[ v01 p817 ]
01:0817(92)AS
The decision of the Authority follows:
1 FLRA No. 92 JULY 31, 1979 MR. ANTHONY D'AMATO DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20224 RE: INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, SOUTH CAROLINA DISTRICT, A/SLMR No. 1172, Case No. 0-AS-7 DEAR MR. D'AMATO: THE AUTHORITY HAS CAREFULLY CONSIDERED YOUR PETITION FOR REVIEW AND REQUEST FOR A STAY OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY'S DECISION, AND THE UNION'S OPPOSITION THERETO, IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CASE. IN THIS CASE, THE NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION (THE UNION) FILED AN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE COMPLAINT ALLEGING, IN SUBSTANCE, THAT THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, SOUTH CAROLINA DISTRICT (THE ACTIVITY) VIOLATED SECTION 19()(1) AND (6) OF THE ORDER WHEN IT INTERVIEWED A BARGAINING UNIT EMPLOYEE, WHO WAS A POTENTIAL WITNESS IN AN UPCOMING ARBITRATION HEARING, WITHOUT AFFORDING THE EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATIVE NOTIFICATION OF THE INTERVIEW AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE PRESENT. AS FOUND BY THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY, THE ACTIVITY'S ATTORNEY INTERVIEWED THE UNIT EMPLOYEE APPROXIMATELY 1 WEEK PRIOR TO THE ARBITRATION HEARING. THE INTERVIEW TOOK PLACE IN THE GROUP MANAGER'S OFFICE IN THE PRESENCE OF THE ACTIVITY'S CHIEF OF PERSONNEL. THE ATTORNEY QUESTIONED THE EMPLOYEE CONCERNING HIS KNOWLEDGE OF, AND INVOLVEMENT IN, THE EVENTS WHICH PRECIPITATED THE GRIEVANCE AT ISSUE IN THE ARBITRATION HEARING. THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOUND THAT THE ACTIVITY VIOLATED SECTION 19(A)(1) AND (6) OF THE ORDER IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE. IN SO FINDING, HE STATED: IN MY VIEW, WHEN AN EMPLOYEE WHO IS A MEMBER OF THE BARGAINING UNIT AT ALL TIMES MATERIAL TO A PENDING GRIEVANCE IS INTERVIEWED BY MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES CONCERNING THE EVENTS SURROUNDING THE GRIEVANCE, (S)ECTION 10(E) OF THE ORDER GRANTS THE EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATIVE THE RIGHT TO BE REPRESENTED AT SUCH A FORMAL DISCUSSION. AS THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY STATED IN THE MCCLELLAN CASE (UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, MCCLELLAN AIR FORCE BASE, CALIFORNIA, A/SLMR 830 (APR. 21, 1977), REVIEW DENIED, 5 FLRC 866 (FLRC 77A-56 (AUG. 31, 1977), REPORT ON. 136)), . . . AN EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATIVE HAS A LEGITIMATE INTEREST IN BEING REPRESENTED AT THE INTERVIEWS OF UNIT EMPLOYEES CONDUCTED BY MANAGEMENT IN CONNECTION WITH THE PROCESSING OF A PENDING GRIEVANCE, AND THE REPRESENTATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES CONFERRED BY (S)ECTION 10(E) OF THE ORDER IN THIS REGARD OUTWEIGH ANY IMPACT ITS PRESENCE MIGHT HAVE ON MANAGEMENT'S PREPARATION OF ITS CASE FOR ARBITRATION. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, I CONCLUDE THAT BY FAILING TO AFFORD THE (UNION) AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE REPRESENTED AT THE INTERVIEW OF (THE UNIT) EMPLOYEE . . ., THE (ACTIVITY) VIOLATED (S)ECTION 19(A)(1) AND (6) OF THE ORDER. IN THE AGENCY'S PETITION FOR REVIEW, IT IS ALLEGED THAT THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY'S DECISION PRESENTS THE FOLLOWING MAJOR POLICY ISSUES: (1) "IS THERE A PER SE VIOLATION OF SECTION 19(A)(6) OF THE ORDER . . . WHENEVER AN AGENCY ATTORNEY/REPRESENTATIVE INTERVIEWS BARGAINING UNIT EMPLOYEES IN PREPARATION FOR AN ARBITRATION HEARING WITHOUT AFFORDING THE EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATIVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE PRESENT?" AND (2) "UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES IS AN AGENCY REQUIRED TO PROVIDE AN EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATIVE WITH THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE PRESENT WHEN IT CONDUCTS FACT-GATHERING INTERVIEWS WITH BARGAINING UNIT EMPLOYEES?" IT IS ALSO CONTENDED THAT THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY'S ADOPTION OF A "PER SE APPROACH" IN THE INSTANT CASE IS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS. AS TO ALL OF THE FOREGOING ALLEGATIONS, IT IS ASSERTED, MORE PARTICULARLY, THAT THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY VIOLATED COUNCIL PRECEDENT /1/ AND PRIVATE SECTOR PRINCIPLES BY ESTABLISHING A PER SE RULE WITH REGARD TO FACT-GATHERING INTERVIEWS. IN THE AUTHORITY'S OPINION, THE PETITION FOR REVIEW DOES NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 2400.2 OF THE AUTHORITY'S TRANSITION RULES WHICH INCORPORATES BY REFERENCE SECTION 2411.12 OF THE COUNCIL'S RULES. THAT IS, THE DECISION OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY DOES NOT APPEAR ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS OR PRESENT ANY MAJOR POLICY ISSUES WARRANTING AUTHORITY REVIEW. AS TO THE ALLEGATION THAT THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY'S DECISION IS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS, IT DOES NOT APPEAR THAT THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY ACTED WITHOUT REASONABLE JUSTIFICATION IN REACHING HIS DECISION. AS TO THE ALLEGED MAJOR POLICY ISSUE WITH RESPECT TO WHETHER THERE IS A "PER SE" VIOLATION OF THE ORDER WHEN UNIT EMPLOYEES ARE INTERVIEWED IN PREPARATION FOR AN ARBITRATION HEARING WITHOUT AFFORDING THE EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATIVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE PRESENT, IN THE AUTHORITY'S VIEW NO MAJOR POLICY ISSUE WARRANTING REVIEW IS PRESENTED IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE. THE AUTHORITY NOTES IN THIS REGARD THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY'S DETERMINATION OF THE UNION'S OPPORTUNITY TO BE PRESENT IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE WAS BASED ON A CONCLUSION THAT THE DISCUSSIONS IN QUESTION WERE "FORMAL DISCUSSIONS" WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION 10(E) OF THE ORDER. YOUR ASSERTIONS TO THE CONTRARY CONSTITUTE ESSENTIALLY DISAGREEMENT WITH THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY'S CONCLUSION THAT THE DISCUSSIONS WERE "FORMAL" AND THEREFORE PROVIDE NO BASIS FOR REVIEW. SIMILARLY NO MAJOR POLICY ISSUE WARRANTING REVIEW IS PRESENTED CONCERNING THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH THE EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATIVE IS ENTITLED TO AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE PRESENT, NOTING IN THIS REGARD THAT SECTION 10(E) REQUIRES SUCH OPPORTUNITY "AT FORMAL DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN MANAGEMENT AND EMPLOYEES OR EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES CONCERNING GRIEVANCES." FURTHER, YOUR APPEAL FAILS TO CONTAIN ANY BASIS TO SUPPORT THE CONTENTION THAT THE DECISION IS INCONSISTENT EITHER WITH APPLICABLE PRECEDENT OR THE PURPOSES AND POLICIES OF THE ORDER, BUT AGAIN CONSTITUTES NO MORE THAN MERE DISAGREEMENT WITH THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY'S FINDING THAT THE ACTIVITY VIOLATED SECTION 19(A)(1) AND (6) OF THE ORDER IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE. /2/ SINCE THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY'S DECISION DOES NOT APPEAR ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS OR PRESENT ANY MAJOR POLICY ISSUES, THE APPEAL FAILS TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS FOR REVIEW AS SET FORTH IN SECTION 2400.2 OF THE AUTHORITY'S TRANSITION RULES OF PROCEDURE WHICH INCORPORATES BY REFERENCE SECTION 2411.12 OF THE COUNCIL'S RULES. ACCORDINGLY, THE PETITION FOR REVIEW IS HEREBY DENIED. THE REQUEST FOR A STAY IS ALSO DENIED. /3/ RONALD W. HAUGHTON, CHAIRMAN HENRY B. FRAZIER III, MEMBER CC: K. POOLE NTEU /1/ THE COUNCIL'S STATEMENT ON MAJOR POLICY ISSUE, 4 FLRC 709 (FLRC 75P-2 (DEC. 2, 1976), REPORT NO. 116), AND ITS MCCLELLAN DECISION (SUPRA P. 2), ARE PRINCIPALLY RELIED UPON IN THIS REGARD. /2/ IN SO CONCLUDING, THE AUTHORITY DOES NOT CONSTRUE THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY'S DECISION AS ESTABLISHING A PER SE RULE HEREIN. RATHER, AS PREVIOUSLY STATED, THE AUTHORITY DECIDES ONLY THAT THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY'S FINDING THAT THE AGENCY VIOLATED SECTION 19(A)(1) AND (6) OF THE ORDER, IN THE PARTICULAR FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE, NEITHER APPEARS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS NOR PRESENTS ANY MAJOR POLICY ISSUE WARRANTING REVIEW. /3/ IN CONFORMITY WITH SECTION 902(B) OF THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM ACT OF 1978 (92 STAT. 1224), THE INSTANT CASE WAS DECIDED SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF E.O. 11491, AS AMENDED, AND AS IF THE NEW FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS STATUTE (92 STAT. 1191) HAD NOT BEEN ENACTED. THE DECISION DOES NOT PREJUDGE IN ANY MANNER EITHER THE MEANING OR APPLICATION OF RELATED PROVISIONS IN THE NEW STATUTE OR THE RESULT WHICH WOULD BE REACHED BY THE AUTHORITY IF THE CASE HAD ARISEN UNDER THE STATUTE RATHER THAN THE ORDER.