[ v25 p987 ]
25:0987(83)NG
The decision of the Authority follows:
25 FLRA No. 83
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
LOCAL NO. 12
Union
and
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Agency
Case No. 0-NG-981
DECISION AND ORDER ON NEGOTIABILITY ISSUES
I. Statement of the Case
This case is before the Authority because of a negotiability appeal
filed under section 7105(a)(2)(E) of the Federal Service
Labor-Management Relations Statute (the Statute), and concerns the
negotiability of seven Union proposals.
II. Procedural Issues
The Agency contends that the petition for review should be dismissed
because the Union did not provide an explicit statement of the meaning
to be given to the disputed proposals. The Union did not file a
response. With the exception of Proposal 5, we find that the meaning of
the proposals is clear and that the petition complies with the
Authority's Rules and Regulations. See American Federation of
Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 3004 and Department of the Army and
Air Force, National Guard Bureau, 15 FLRA 270, at n.1 (1984). Our
reasons for finding that Proposal 5 is not sufficiently clear for us to
decide its negotiability are fully set forth in the analysis of that
proposal.
The Agency also asserts that it has no duty to bargain concerning
Proposals 1, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 because they are governed by provisions in
the parties' Agreement and/or by Agency regulations which have already
been negotiated and incorporated into the Agreement. Because of the
claimed existence of threshold issues concerning the duty to bargain the
Agency contends that the Authority has no jurisdiction to decide the
negotiability issues in this case. This contention cannot be sustained.
Under section 7117(c) of the Statute, a union is entitled to a decision
by the Authority as to whether a proposal is negotiable under the
Statute, despite the existence of other issues in the case, for example,
an alleged conflict between a proposal and a controlling agreement.
American Federation of Government Employees, Local 2736 v. FLRA, 715
F.2d 627, 631 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Moreover, the record in this case does
not provide any basis upon which to substantiate the Agency's assertions
that the proposals are governed by provisions in the parties' Agreement.
To the extent that there are factual issues regarding the duty to
bargain in the specific circumstances of this case, such as whether the
disputed proposals have already been bargained between the parties,
these issues should be resolved in other appropriate proceedings. See
American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 2736 and
Department of the Air Force, Headquarters 379th Combat Support Group
(SAC), Wurtsmith Air Force Base, Michigan, 14 FLRA 302, 306 n.6 (1984).
Thus, the Union's proposals in this case are properly before us under
section 7105(a)(2)(E) and section 7117(c) of the Statute.
III. Preliminary Discussion Concerning "Appropriate
Arrangements" Under Section 7106(b)(3)
In National Association of Government Employees, Local R14-87 and
Kansas Army National Guard, 21 FLRA No. 4 (1986), the Authority adopted
the "excessive interference" test set forth in American Federation of
Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 2782 v. FLRA, 702 F.2d 1183 (D.C.
Cir. 1983), for determining whether a proposal constitutes a negotiable
"appropriate arrangement" under section 7106(b)(3) of the Statute. The
Authority also stated that in order for a proposal to be considered
under section 7106(b)(3) the union must first show that employees have
been or will be adversely affected by an exercise of a management right
and that its proposal is intended to mitigate against those adverse
effects. In American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
Employees, Local 3097 and Department of Justice, 24 FLRA No. 49 (1986),
it was stated that in cases filed before Kansas Army National Guard,
like this case, the Authority will examine the record to determine
whether any adverse effects have been identified or whether such effects
are reasonably foreseeable based upon the nature of the matter in
dispute. We have consistently considered proposals relating to the
effect of a reduction-in-force (RIF) on employees under section
7106(b)(3) because the adverse effect on employees of a RIF action is
clear. See, for example, International Plate Printers, Die Stampers and
Engravers Union of North America, AFL-CIO, Local 2 and Department of the
Treasury, Bureau of Engraving and Printing, Washington, D.C., 25 FLRA
No. 9 (1987) and National Treasury Employees Union and Department of
Energy, 24 FLRA No. 52 (1986). For that reason, because the proposals
at issue here concern union attempts to mitigate against the adverse
effect on employees of a RIF, reorganization, or downgrading, we will
consider the negotiability of these proposals under section 7106(b)(3)
of the Statute, where necessary.
IV. Proposal 1
Section 1: All positions throughout the National Office of the
Department of Labor will be frozen pending placement of all
employees at ETA adversely affected by the RIF, reorganization,
downgrading (RRD).
A. Position of the Agency
The Agency contends that Proposal 1 is not negotiable because it
conflicts with the Agency's rights under section 7106(a) and because it
involves a permissive subject of bargaining under section 7106(b)(1) of
the Statute concerning which the Agency has elected not to bargain.
B. Analysis
1. Effect of the Proposal on Management's Rights
Proposal 1 requires the imposition of a freeze on the filling of all
vacancies throughout the Agency's National Office until all employees
adversely affected by a RIF, reorganization, or downgrading (RRD) have
been placed. It is not clear from the record whether the proposed
freeze is to take effect before or after the effective date of a RIF,
reorganization, or downgrading. When the freeze takes effect, however,
is irrelevant, because in either situation the proposal requires
management to act in a manner inconsistent with its reserved rights
under section 7106 of the Statute. As to the freeze itself, there is
nothing in the express language of the proposal or in the record before
us which indicates that the Agency would be able to hire an employee
from outside the bargaining unit to fill a vacancy in the National
Office even if none of the employees affected by the RRD qualified for
that vacancy. That is, the proposal imposes an absolute and indefinite
freeze on filling positions until all affected employees are in some
manner placed, regardless of their qualifications or the availability of
vacancies for which they would be eligible.
This proposal is to the same effect, therefore, as the proposal found
nonnegotiable in National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 1332
and Headquarters, U.S. Army Materiel Development Command, Alexandria,
Virginia, 3 FLRA 611 (1980). The proposal in that case would have
precluded the agency from hiring new employees of the requisite types,
at the requisite grades, and in the necessary numbers to meet changes in
the agency's mission requirements unless an exception was granted by a
joint labor-management board. The Authority held that the proposal
required negotiation on a matter which is directly and integrally
related to the numbers and types of employees to be employed, a matter
about which an agency may elect not to negotiate under section
7106(b)(1) of the Statute. Thus, based on U.S. Army Materiel
Development Command, the proposal in this case also is integrally
related to management's right under section 7106(b)(1) to determine the
numbers, types, and grades of employees to be assigned to an
organizational subdivision; that is, the National Office. Because the
Agency has elected not to bargain on Proposal 1, it is outside the
Agency's duty to bargain. The proposal is distinguishable from the
proposal found negotiable in National Treasury Employees Union and
Department of Energy, 24 FLRA No. 52 (1986) (Chairman Calhoun concurring
in the result). The proposal in that case would not have prevented the
agency from hiring additional employees from outside the unit when there
are no eligible employees within the unit.
Moreover, Proposal 1 requires that before management could even
contemplate filling vacancies in the National Office, either before or
after the effective date of a RRD, management would first be required to
place, that is, assign, all employees affected by the RRD. By thus
requiring management to place affected employees, the proposal directly
interferes with management's right under section 7106(a)(2)(A) to assign
employees in the agency. See American Federation of Government
Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 1858 and Department of the Army, U.S. Army
Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, 10 FLRA 440, 443-44 (1982).
In this circumstance, the proposal would condition the exercise of
management's right under section 7106(b)(1) to determine the numbers,
types, and grades of employees assigned to an organizational subdivision
on the prior exercise of its right under section 7106(a)(2)(A) to assign
employees. In so doing, Proposal 1 would interfere with those rights
both individually and collectively. See, for example, American
Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 12 and Department of
Labor, 18 FLRA No. 58 (1985) (Proposal 2).
Finally, if the proposal is also interpreted to require that
vacancies in the National Office be filled with employees affected by a
RRD, either before or after the effective date of a RIF, the proposal
would interfere with management's right under section 7106(a)(2)(C) of
the Statute to fill or not to fill positions and to select from any
appropriate source. Similarly, to the extent that the proposal would
apply outside the context of a RIF, the proposal is inconsistent with
Requirement 4 of Federal Personnel Manual, Chapter 335, Subchapter 1-4
because the proposal requires management to fill vacant positions
through reassignment of affected employees. The proposal dictates the
source from which the Agency must select candidates to fill those vacant
positions, in conflict with the discretion provided management under the
Government-wide regulation. Compare National Treasury Employees Union
and Department of Energy, 24 FLRA No. 52 (1986), slip op. at 4, with the
Decision and Order on Remand in American Federation of Government
Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 2782 and Department of Commerce, Bureau of the
Census, Washington, D.C., 14 FLRA 801 (1984), affirmed sub nom. AFGE,
Local 2782 v. FLRA, 803 F.2d 737 (1986).
2. Whether the Proposal is Negotiable as An "Appropriate
Arrangement" Under Section 7106(b)(3)
We find that Proposal 1 does not constitute an "appropriate
arrangement" within the meaning of section 7106(b)(3). To the extent
that the proposal would mitigate against the adverse effect on employees
of a RIF, or a reorganization or downgrading in the context of a RIF, by
requiring reassignment of all affected employees, it would completely
eliminate management's discretion as to whether to reassign those
employees, as well as its discretion to decide how many or which
employees to reassign, or whether the employees to be reassigned were
qualified for the vacant positions. In essence, therefore, this
proposal would completely abrogate management's right to assign
employees. Proposals which totally abrogate the exercise of a
management right excessively interfere with that right and do not
constitute "appropriate arrangements." See American Federation of
Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 3186 and Department of Health and
Human Services, Office of Social Security Field Operations, Philadelphia
Region, 23 FLRA No. 30 (1986) (Proposal 1); Federal Union of Scientists
and Engineers and Department of the Navy, Naval Underwater Systems
Center, 22 FLRA No. 83 (1986). To the extent that the proposal concerns
a reorganization or downgrading outside the context of a RIF, even if in
this respect it were found to be an "appropriate arrangement" under
section 7106(b)(3), it would nevertheless be barred by an applicable
Government-wide regulation. See Bureau of the Census, 14 FLRA 801
(1984).
C. Conclusion
For the reasons and cases discussed above, we conclude that Proposal
1 is outside the duty to bargain.
V. Proposal 2
Section 8: All personnel actions (new hires, transfers, etc.)
from June 30, 1983 on, shall be terminated. The employees shall
be returned to their previous employment status.
A. Position of the Agency
The Agency argues that Proposal 2 is nonnegotiable because it
interferes with management's rights to hire, assign and direct employees
under section 7106(a)(2) of the Statute.
B. Analysis and Conclusions
1. Effect of the Proposal on Management's Rights
This proposal would require the Agency to undue all hiring and
assignment actions taken after a specified date and reassign affected
employees to their previous positions. The proposal is nonnegotiable.
Just as management may not be prevented through negotiation from hiring
persons from outside the agency or from reassigning employees to
positions within the agency, National Treasury Employees Union and
Department of the Treasury, 21 FLRA No. 113 (1986) (assign), management
may not be required through negotiation to undo a hiring or assignment
action once that action has been taken. The substantive effect on
management's rights is the same in either case, namely, the negation of
the exercise of the right. Compare American Federation of Government
Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 1858 and Department of the Army, U.S. Army
Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, 10 FLRA 440, 443-44 (1982)
(proposal requiring management to hire or assign employees with
specified qualifications held inconsistent with management's rights to
hire and assign or to decide not to take such actions). By requiring
the reversal of hiring and assignment actions taken after a certain
date, Proposal 2 directly interferes with management's rights under
section 7106(a)(2)(A) to hire persons from outside the Agency and to
assign employees within the Agency.
2. Whether the Proposal is Negotiable as An Appropriate
Arrangement Under Section 7106(b)(3)
When read in conjunction with Proposal 1, Proposal 2 appears to be
intended to free up positions which had been filled after the specified
date so as to make them available during the proposed freeze for
reassignment of employees adversely affected by a RIF, reorganization or
downgrading. That is, the proposal seeks to mitigate against
foreseeable adverse effects on employees by creating vacant positions.
We find, therefore, that it is intended to be an "arrangement" for
employees adversely affected by management's decision to conduct a RIF,
to reorganize, or to downgrade employees.
As to whether Proposal 2 is an "appropriate" arrangement, in
attempting to undo previous management actions, it has an effect similar
to the proposal at issue in National Federation of Federal Employees,
Local 1945 and U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land
Management, 25 FLRA No. 55 (1987). In that case, the proposal required
the agency to reverse its decision to operate only one shift. We held
that because the proposal in that case would completely reverse the
substantive effect of a management decision under section 7106 it did
not constitute an appropriate arrangement under section 7106(b)(3). See
also National Association of Government Employees, Local R7-23 and
Department of the Air Force, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, 23 FLRA No.
97 (1986) (Proposal 3). Similarly, because Proposal 2 here would
completely reverse management's actions in hiring and assigning it is
not an "appropriate" arrangement within the meaning of section
7106(b))3) of the Statute. Proposal 2, therefore, is outside the
Agency's duty to bargain.
VI. Proposal 3
Section 9: Part-time positions shall be impacted at a
percentage rate equal to full time permanent positions.
A. Position of the Agency
The Agency asserts that Proposal 3 is nonnegotiable because it
conflicts with 5 C.F.R. Section 351.403(b)(4). The Agency also contends
that the proposal is nonnegotiable because it would affect the numbers
and types of positions assigned to an organizational unit and therefore
concerns a permissive subject of bargaining under section 7106(b)(1) of
the Statute, over which the Agency has elected not to bargain.
B. Analysis and Conclusions
1. Effect of the Proposal on Management's Rights
We find Proposal 3 to be nonnegotiable on a different ground from
those alleged by the Agency. Specifically, this proposal would require
the Agency to layoff a certain number of employees in order to assure
that, in the event of a RIF, reorganization or employee downgrading,
full-time positions are affected at a percentage rate equal to part-time
positions. This proposal is to the same effect as Proposal 8 in
American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 12 and
Department of Labor, 18 FLRA No. 58 (1985), requiring that "the
employee-supervisory ratio before the RIF will be maintained during and
following the RIF." In that case, the Authority held that the proposal
violated management's right under section 7106(a)(2)(A) of the Statute
to "layoff" employees because it would interfere with the agency's
discretion to determine which positions to abolish and which employees
to layoff. Proposal 3 in this case would, in like manner, interfere
with the Agency's discretion to determine which positions to abolish and
which employees to layoff.
2. Whether the Proposal is Negotiable as An "Appropriate
Arrangement" Under Section 7106(b) (3)
We find that Proposal 3 is intended to be an "arrangement" for
part-time employees who would be adversely affected, perhaps
disproportionately, by management's decision to conduct a RIF, to
reorganize, or to downgrade employees. The proposal would lessen the
impact of those actions on part-time employees by making them
proportional to the actions taken against full-time employees. The
proposal is not, however, an "appropriate" arrangement under section
7106(b)(3) because it would totally abrogate management's discretion as
to the elimination of part-time positions. We find, therefore, that
Proposal 3 excessively interferes with management's right to layoff
employees under section 7106(a)(2)(A) and is outside the Agency's duty
to bargain. Accordingly, we do not reach other arguments as to the
nonnegotiability of the proposal.
VII. Proposal 4
The FLRA Members disagree over the negotiability of this proposal.
The majority opinion on Proposal 4 is on page 13 of this decision;
Chairman Calhoun's dissent is on page 15.
VIII. Proposal 5
Section 11: The RRD shall not be run until at least 120 days
after providing Local 12 with the information request accompanying
these proposals.
A. Position of the Agency
The Agency argues that this proposal, by restricting the Agency's
ability to conduct a RIF and any subsequent organizational changes,
conflicts with management's right, under 7106(a)(2)(A) of the Statute,
to layoff and/or assign employees.
B. Analysis
Proposal 5 provides for a delay in implementing an RRD -- a RIF,
reorganization or employee downgrade -- until at least 120 days after
the Union is provided with "the information request accompanying these
proposals." The Union has not provided the Authority with a copy of, or
any information concerning, its "information request." Thus, we cannot
assess whether it is possible for the Agency to provide the information
sought. If the Union's request is for information which does not exist,
the RRD would be delayed indefinitely.
It is well established that the parties bear the burden of creating a
record upon which the Authority can make a negotiability determination.
National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 1167 v. Federal Labor
Relations Authority, 681 F.2d 886, 891 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aff'g National
Federation of Federal Employees, Local 1167 and Department of the Air
Force, Headquarters, 31st Combat Support Group (TAC), Homestead Air
Force Base, Florida, 6 FLRA 574 (1981). See also American Federation of
Government Employees, Local 12, AFL-CIO and Department of Labor, 17 FLRA
550 (1985). The Union in this case has not satisfied its burden of
creating a record upon which the Authority can make a negotiability
determination with respect to Proposal 5.
C. Conclusion
Because this proposal does not set forth sufficient information to
enable us to determine whether it is within the duty to bargain, the
petition for review as to the proposal must be dismissed. Accordingly,
it is unnecessary to consider the Agency's argument that Proposal 5
conflicts with management's right to assign or layoff employees under
section 7106(a)(2)(A) of the Statute. Nor do we need to consider
whether the proposal constitutes an "appropriate arrangement" within the
meaning of section 7106(b)(3).
IX. Proposal 6
Section 12: Employees accepting a lower-graded position in the
DOL, prior to, and after the effective date of the RRD, shall have
pay retention for 2 years.
A. Position of the Agency
The Agency argues that it does not have a duty to bargain over
Proposal 6 because grade and pay retention are covered by FPM Chapter
536, which was incorporated into the parties' collective bargaining
agreement.
B. Analysis and Conclusion
Proposal 6 would require the Agency to provide pay retention for 2
years to employees who, either before or after the RRD, voluntarily
accept a lower-graded position. By its terms, the proposal therefore
would require the Agency to provide pay retention in all circumstances
where an employee voluntarily accepts a lower graded position. In this
regard, we note that 5 U.S.C. Section 5363(c), which governs pay
retention in the Federal service, sets out several exceptions to the
blanket granting of pay retention to Federal employees. /1/ There is no
indication in the record, nor is it otherwise apparent, that the Union
intended to incorporate by reference the statutory exceptions.
Consequently, by requiring pay retention for employees in all
circumstances where the employee voluntarily accepts a lower-graded
position, including circumstances specifically prohibited by statute,
Proposal 6 conflicts with 5 U.S.C. Section 5363(c) and is outside the
duty to bargain under section 7117(a)(1) of the Statute. Moreover,
because we find that Proposal 6 is inconsistent with law, we do not need
to decide whether it would constitute an "appropriate arrangement"
within the meaning of section 7106(b)(3) of the Statute. See National
Federation of Federal Employees, Local 29 and Department of the Army,
Kansas City District, Corps of Engineers, 21 FLRA No. 31 (1986).
X. Proposal 7
Section 13: Employees receiving specific RIF notices will not
be separated or downgraded for at least 30 work days from the date
or receipt of the specific notice.
A. Position of the Agency
According to the Agency, Proposal 7 directly conflicts with the
notice provision of an Agency regulation, DOL Supplement to FPM 351,
Appendix F, which had been bargained on and incorporated into the
parties' Agreement.
B. Analysis
The Agency contends that Proposal 7 concerns matters relating to
notice periods in a RIF which are covered by the parties' Agreement and
that management has proposed no mid-term changes which exceed the scope
of the Agreement. As stated in section II of this decision, the record
does not substantiate the Agency's assertions. To the extent that there
are factual issues in dispute between the parties concerning the duty to
bargain in the specific circumstances of this case, such issues should
be resolved in other appropriate proceedings. Although the Agency
references its own regulation in its Statement of Position at page 6,
that reference does not appear to include a claim that there is a
compelling need for that regulation. Rather, the Agency simply uses the
reference to support its contention that the subject matter of this
proposal has already been bargained and incorporated into the parties'
Agreement. Therefore, since the Agency has made no claim that Proposal
7 is inconsistent with law -- including the management rights provisions
of the Statute -- or applicable rule or regulation, and no such
inconsistency is otherwise apparent, the proposal is negotiable.
Because there is no basis for finding that the proposal interferes with
management's rights, we do not reach the question of whether it would
constitute an "appropriate arrangement" under section 7106(b)(3).
C. Conclusion
For the reasons stated in the foregoing analysis, Proposal 7 is
within the duty to bargain.
XI. Order
The Union's petition for review as it relates to Proposals 1, 2, 3, 5
and 6 is dismissed. The Agency must upon request (or as otherwise
agreed to by the parties) bargain concerning Proposal 7. /2/
Issued, Washington, D.C., February 27, 1987.
/s/ Jerry L. Calhoun, Chairman
/s/ Henry B. Frazier III, Member
/s/ Jean McKee, Member
FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY
DECISION AND ORDER ON PROPOSAL 4
Proposal 4
Section 10: DOL shall not contract out any current or future
ETA functions, where positions in those functions are to be
abolished or downgraded, for one year after the effective date of
the RRD.
A. Position of the Agency
The Agency contends that Proposal 4 is nonnegotiable because it
directly conflicts with management's right under section 7106(a)(2)(B)
of the Statute to make determinations with respect to contracting out.
B. Analysis and Conclusions
Proposal 4 reflects the Union's attempt to negotiate for a delay in
the Agency's implementation of certain contracting out actions. The
Union seeks to delay the actual contracting out of functions affected by
a RIF, reorganization, or downgrading. The Agency has not presented
anything to indicate the nature of the proposal's effect on the Agency's
operations.
This proposal does not impose any substantive criteria on
management's exercise of its rights to contract out, nor does it prevent
the Agency from contracting out. The Agency retains full discretion to
take any actions it deems necessary in connection with a determination
to contract out under section 7106(a)(2)(B), and to implement such a
determination once the negotiated delay period has passed. Consistent
with established Authority precedent, such a proposal is negotiable
under section 7106(b)(2) because it delays but does not prevent
management from acting at all to exercise its rights. See, for example,
National Treasury Employees Union and Department of Energy, 24 FLRA No.
52 (1986); American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local
2736 and Department of the Air Force, Headquarters 379th Combat Support
Group (SAC), Wurtsmith Air Force Base, Michigan, 14 FLRA 302 (1984)
(Proposal 3); National Treasury Employees Union and U.S. Customs
Service, Region VIII, San Francisco, California, 2 FLRA 255, 261-62
(1979), and cases cited therein. Consequently, we do not need to reach
the question of whether this proposal constitutes an "appropriate
arrangement" within the meaning of section 7106(b)(3) of the Statute.
C. Order
The Agency must upon request, or as otherwise agreed to by the
parties, bargain on Proposal 4. /3/
Issued, Washington, D.C., February 27, 1987.
/s/ Henry B. Frazier III, Member
/s/ Jean McKee, Member
FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY
--------------- FOOTNOTES$ ---------------
(1) 5 U.S.C. Section 5363(c) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(c) The preceding provisions of this section shall cease to
apply to an employee who --
(1) has a break in service of one workday or more;
(2) is entitled by operation of this subchapter or chapter 51,
53, or 54 of this title to a rate of basic pay which is equal to
or higher than, or declines a reasonable offer of a position the
rate of basic pay for which is equal to or higher than, the rate
to which the employee is entitled under this section; or
(3) is demoted for personal cause or at the employee's request.
(2) In deciding that Proposal 7 is within the duty to bargain, we
make no judgment as to its merits.
(3) In finding the proposal to be within the duty to bargain, we make
no judgment as to its merits.
Dissenting Opinion of Chairman Calhoun
For the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in National
Treasury Employees Union and Department of the Treasury, 24 FLRA No. 54
(1986), I would find that Proposal 4 substantively infringes on
management's right to contract out because it precludes management from
determining when it must contract out in order to be able to function in
an efficient and effective manner. Moreover, I would not find this
proposal to be an "appropriate arrangement" under section 7106(b)(3) of
the Statute because the burden imposed on management by the year-long
suspension of its right to contract out outweighs any benefits to
employees provided by this proposal. In my view, Proposal 4 is outside
the Agency's duty to bargain.
Issued, Washington, D.C., February 27, 1987.
/s/ Jerry L. Calhoun, Chairman