[ v01 p147 ]
01:0147(16)CA
The decision of the Authority follows:
1 FLRA No. 16 APRIL 9, 1979 MR. BILL LOFTIS PRESIDENT AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO 300 SOUTH WACKER DRIVE CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60606 RE: DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM STAFF, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, A/SLMR No. 1128, FLRC No. 78A-152 DEAR MR. LOFTIS: THE AUTHORITY HAS CAREFULLY CONSIDERED YOUR PETITION FOR REVIEW OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY'S DECISION IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CASE. IN THIS CASE, AS FOUND BY THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 3400 (THE UNION) FILED AN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE COMPLAINT AGAINST THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM STAFF, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS (THE ACTIVITY). THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED THAT THE ACTIVITY VIOLATED SECTION 19(A)(1) OF THE ORDER BY ENGAGING IN DILATORY TACTICS IN THE PROCESSING OF A GRIEVANCE. THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE (ALJ) CONCLUDED THAT, IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE, THE ACTIVITY'S REFUSAL TO PROCESS A GRIEVANCE BEYOND THE SECOND STEP OF THE PARTIES' NEGOTIATED GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE, PENDING COMPLETION OF A RELATED EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY (EEO) PROCEEDING, DID NOT CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF SECTION 19(A)(1) OF THE ORDER. THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY, IN AGREEMENT WITH THE ALJ, FOUND THAT THE ACTIVITY'S CONDUCT WAS NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE ORDER AND ORDERED THAT THE COMPLAINT BE DISMISSED. IN SO CONCLUDING, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY STATED: IN THIS REGARD, IT IS NOTED PARTICULARLY THAT AT ALL TIMES MATERIAL THE (ACTIVITY) HAD INDICATED ITS WILLINGNESS TO PROCEED WITH THE GRIEVANCE ONCE THE EEO MATTER HAD BEEN RESOLVED. MOREOVER, UPON BECOMING AWARE THAT NO FURTHER USE OF THE EEO PROCEDURES WAS CONTEMPLATED, THE (ACTIVITY) INDICATED ITS WILLINGNESS TO RESUME CONSIDERATION OF THE MATTER UNDER THE NEGOTIATED GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE, AND TO PROCEED TO ARBITRATION IF THE (UNION) SO DESIRED. IN THE UNION'S PETITION FOR REVIEW, IT IS CONTENDED THAT THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY'S DECISION PRESENTS TWO MAJOR POLICY ISSUES: (1) "WHETHER THE MEASUREMENT OF THE (A)GENCY'S BEHAVIOR IN TERMS OF SUBJECTIVE GOOD FAITH IN THIS PARTICULAR TYPE OF CASE IS CONSISTENT WITH THE INTENT AND PURPOSE OF THE EXECUTIVE ORDER"; AND (2) "THE DECISION PERMITS THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY TO ACT OUTSIDE OF HIS AUTHORITY BY REGULATING THE SUBSTANTIVE TERMS OF A (N)EGOTIATED (A)AGREEMENT." WITH REGARD TO THE FIRST ALLEGED MAJOR POLICY ISSUE, IT IS CONTENDED THAT A UNILATERAL CHANGE IN THE NEGOTIATED PROCEDURE WHERE THE INHERENT EFFECT IS TO INTERFERE WITH RIGHTS GRANTED BY THE ORDER WAS A PER SE VIOLATION OF THE ORDER REGARDLESS OF THE ACTIVITY'S GOOD FAITH. IN CONNECTION WITH THE SECOND ALLEGED MAJOR POLICY ISSUE, IT IS ASSERTED THAT THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY IN EFFECT CHANGED THE SUBSTANTIVE TERMS OF THE PARTIES' AGREEMENT BY PERMITTING THE AGENCY, CONTRARY TO THE NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT, TO HOLD A GRIEVANCE IN ABEYANCE RATHER THAN PERMITTING A GRIEVANCE AND AN EEO ACTION TO PROCEED SIMULTANEOUSLY. IN THE AUTHORITY'S OPINION, YOUR PETITION FOR REVIEW DOES NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 2400.2 OF THE AUTHORITY'S TRANSITION RULES AND REGULATIONS WHICH INCORPORATES BY REFERENCE SECTION 2411.12 OF THE COUNCIL'S RULES. THAT IS, IT DOES NOT APPEAR THAT THE DECISION OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY PRESENTS ANY MAJOR POLICY ISSUES, AND YOU NEITHER ALLEGE, NOR DOES IT APPEAR, THAT THE DECISION WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS. THUS, AS TO THE FIRST ALLEGED MAJOR POLICY ISSUE, TO THE EFFECT THAT THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY'S DECISION ALLOWING THE AGENCY'S BEHAVIOR TO BE MEASURED IN TERMS OF SUBJECTIVE GOOD FAITH IN THIS PARTICULAR TYPE OF CASE IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE INTENT AND PURPOSES OF THE EXECUTIVE ORDER, THE APPEAL FAILS TO PROVIDE ANY BASIS TO SUPPORT A CONTENTION THAT THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY'S DECISION IS IN ANY MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES AND POLICIES OF THE ORDER. RATHER, SUCH ASSERTION AMOUNTS TO ESSENTIALLY A MERE DISAGREEMENT, WITH THE ASSISTANT ASECRETARY'S DETERMINATION THAT THE ACTIVITY'S CONDUCT DID NOT VIOLATE THE ORDER IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE AND THEREFORE PRESENTS NO BASIS FOR REVIEW. SIMILARLY, AS TO THE SECOND ALLEGED MAJOR POLICY ISSUE THAT THE DECISION OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY PERMITS HIM TO ACT OUTSIDE HIS AUTHORITY BY REGULATING THE SUBSTANTIVE TERMS OF THE PARTIES' AGREEMENT, NO BASIS FOR AUTHORITY REVIEW IS PRESENTED. IN THIS REGARD, THE APPEAL ONCE AGAIN FAILS TO PROVIDE ANY BASIS TO SUPPORT AN ALLEGATION THAT THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY'S DECISION IN EFFECT CHANGED THE SUBSTANTIVE TERMS OF THE PARTIES' AGREEMENT BY PERMITTING THE AGENCY TO HOLD A GRIEVANCE ABEYANCE. RATHER, AS PREVIOUSLY NOTED, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOUND THAT THE ACTIVITY "AT ALL TIMES . . . INDICATED ITS WILLINGNESS TO PROCEED WITH THE GRIEVANCE ONCE THE EEO MATTER HAD BEEN RESOLVED" AND, UPON DISCOVERING THAT NO FURTHER USE OF THE EEO PROCEDURES WAS CONTEMPLATED, "TO PROCEED TO ARBITRATION IF THE (UNION) SO DESIRED." SEE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, MILWAUKEE DISTRICT OFFICE, MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY CASE NO. 51-3911(CA), FLRC 77A-135 (MAR. 21, 1978), REPORT NO. 148. SINCE THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY'S DECISION DOES NOT PRESENT A MAJOR POLICY ISSUE AND YOU NEITHER ALLEGE, NOR DOES IT APPEAR, THAT HIS DECISION IS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS, YOUR APPEAL FAILS TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS FOR REVIEW AS SET FORTH IN SECTION 2400.2 OF THE AUTHORITY'S TRANSITION RULES OF PROCEDURE WHICH INCORPORATES BY REFERENCE SECTION 2411.12 OF THE COUNCIL'S RULES. ACCORDINGLY, REVIEW OF YOUR APPEAL IS HEREBY DENIED. /1/ RONALD W. HAUGHTON, CHAIRMAN HENRY B. FRAZIER III, MEMBER CC: C.COHEN DHEW /1/ IN CONFORMITY WITH SECTION 902(B) OF THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM ACT OF 1978 (92 STAT. 1224), THE INSTANT CASE WAS DECIDED SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF E.O. 11491, AS AMENDED, AND AS IF THE NEW FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS STATUTE (92 STAT. 1191) HAD NOT BEEN ENACTED. THE DECISION DOES NOT PREJUDGE IN ANY MANNER EITHER THE MEANING OR APPLICATION OF RELATED PROVISIONS IN THE NEW STATUTE OR THE RESULT WHICH WOULD BE REACHED BY THE AUTHORITY IF THE CASE HAD ARISEN UNDER THE STATUTE RATHER THAN THE ORDER.