Case This matter is before the Authority on exceptions to the award of Arbitrator Timothy D. W. Williams. The Arbitrator first found that the grievances were grievable and arbitrable and rejected the claim that one of the grievances had not been timely filed. The Arbitrator further found that the two grievants are qualified as counselors in accordance with applicable regulations and qualification standards. Accordingly, he directed that they be recertified as counselors and that counselor positions be made available to them with backpay. The Agency (DoDDS) filed exceptions under section 7122(a) of the Federal Service Labor - Management Relations Statute (the Statute) and part 2425 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations. We conclude that the Agency has failed to establish that the grievances are not arbitrable or that the Arbitrator erred (1) by finding that the one grievance had been timely filed, and (2) by relying on a regulation and an agreement provision which were not in effect at any time material to the grievances. However, we conclude that by finding that the grievants are qualified as counselors and by directing that they be offered counselor positions with backpay, the award is contrary to management's rights to assign employees under section 7106(a)(2)(A) and to make selections in filling positions under section 7106(a)(2)(C). II. Background The parties submitted two grievances to arbitration concerning the Agency's determinations that the grievants were not qualified as counselors because they did not meet the Agency's qualification standards. A. Grievant David Markewitz Grievant Markewitz' education included a B.A. in journalism, a Master's degree in social studies, and a Ph.D. in psychology. In 1980, he was certified by the Agency as an elementary and secondary school counselor. In March 1985, he was assigned as a high school counselor and social studies teacher where his counseling activities comprised two periods per day. He was selected for assignment to a full-time counseling position for the 1985-86 school year. However, in May 1985, he was advised by the Agency that he was not qualified as a counselor. The Agency stated that in order to be qualified as a counselor under the qualification standards set forth in agency regulation and the parties' collective bargaining agreement, the employee must have a Master's degree in educational guidance and counseling or course work in guidance and counseling. The Agency determined that Grievant Markewitz was not qualified for assignment as an elementary or secondary school counselor because he did not have a Master's degree in guidance and counseling and because a majority of his graduate-level course work was in psychology and not in guidance and counseling. Consequently, Grievant Markewitz was assigned as a high school teacher rather than a counselor for the 1985-86 school year. In 1986, the Agency did not recertify Grievant Markewitz as an elementary or secondary school counselor. A grievance was filed contending that management's decision regarding the grievant's qualifications was arbitrary and capricious and constituted a misinterpretation of pertinent provisions of agency regulation and the collective bargaining agreement. B. Grievant Mary Louise Owen Grievant Owen's education included a B.S. degree in education and a Master's degree in counseling psychology. From 1975 to 1981, she was a school guidance counselor with the Agency. In 1980, she was certified by the Agency as an elementary and secondary school counselor, and in 1986, she was recertified in these categories. During the 1985-86 school year, Grievant Owen was an elementary school teacher. In the spring of 1986, shortly after she had been recertified, she requested reassignment to a counseling position. She was advised by the Agency that she was not qualified as a counselor because she did not have a Master's degree in educational guidance and counseling and because her course work did not emphasize school guidance and counseling. She filed a grievance contending that she had not been treated fairly. III. Arbitrator's Award A. Threshold Issues of Grievability and Arbitrability The Arbitrator considered the issues of whether the grievances were grievable and whether the grievance of Grievant Markewitz had been timely filed. The Arbitrator concluded that the two grievances were grievable and arbitrable because they concerned the manner in which the Agency interpreted and applied the established qualification standards to the two grievants. He also concluded that under the provisions of the parties' collective bargaining agreement, the grievance of Grievant Markewitz had been timely filed. B. Issue on the Merits The Arbitrator framed the issue on the merits as whether the grievants were qualified as counselors in accordance with applicable regulations and qualification standards. The Arbitrator noted that at all relevant times, the qualification standards for certification as an elementary or secondary school counselor required a Master's degree in educational guidance and counseling. The Arbitrator noted that in 1980, the Agency certified both grievants as elementary and secondary school counselors and in 1986, recertified Grievant Owen in both categories. The Arbitrator concluded that although the qualification standards had not been changed (except in minor respects which were not involved in the grievances), the Agency changed its interpretation of the qualification standards. The Arbitrator acknowledged that the Agency has the right to establish the standards, to change the standards, and to determine whether an individual employee meets the standards. The Arbitrator further acknowledged that the Agency has the right to change its interpretation of the standards. Moreover, the Arbitrator concluded that the Agency at the arbitration hearing had articulated a reasonable basis for more restrictively interpreting the standards. However, the Arbitrator determined that the Agency had acted arbitrarily and capriciously by substantially altering its interpretation of the qualification requirements without providing notice of the changed interpretation to employees. The Arbitrator ruled that the Agency's failure to notify the grievants and provide information concerning the classes the grievants should take to become qualified violated "at least the spirit" of the provision of the parties' agreement requiring the Agency to assure that employees are provided appropriate guidance, assistance, and counseling concerning certification requirements. Award at 48. The Arbitrator also addressed the question of the grievants' recertification. He found that the Agency's failure to recertify Grievant Markewitz and to maintain Grievant Owen's recertification was a clear violation of the agency certification regulation. The Arbitrator acknowledged that the grievants did not meet the Agency's new interpretation of the qualification standards. However, the Arbitrator found that, under the certification regulation, current qualification is not required. He noted that the requirements for recertification are different from those applicable to a reassignment. The Arbitrator found that to be eligible for reassignment, an employee must both hold an applicable certification and meet the current qualification requirements for the position. Under the certification regulation, an employee is entitled to be recertified when the employee meets the qualification requirements "for any of the last 3 school years of the certification period." The Arbitrator ruled that Grievant Owen was entitled to maintain her recertification by the Agency in 1986 for elementary and secondary school counselor. The Arbitrator also ruled that Grievant Markewitz was entitled to have been recertified for elementary and secondary school counselor in 1986. He concluded that the grievant met the qualification requirements for one of his last 3 years of his certification period because the Agency had assigned him as a counselor in school year 1984-85. C. Award and Remedies The Arbitrator concluded that both grievants qualified as counselors in accordance with applicable regulations and qualification standards. He awarded the grievants the following remedies: The appropriate remedy regarding grievant David Markewitz is: a. The grievant should have been placed in the position of Counselor at Kadena High School for the year 1985-86. Therefore the grievant is granted a back pay award effective from March 5, 1986 through the remainder of that school year. The award is for the difference between the salary the grievant made for that time period and the salary he would have made as a Counselor. b. DoDDS is directed to reissue the grievant, David Markewitz, his 1986 certificate and add categories 400 and 401 (Secondary and Elementary Counselor) to those areas on his current certificate. c. DoDDS is directed to make available to the grievant, David Markewitz, a Counselor position. If none are currently available in a location or program acceptable to the grievant, then he is awarded the right of first refusal to future available Counselor positions. This right extends until the grievant accepts a position or until September 1, 1989, whichever comes first. The appropriate remedy regarding grievant Mary Louise Owen is: a. The grievant should have been placed in the position of Counselor at Kubasaki High School for school year 1986-87. The grievant is granted a back pay award effective for school year 1986-87. The award is for the difference between the salary the grievant made for that time period and the salary she would have made as a Counselor. b. DoDDS is directed to reissue the grievant, Mary Louise Owen, her 1986 certificate and add categories 400 and 401 (Secondary and Elementary Counselor) to those areas on her current certificate. c. DoDDS is directed to make available to grievant Mary Louise Owen a Counselor position. If none are currently available in a location or program acceptable to the grievant, then she is awarded the right of first refusal to future available Counselor positions. This right extends until the grievant accepts a position or until September 1, 1989, whichever comes first. IV. First Exception A. Contentions The Agency contends that the award is contrary to the Statute. The Agency maintains that the grievances are excluded from coverage under the negotiated grievance procedure because they concern certification within the meaning of section 7121(c)(4). B. Analysis and Conclusions We conclude that the Agency fails to establish that the award is contrary to the Statute as alleged. Section 7121 (c) (4) excludes from the coverage of the grievance procedure prescribed by the Statute grievances concerning "examination, certification, or appointment." In view of the group of matters enumerated in section 7121(c)(4), we find that "certification" refers to the process defined in Federal Personnel Manual (FPM) chapter 332. FPM chapter 332, subchapter 1-6 defines "certification" as the process by which the Office of Personnel Management submits certificates of a list of eligibles from a register to appointing officers so that the eligibles may be considered for appointment. Consequently, the grievances and the award concerning the eligibility of the grievants to be recertified as counselors are not precluded by section 7121(c)(4) of the Statute. Accordingly, this exception is denied. V. Second Exception A. Contentions The Agency contends that the Arbitrator erred in relying on a certification regulation and an agreement provision which were not in effect at any time material to the grievances. The Agency also contends that the Arbitrator erred in finding that the grievance of Grievant Markewitz had been timely filed under the agreement. B. Analysis and Conclusions We conclude that this exception fails to establish that the award is deficient. The Agency fails to establish that the Arbitrator relied on a certification regulation and a collective bargaining agreement provision which were not in effect at any time material to the grievance. In rendering his award, the Arbitrator relied on the Agency's failure to provide notice to employees of the changed interpretation of the qualification standards. The Arbitrator's references to subsequent provisions were only for the purpose of noting that the standards had not materially changed, and the references provide no basis for finding the award deficient. The Agency's contention that the Arbitrator erred in finding that the grievance of Grievant Markewitz had been timely filed constitutes nothing more than disagreement with the Arbitrator's ruling on procedural arbitrability. See, for example, Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center, Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma and American Federation of Government Employees, Local No. 916, 30 FLRA No. 125 (1988) (exception which simply disagrees with an arbitrator's determinations on the procedural arbitrability of the grievance provides no basis for finding the award deficient). Accordingly, this exception is denied. VI. Third and Fourth Exceptions A. Contentions The Agency contends that the award is contrary to section 7106(a) of the Statute and the Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. 5596. The Agency argues that by determining that the grievants are qualified for counselor positions and by requiring that they be offered counselor positions, the award conflicts with management's rights to establish qualifications, to determine whether individual employees meet the qualifications, and to assign employees to positions for which management determines they are qualified. The Agency further argues that the Arbitrator failed to make the specific findings necessary for an award of backpay under the Back Pay Act. B. Analysis and Conclusions We conclude that the award is deficient as contrary to section 7106(a) of the Statute. We find that by ruling that the grievants are qualified as counselors under applicable regulations and qualification standards and by directing that counselor positions be made available to them with backpay, the award is contrary to management's rights to assign employees under section 7106(a)(2)(A) and to make selections in filling positions under section 7106(a)(2)(C). In Overseas Education Association and Department of Defense Dependents Schools, 29 FLRA 734 (1987), we considered the negotiability of a number of proposals relating to the certification and qualification of teachers and educators employed by the Agency. We recognized that the determination of the personnel requirements of a position--the qualifications, skills, and abilities needed to perform the work of the position--is encompassed within management's rights to assign employees under section 7106(a)(2)(A) and to make selections in filling positions under section 7106(a)(2)(C). 29 FLRA at 803-08, 813-14. We found that proposals which prevented management from changing qualification requirements or which required the Agency to consider employees eligible for positions regardless of changes in qualification standards conflicted with management's rights to assign employees and to make selections in filling positions. 29 FLRA 734 (Proposals 51, 53, 58-61). We conclude that the award in this case conflicts with management's rights to assign employees and to make selections in filling positions. The Arbitrator acknowledged that management had the right to change the interpretation of the qualification standards and that the grievants did not meet the Agency's new interpretation of the standards. However, he concluded that the Agency (1) had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in altering its interpretation of the standards, and (2) had violated "at least the spirit" of the agreement by failing to notify the grievants of what courses were necessary for them to complete to qualify under the new interpretation of the standards. Despite his acknowledgment that the grievants did not meet the new interpretation, the Arbitrator ruled that the grievants are qualified as counselors and directed that counselor positions be made available to them with backpay. An arbitration award may not improperly deny an agency the authority to exercise its rights under section 7106(a) of the Statute. For example, Naval Undersea Warfare Engineering Station, Keyport, Washington and International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Local 282, 22 FLRA 957, 959 (1986). However, management's rights under section 7106(a) are subject to section 7106(b)(2) and (3). Thus, an award that simply enforces an applicable negotiable procedure or appropriate arrangement is not deficient as contrary to section 7106(a). Id. In this case, the award directly interferes with management's rights, encompassed under the rights to assign employees and to make selections in filling positions, to establish qualification standards, to interpret the standards, to change the interpretation of the standards, and to determine whether individual employees meet the standards. The award does not simply constitute the enforcement of an applicable procedure or appropriate arrangement of the parties' collective bargaining agreement. To the extent that the Arbitrator based his award on a finding that the Agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously, there is nothing in the record on which to conclude that the Arbitrator enforced a contract provision providing for review of the exercise of management's rights under a standard of arbitrary or capricious. To the extent that the Arbitrator based his award on "at least the spirit" of the contract provision which requires the Agency to provide guidance, assistance, and counseling on certification, the award is also deficient. The Arbitrator's finding does not constitute a finding of a violation of the collective bargaining agreement. Furthermore, even if we viewed the award as finding a violation of a provision of the parties' agreement, the award improperly denies management the rights to assign employees under section 7106(a)(2)(A) and to make selections in filling positions under section 7106(a)(2)(c). The Arbitrator's enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement in this manner makes no provision for the grievants becoming qualified under the Agency's new interpretation of the qualification standards. There is no requirement that the grievants successfully complete the courses that have been identified by the Agency as necessary for them to meet the qualification standards for elementary or secondary school counselor. Instead, the award prevents the Agency from applying the new interpretation of the qualification standards to the grievants and compels the Agency to make counselor positions available to the grievants and to pay them as counselors, notwithstanding that they are not qualified for the positions. VII. Decision For the reasons stated above, the award is deficient by ruling that the grievants are qualified as counselors under applicable regulations and qualification standards and by directing that counselor positions be made available to them with backpay, and the award must be modified. Accordingly, paragraphs 3 and 5, finding that the grievants are qualified as counselors, are struck from the award. Paragraph 4 is modified to provide as follows: 4. The appropriate remedy regarding Grievant Markewitz is as follows: a. DoDDS is directed to reissue to the grievant, David Markewitz, his 1986 certificate and add categories 400 and 401 (Secondary and Elementary Counselor) to those areas on his current certificate. Paragraph 6 is modified to provide as follows: 6. The appropriate remedy regarding Grievant Owen is as follows: a. DoDDS is directed to reissue to the grievant, Mary Louise Owen, her 1986 certificate and add categories 400 and 401 (Secondary and Elementary Counselor) to those areas on her current certificate. Issued, Washington, D.C. February 23, 1988. Jerry L. Calhoun, Chairman Jean McKee, Member FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY